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ARTICLES
AMBITION'S PLAYGROUND
Paul E. McGrea"
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."
- The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison)
A MBITION was an essential ingredient in James Madison's
prescription for good government. The sentence above describes
the system of constitutional government Americans have inherited
from Madison's generation. Day in and day out, four combatants-
the three branches of the federal government and the People-duke it
out in the prescribed arena known as the American system of checks
and balances. Each combatant's ambition-their desire for public or
private power and for satisfaction of personal wants or needs-puts
them on guard against actions of the others. If any combatant tries to
grab power at the expense of another, the others are constitutionally
armed to defend themselves. It is in the fire of this furnace, not in the
ether of academic theory, that the Constitution's meaning is forged.
Yet, constitutional scholars from such varied positions as Laurence
Tribe' and Robert Bork2 have, at one time or another, joined the hunt
for a grand theory of constitutional law. Like the elusive Grand
Unifying Theory sought by physicists,3 a grand theory of constitutional
law would ideally organize and discipline constitutional adjudication,
and would explain and justify all constitutional results that like-
minded members of the community of constitutional lawyers deem
* Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law <pmcgreal@stcl.edu>. I
would like to thank William Van Alstyne, Bruce Burton, Lackland Bloom, Karen
Conway, Val Ricks, and Kevin Yamamoto for their helpful comments on prior drafts
of this article, as well as Kamy Schiffman for her research assistance and keen editing.
I also received crucial research support from Monica Ortale and the staff at the South
Texas College of Law library.
1. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law vii (2d ed. 1988)
(preface begins with: "This treatise ventures a unified analysis of constitutional law.").
2. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 Ind. LJ. 1, 1 (1971).
3. See Stephen W. Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to
Black Holes 74-79 (1988).
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correct.4 Many grand theorists argue that their own theories have
strong claim to legitimacy because they are either most consistent with
or required by the Constitution.' Admittedly, this is a tall order for
any such theory,6 and no author has yet made a persuasive claim to
have created a grand theory that does so.
This Article takes a contrary view: The Constitution does not
require or prefer any particular theory of constitutional
interpretation.7 Indeed, a rejection of grand constitutional theory can
be inferred from aspects of the Constitution's structure and history.
4. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 201, 206
(1993) (describing "unified theory" of constitutional law as "any theory of
constitutional law that attempts to unite, in some fashion, the two great domains of
constitutional law, the system of rights and the system of structure"); see also Richard
A. Posner, Overcoming Law 171-97 (1995). Judge Posner refers to such a theory as
"top-down" legal reasoning, which he describes as follows:
In reasoning from the top down, the judge or other legal analyst invents or
adopts a theory about an area of law-perhaps about all law-and uses it to
organize, criticize, accept or reject, explain or explain away, distinguish or
amplify the decided cases to make them conform to the theory and generate
an outcome in each new case as it arises that will be consistent with the
theory and with the cases accepted as authoritative within the theory.
Id. at 172. For other views on constitutional theory, see generally Michael C. Dorf,
Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 593 (1999) (setting forth his
idea that constitutional theories emerge from contextual judgments about particular
cases), and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L.
Rev. 535 (1999) (arguing that, in addition to being based on the text of the
Constitution and its surrounding practice, theory should maintain the rule of law,
preserve fair opportunity for political democracy and protect an acceptable set of
rights).
5. For example, Robert Bork has argued that we must search for the "correct"
way to interpret the Constitution, or at least a method that yields "outcomes that can
be called correct" in the large run of cases. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of
America: The Political Seduction of the Law 140-41 (1990).
6. See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1998) ("No method of constitutional interpretation will yield easy or
certain answers; it is proper for us to be wary of any theory that purports to suggest
otherwise."); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 Tex. L.
Rev. 1753, 1766 (1994) ("What theory could possibly provide a persuasive and
coherent rationale for the entire body of American constitutional law as well as
provide persuasive guidance for all future cases?"); see also Posner, supra note 4, at
186-87 ("A comprehensive theory of constitutional law will infringe a multitude of
deeply held commitments without being supportable by decisive arguments.").
7. As some have commented, the view set forth above could be called a form of
grand theory. My response is that the approach offered in this Article is not a grand
theory of constitutional law in the sense used above. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text. The phrase "grand theory of constitutional law" has two
important parts. First, as described above, a grand theory of constitutional law seeks a
method or approach that directs the decision of particular cases. Ideally, the theory
could be used to reach specific outcomes in specific cases, and the theory's
proponents would criticize judges who deviate from the chosen method or approach.
Second, also as described above, a grand theory of constitutional law seeks to show
how the author's particular theory is either required by or most consistent with the
Constitution and its history, text, structure, etc.
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To be clear, my argument is not that the framers, ratifiers, or other
founding decision-makers specifically rejected grand constitutional
theory; they likely never considered the point.8 Rather, working from
the government structure the framers established, their expressed
understanding of certain institutions (for example, the qualifications
and role of federal judges), and an understanding of law and legal
reasoning, we can infer that the Constitution neither requires nor
supports the quest for a grand theory of constitutional law.
Without a grand theory to guide them, how are judges to decide
constitutional cases? The answer ies in a careful review of the
Constitution's delicate system of interlocking powers: the system of
checks and balances. This system, properly understood, merely
anticipates that federal judges will fight for survival. Federal judges
are in the position of the youngest son in a parable related by
philosophy Professor Max Black.9 Of three siblings, the youngest son
is neither faster nor stronger than his two brothers. If the youngest
son is to defeat his two brothers in any contest, then he must rely on
his analytical and psychological skills to outsmart them. He must
always be at the ready to anticipate their moves and outfox them.
In our system of checks and balances, the judiciary plays the role of
Professor Black's youngest son. Having neither the power of the
purse nor the power of the sword, the federal courts must enlist the
respect and aid of Congress and the President, as well as the
acceptance (or tolerance) of the People, if their judgments are to have
any effect." Judges must explain their decisions, including
constitutional decisions, in a way that engenders support by, and not a
retaliatory check from, the other branches of government or the
People." This need for support pressures courts to settle on an
8. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 948 (1985). Indeed, this Article proceeds aware of Professor
Martin Flaherty's warning about amateur historians misusing historical materials. See
Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum.
L. Rev. 523, 563 (1995). Professor Rebecca Brown, however, has offered a concise
statement of the role of history in constructing a current understanding of American
constitutional government:
It is simply impossible in the course of an article of this scope to provide
complete context on all issues relevant to the Framers' philosophy .... Nor
would doing so, in my view, necessarily resolve any questions about how to
understand those issues today. What I do hope to achieve by reference to
historical accounts is the development of a plausible model by which to
understand the constitutional system and aspirations that we have.
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L Rev.
531, 536 n.17 (1998) (citations omitted).
9. See Max Black, Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Logic and the Scientific
Method 12 (2d ed. 1952).
10. See The Federalist No. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text.
11. As others have done, I use "the People" as a proper noun referring
collectively to those people in the United States to whom the various bodies of
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acceptable interpretive method, or at least acceptable solutions to
individual cases.12  It is this pressure, not some specific method or
grand theory, that the Constitution envisioned. The search for some
overarching, legitimating theory or method of interpretation is a
chimera.1 3
This Article develops its thesis in three parts. Part I begins by
analyzing constitutional structure and history in light of one of a
federal judge's most contentious tasks-judicial review of
constitutional questions. Many myths surround the debate about
judicial review, such as the beliefs that judicial review means judicial
supremacy or that judicial review is out-of-place in our primarily
majoritarian government. These myths serve as a springboard for the
discussion of checks and balances.
The most persistent myth surrounding judicial review, and thus the
myth that occupies most of Part I, is the "counter-majoritarian
difficulty."14 This myth has two parts: judicial review is "counter-
majoritarian" because judges are not accountable to electoral
majorities, and this presents a "difficulty" because American
government prefers democratic, majority-based decision-making.
American government are accountable. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations 6 (1991); Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme
Court's Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People Can
Understand 5 (1992). The phrase invokes the Preamble to the Constitution, which
notes that ultimate sovereignty in the United States is lodged in the People. U.S.
Const. preamble ("WE THE PEOPLE of the United States... do ordain and
establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America."). Of course, who
is included in "the People" has expanded over time. See Richard B. Morris, The
Forging of the Union: 1781-1789, at 173 (1987) ("The original Constitution we now
recognize to have been basically a document of governance for free white propertied
adult males.").
12. Professor Cass Sunstein's work on what he calls incompletely theorized
agreements shows how judges who disagree on either constitutional method or theory
can nonetheless agree on holdings and rationales in particular cases. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 37 (1996) ("When people diverge on
some (relatively) high-level proposition, they might be able to agree when they lower
the level of abstraction.").
13. Others have argued that constitutional scholars ought to abandon the search
for a grand theory of constitutional law. See Posner, supra note 4, at 171-72; Lawrence
Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: What a Constitutional Theory
Should Be, 85 Geo. L.J. 1837, 1837-39 (1997). Most notably, Professor Philip
Bobbitt's influential works have urged that we abandon the quest for a normative
justification respecting one interpretive methodology or another. See generally Philip
Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Interpretation];
Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (1982) [hereinafter
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate]. Instead, when it comes to constitutional law, to
paraphrase a popular commercial slogan, we ought to "just do it." Professor Akhil
Amar has expressed a similar attitude toward constitutional interpretation. See Akhil
Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1657, 1662 (1997).
14. See infra notes 68-234 and accompanying text. This myth, partly because of its
pedigree and entrenchment in current constitutional thought, is the most difficult to
dispel.
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Proponents of the counter-majoritarian difficulty suggest that judges
defer to the accountable branches of government on constitutional
questions. The counter-majoritarian difficulty assumes that the
Constitution prefers ordinary law-making'5 by accountable legislatures
over prevention of ordinary law-making by judges exercising judicial
review. Part I explains the Constitution's structure and history,
concluding that the framers had experienced democracy run amok in
their state legislatures and were suspicious of ordinary democratic
lawmaking. Under the Constitution's system of checks and balances,
law-making was to be difficult and, consequently, rare.16 Within this
system, federal courts were to be co-equal partners with Congress and
the President in interpreting the Constitution, providing an essential
check on federal governmental power. Further, judicial deference to
the accountable branches is unnecessary: just as the judiciary may
check the other branches, the other branches may check the judiciary.
In order to avoid a check on its authority, the judiciary may defer to
Congress and the President in certain cases, but it should do so only to
preserve it authority, and not as a general principle of constitutional
interpretation.
Part II explains that the checks and balances theory of judicial
review, with its corollary of robust judicial review, reflects the best
understanding of constitutional law's hoariest chestnut-Marbury v.
Madison.'7 The discussion also explains how the checks-and-balances
approach to robust judicial review sheds new light on Marbury, the
fount of judicial review.
Part III explains the implications of the checks-and-balances
approach for theories and methods of constitutional interpretation.
Judges will tend toward methods of argument that will maintain (or
enhance) their power within the system of checks and balances and
will avoid a retaliatory check by the other branches. Thus, while the
system of checks and balances anticipates a need for reasoned
interpretation, it does not require or prefer any specific theory or
method of doing so. Historical sources show that many framers
believed federal judges would have the skill and training of lawyers,
and, thus, that those judges would "do law"'8 while on the bench.
15. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 6-7 (explaining dualist conception of
democracy that distinguishes between ordinary and higher law-making). Ordinary
law-making is to be distinguished from fundamental law-making. Fundamental law is
that law which creates and organizes a society's legal system, like a constitution.
Conversely, ordinary law is that law which is made pursuant to the fundamental law,
like statutes. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 218-29 and accompanying text.
17. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
18. As will be discussed later, the phrase "do law" refers to the idea that legal
method is best described as the set of practices that lawyers, judges, academics, and
other legal actors use in their professional work. See Victoria F. Nourse, Making
Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist Age, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1401, 1405 (1997) (stating
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While the Constitution does not envision any particular method or
theory of interpretation, it does anticipate that judges will do law as
that practice is defined at any given time; grand constitutional theory
is inconsistent with the Constitution's design.
Constitutional scholars can play an important role within this
system of checks and balances. Scholars can critique the courts' work
as attempts at doing law and try to better understand how judges do,
in practice, decide cases and make law. We can also marshal
empirical data that might be necessary to assess the efficacy of court
decisions.19 Also, as legal scholars have done throughout history, we
can critique the various methods of law and suggest changes to our
prevailing practices. What we do not need, and what the Constitution
does not require, is some overarching theory that ties together all
cases in all areas of constitutional law. Such a theory is not only
impossible (both descriptively and normatively), but it is irrelevant to
our Constitution.
I. THE CHECKS AND BALANCES DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Defenses of judicial review have proceeded along many lines. Some
point to portions of the Constitution's text-such as the Supremacy
Clause-in support of judicial review." Others point to statements
made during the drafting convention or the ratification period,
including the Federalist Papers,21 as evidence that the drafters or
ratifiers intended federal courts to exercise judicial review.' Still
that legal "doctrine is a practice that develops within institutions, not simply as the
random acts of individual judges"). Legal method, then, is not some a priori set of
ideal forms of argument, but rather consists of the current practices of the legal
community, which are subject to change as the community changes its practices. See
id. at 1412 ("[Dloctrines have histories... they emerge, gain currency, and may
die."). Thus, a person is recognized as doing law when they use the methods or
practices recognized by the legal community. What constitutes "doing law" at any
given time might be a contested proposition. But, on the whole, certain practices will
be accepted by the legal community (for example, resort to text and history) and
certain practices will be unacceptable (such as ad hominem attacks). For further
discussion of this point, see infra notes 319-40 and accompanying text.
19. See Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 1
(1998).
20. See Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law 4-10 (1961).
21. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
22. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics 15 (1962) ("[I]t is as clear as such matters can be that the
Framers of the Constitution specifically, if tacitly, expected that the federal courts
would assume a power-of whatever exact dimensions-to pass on the
constitutionality of actions of the Congress and the President, as well as of the several
states."); Tribe, supra note 1, § 3-2, at 26 ("[T]he records of the Constitutional
Convention itself suggest to at least some scholars that the Framers did not explicitly
grant federal courts the power of judicial review because they took that power for
granted."); see also 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 74, 78 (rev. ed. 1937) (detailing of a debate over judicial review); The Federalist
No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that it is the proper province of the courts to
1112 [Vol. 68
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others point out that state courts practiced judicial review before and
after ratification of the Constitution.?
This Article follows another approach. Articulation of the checks
and balances approach will necessarily entail a defense of robust
judicial review. This part articulates judicial review's integral role in
the system of checks and balances. The first section begins with a
critical review of the myth that judicial review will result in judicial
supremacy, making the judiciary the only branch of government that
can force its interpretation of the Constitution on other branches!'
By exposing the myth that robust judicial review leads to judicial
supremacy, this section presents an initial view of how the system of
checks and balances works in practice.
The second section addresses the objection that the Constitution
nowhere grants federal courts the power of judicial review. While
true, this objection ignores the equally accurate fact that the
Constitution grants no branch such a power. Yet, the very point of a
written Constitution is that it shall limit all exercises of government
power. To do so, the members of each branch of government must
necessarily form some opinion about what the Constitution requires
of them. Thus, each branch, in executing its limited functions, must of
necessity both interpret and apply the Constitution.
The third section tackles the objection that federal courts must
defer to the judgment of politically accountable branches on close
constitutional questions. I The main line of argument here is that
judicial decisions on the meaning of the Constitution are somehow out
of place--due less weight or legitimacy-than decisions by politically
accountable decision-makers. The third section argues that there is no
warrant in the structure of the Constitution for such a view of judicial
review. Rather, constitutional structure indicates that robust judicial
review, where the courts decide constitutional questions for
themselves without any required deference to other branches,2 6 is the
ascertain the meaning of any legislative act). For a collection of cites to the records of
the federal drafting convention, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 70 n.42 (1985).
23. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646, 655 (1982) ("State courts had set
aside state statutes under constitutions no more explicit about judicial review than the
federal."); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial
Review, 42 Duke L.J. 279, 282 (1992) ("Several state courts before 1787 had
disregarded state measures as unconstitutional.").
24. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 37-46 (1988) (describing different
commentators who argue that the judiciary should be the supreme interpreter of the
Constitution).
25. This objection to robust judicial review that has framed much of constitutional
theory for the last three decades and is most closely associated with Professor
Alexander Bickel. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 19; Brown, supra note 8, at 532-33.
26. As discussed later, the Constitution does anticipate that each branch of
government may find it expedient-even necessary to its continued existence-to
2000] 1113
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proper course. Under this view, the politically accountable branches
of government have no preferred claim-are not better
constitutionally situated or constituted to decide what the
Constitution means.
A. The Myth of Judicial Supremacy
The argument against judicial supremacy takes a single, simple fact
as its basis: Judicial review somehow makes the judiciary "supreme"
over the other branches of the federal government on issues of
constitutional interpretation. By "supreme," commentators typically
mean that the judiciary has the last word on constitutional questions,
and, thus, its decisions effectively trump the constitutional judgments
of the other two branches. This argument, however, begs an
important question: Does judicial review, in practice, give judges the
final word on the Constitution's meaning (thus making the judiciary
supreme)? This section turns to that central question.
In practice, the Supreme Court is hardly the "supreme" interpreter
of the Constitution.27  To see this, consider several different
hypothetical scenarios loosely drawn from historical incidents:
(1) The House or the Senate decides not to pass a bill because their
members believe that the bill would not be constitutional. 2
(2) The House and the Senate pass a bill, believing it is
constitutional. The President vetoes the bill believing it to be
unconstitutional, and neither chamber of Congress can override the
veto.
defer to other branches of government on the meaning of the Constitution. See infra
notes 328-66 and accompanying text. Part of the checks and balances in our system of
government is that each branch has the power and the motive to check-effectively,
to mount a political attack against-the other branches. To forestall such a check (or
attack), a branch may find it prudent to defer to another branch's judgment. Such
deference, however, is as a matter of practical survival, a built-in component of the
Constitution's political structure, and not a comment on the proper role of any
branch. Thus, such deference is different from saying that judges must always defer
to accountable branches because judges are second-class constitutional decision-
makers.
27. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability,
84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 96 (1998) ("The Supreme Court may be the ultimate interpreter in
a particular case, but not in the larger social issues of which that case is a reflection.").
There is now burgeoning literature discussing whether Congress and the President
should treat Supreme Court decisions as supreme on constitutional issues. See id. at
83-85; see also John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of
the United States § 141, at 94 (10th ed. 1888) ("There must ... be some judge, some
single umpire, to whose arbitrament the government as well as the citizen are
subject."); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1363 (1997).
28. As with a judge, a representative's constitutional opinion could be based on
any of the accepted sources of constitutional meaning. Unlike a judge, however, we
do not expect representatives to explain their constitutional judgments in lawyer-like
terms. See infra notes 299-27 and accompanying text.
1114 [Vol. 68
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(3) The House and the Senate pass a bill, believing it is
constitutional. The President vetoes the bill believing it to be
unconstitutional, two-thirds of the Senate votes to override the veto,
but the House cannot muster enough votes to override the veto.
(4) The same scenario as in (3), except it is the Senate that cannot
muster enough votes to override the President's veto.
(5) The House and the Senate pass a bill, believing it is
constitutional. The President vetoes the bill and two-thirds of both
the House and the Senate vote to override the veto. The President
then announces that the statute will not be enforced. -9
(6) The House and the Senate pass a bill, and the President signs
the bill into law. After the next congressional election but before any
judicial proceedings have begun under the statute, the new Congress
repeals the statute believing that it is unconstitutional.
(7) The House and the Senate pass a bill, and the President signs
the bill into law. After the next presidential election but before any
judicial proceedings have begun under the statute, the new President
announces that the statute will not be enforced because the new
President believes that it is unconstitutional.'
(8) The House and the Senate pass a bill, presumably believing it is
constitutional, and the President signs the bill into law. The Supreme
Court holds that the law is unconstitutional. The President, believing
the Supreme Court is wrong, refuses to enforce the Court's
judgment.
(9) The House and the Senate pass a bill, presumably believing it is
constitutional, and the President signs the bill into law. Before the
President can enforce the law, Congress drastically reduces the budget
29. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws:
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. LQ. 865, 945-69 (1994); Christine
E. Burgess, Note, When May a President Refitse to Enforce the Law?. 72 Tex. L Rev.
631, 649-66 (1994); infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
30. See May, supra note 29, at 969-77. This example also illustrates how the
People play a role in the system of checks and balances. The People, through the
Electoral College process set forth in Article II, Section 1, have elected a President
who offered a changed reading of the Constitution. Of course, this is not to suggest
that the People vote solely, or even primarily, on constitutional issues. Yet, a
constitutional world view is likely to be part of a candidate's platform or ideology.
Thomas Jefferson's state-centered constitutional view included opposition to the
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts. When elected in 1800, Jefferson set
to implementing his decentralist ideology, which included pardons of all those
convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at
88. Thus, while voters in 1800 might not have had the Alien and Sedition Acts on
their minds, they voted for a candidate whose web of constitutional beliefs included
that specific issue.
31. For a discussion of similar historical incidents, see infra notes 338-53 and
accompanying text (discussing President Andrew Jackson's role in the cases
challenging Georgia's treatment of the Cherokee Indian tribe) and infra notes 341-58
and accompanying text (discussing President Abraham Lincoln's opposition to the
Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856)).
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of the agency charged with enforcing the law.32 Enforcement is
effectively prevented.
In each of these cases, the judiciary does not-and cannot-have
the final say on the constitutionality of a law.33 Rather, the President
or one chamber of Congress, based on their interpretation of the
Constitution, takes action that finally decides a constitutional issue.
For example, if the Senate cannot pass a bill because a majority of its
members believe the bill to be unconstitutional, the House, the
President, and the Supreme Court are all powerless to enact the bill
into law if any or all of them disagree with the Senate's interpretation
of the Constitution. The Senate's constitutional judgment is final,
32. See Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary
Response to Extinction, 33 Ga. L. Rev. 413 (1999) (describing how Congress reduced
funding of federal agencies to slow down, or halt, enforcement of the Endangered
Species Act). In 1796, some members of the House of Representatives tried a version
of this tactic to defeat the recently-concluded Jay Treaty. See Stanley Elkins & Eric
McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 442-45 (1993). Chief Justice John Jay had
negotiated the treaty with England, the Senate had ratified substantially all of the
treaty, and President Washington had given his assent. See id. at 418-31. For full
implementation, however, the treaty still required an appropriation from Congress.
See id. at 441-42. Some House members, including James Madison, argued that the
House should show its disapproval of the treaty's constitutionality by refusing to
appropriate the funds needed for implementation. See id. These forces ultimately lost
when the House made the needed appropriation. See id. at 449.
33. See Tribe, supra note 1, §§ 3-4, at 35 ("[S]o long as [the President and
Congress] do not involve themselves in justiciable controversies coming within the
subject-matter limits of article III, the Supreme Court's view of the Constitution
cannot be brought to bear, and those other governmental actors will be free to
interpret and apply the Constitution as they deem best."). Election contests provide
another, though less obvious, example; the House and the Senate each "the Judge of
the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members." U.S. Const. art. I, § 5,
cl. 1. On several occasions, the House has had to interpret the Constitution in
deciding a contest over the election or qualification of a representative. For example,
in one election contest the House considered whether to seat representatives of
Minnesota who were elected when Minnesota was a territory but in anticipation of
imminent statehood. The House decided that the Minnesota representatives were
properly elected and thus were entitled to their seats. See D.W. Bartlett, Cases of
Contested Elections in Congress, from 1834 to 1865, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 38-57, at
249 (1865).
34. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its
Business, Purposes, and Performance 93-94 (2d ed. 1961) ("The President's use of the
veto on constitutional grounds, if not overridden by Congress, will foreclose the
courts from receiving the question of constitutional law."); Tribe, supra note 1, §§ 3-4,
at 35 ("[A] variety of actors must make their own constitutional judgments, and
possess the power to develop interpretations of the Constitution which do not
necessarily conform to the judicially enforced interpretation articulated by the
Supreme Court: the president, legislators, state courts and the public at
large."(citations omitted)).
35. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820),
in 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 1816-1826, at 160 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.
1899) ("If the legislature fails to pass laws for a census, for paying the judges and
other officers of government, for establishing a militia, for naturalization as
prescribed by the constitution, or if they fail to meet in congress, the judges cannot
issue their mandamus to them .... "); Pomeroy, supra note 27, § 147, at 98 (explaining
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effectively binding the other branches.
History is replete with examples of one chamber of Congress or the
President getting the final word on a constitutional question.36
Consider the following examples:
President George Washington believed that a 1792 bill apportioning
the House of Representatives was unconstitutional and, based on that
understanding, vetoed the bill.Y7 Presidents since that time have
exercised the veto power on that basis.
In 1816, Congress passed a bill (signed by President James
Madison) that created a second Bank of the United States. When a
case arose challenging the constitutionality of the bank, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had power to create a national bank s In
1832, Congress passed a bill extending the charter of the second
national bank. President Andrew Jackson, however, believed that
Congress did not have the power to charter a national bank39 and,
despite the Supreme Court's decision to the contrary, vetoed the
second bank bill on that basis.4° According to Jackson, Supreme
Court precedents should receive only "such influence as the force of
their reasoning may deserve. 4 1
President Thomas Jefferson believed that the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798, which made it a crime to criticize the government, were
that judiciary cannot decide a constitutional question unless a case comes before it
that raises that specific issue).
36. Two commentators suggest that using the case-method of teaching
Constitutional Law may blind lawyers to the role of the other branches:
Few Supreme Court Justices have had as much theoretical and practical
influence on our constitutional order as Abraham Lincoln. Yet because
most contemporary casebooks and courses are so unrelentingly U.S.
Supreme Court-centered, they offer a highly distorted understanding of the
American constitutional system to the hapless students exposed to them.
These students will almost inevitably end up believing that constitutional
interpretation is the exclusive province of the judiciary-and particularly the
Supreme Court-both as a theoretical and an empirical proposition. As a
theoretical proposition, this is pernicious. As an empirical proposition, it is
preposterous.
J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 Harv. L
Rev. 963,1016 (1998).
37. See George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), reprinted in 1 A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, at 124 (James
D. Richardson ed., 1896); 2 Annals of Congress 119 (1792) (reporting that President
Washington's veto message is received by the House, and the House failed to
override the veto by the necessary two-thirds vote); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L Rev. 905, 907 (1990).
38. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,425 (1819).
39. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, supra note 37, at 576-91.
40. See id For a discussion of this episode, see 3 Robert V. Remini, Andrew
Jackson and The Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, at 161-78 (1984)
(detailing Andrew Jackson's actions and beliefs regarding a national bank).
41. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, supra note 43, at 582.
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unconstitutional.42 Based on this belief, Jefferson pardoned "every
person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law. '43
Congress passed and President William Clinton signed the
Communications Decency Act of 1996. One section of the Act
prohibits Internet distribution of information about abortion,44 even
though the Supreme Court had struck down a similar prohibition for
the mails.45 In signing the Act, President Clinton recognized the
constitutional problems with this provision of the Act and assured the
public that the Justice Department would "decline to enforce that
provision of the current law. 46
Congress passed and President Clinton signed the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1996.47 One section of that law required the
armed services to discharge any member diagnosed as HIV-positive 8
The requirement applied regardless of the serviceperson's ability to
perform her duties. President Clinton signed the defense bill that
contained the discharge requirement, but immediately indicated that
he would seek repeal of the requirement because he considered it to
be unconstitutional. 49 Congress repealed the discharge requirement
before any serviceperson was discharged under the provision.
In each instance, a constitutional issue was decided, and a statute
was prevented from going into effect, without any opportunity for the
judiciary to offer its opinion. 1 In none of these cases were the federal
courts supreme in any sense of the word.5
42. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 88.
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 11 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 42, 43 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Prior to enactment of the Act,
federal law prohibited distribution of abortion material by an "express company or
other common carrier." 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994). The Act extended this prohibition
to the Internet. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
45. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,829 (1975).
46. Statement on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 219 (Feb. 8, 1996); see also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462-65
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting Justice Department's refusal to enforce 18
U.S.C. § 3501). Similarly, in his one term in office, President Jimmy Carter refused to
follow five congressional statutes that he believed were unconstitutional. See May,
supra note 29, at 962-69.
47. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-06. 110 Stat. 186 (1996).
48. See id.
49. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Province and Duty of the Political Departments,
65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 365, 380-82 (1998) (describing the Clinton Administration's
constitutional objections to the discharge requirement).
50. See 10 U.S.C. § 1177 (Supp. IV 1998); Powell, supra note 49, at 381.
51. For example, by pardoning all those convicted or prosecuted under the Alien
and Sedition Acts, Jefferson had voided the Acts "as much as if the Supreme Court
had held them unconstitutional." Easterbrook, supra note 37, at 907.
52. For a discussion of other situations where the Court has not had a say in
resolving constitutional questions, see Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers:
Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 57, 58 (1990); Paul E. McGreal,
Can Congress Require House Districts? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
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The above hypotheticals and examples establish an important point:
In practice, no law binds the People of the United States unless all
three branches of government concur in its constitutionality. 53 The
disagreement of any branch is enough to prevent a law from taking
effect. This, in a nutshell, is the core of the system of checks and
balances. Each branch of the federal government can interpret the
Constitution within its sphere of authority,- and, in doing so, each
branch can check law-making power by the others. Thus, at different
times, each branch has a form of supremacy on constitutional
questions. History demonstrates that strict judicial supremacy is a
myth.
B. No Textual Grant of Authority
It is commonplace in discussing judicial review to observe that the
Constitution nowhere specifically grants the federal judiciary such a
power.5 5 This observation, however, is at best trivial and at worst
incorrect. The Constitution does not specifically grant any branch-
executive, legislative, or judicial-power to interpret the Constitution.
Yet, it is self-evident that Congress is to consider the constitutional
limits of its power in passing bills, and the executive is to consider the
same issues in deciding whether to approve bills presented by
Congress. 6 If textual silence does not deny Congress and the
President power to interpret the Constitution, it should not deny the
judiciary the power to do so.
One early example of such legislative and executive reflection on
Fordham Law Review) (examining constitutionality of 1845 statute in which Congress
commands state legislatures to draw districts for election of the House of
Representatives).
53. See Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branc, 4 U. Chi.
L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 4 (1997) ("To state the principle at its most basic level,
Congress' law making capacity is meaningless, or at least severely restricted, without
the President to enforce the law or the courts to interpret it.").
54. See Freund, supra note 34, at 93 ("It is part of our political theory that each
department of the government has responsibility in the first instance for interpreting
and applying the Constitution as a limitation of its own action.").
55. See, eg., Bickel, supra note 22, at 1 ("The authority to determine the meaning
and application of a written constitution is nowhere defined or even mentioned in the
document itself."); Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 10 (1958) ("There was nothing
in the United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review the
decisions of Congress.").
56. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 9-10 (arguing that congressional passage and
presidential signing of a bill should be taken as an implicit decision as to the bill's
constitutionality); Charles Gardner Geyh, Courts, Congress, and the Constitutional
Politics of Interbrandc Restraint, 87 Geo. LJ. 243, 259 (1998) (book review)
("Consistent with the Framers' desires, Congress has traditionally taken its role as
interpreter and implementer of the Constitution quite seriously."). Some
commentators have questioned Congress's ability to adequately interpret the
Constitution. See Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587, 609-10 (1983).
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constitutional issues was the legislation creating the first Bank of the
United States.57 In the House, James Madison led the discussion of
the bill's constitutionality." Madison argued that the bill was beyond
Congress's enumerated powers, while supporters of the bill responded
that a national bank was "necessary and proper" to Congress'
enumerated power to tax.59 When the bill passed the House, a similar
debate ensued in the Senate.' After passing both chambers of
Congress, discussion of the bill's constitutionality continued in the
executive branch. There, President Washington asked three of his
cabinet members-Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton-to advise him on the bill's constitutionality.61 Significantly,
President Washington undertook his own review of the bill's
constitutionality even though the House and the Senate had
thoroughly done so. After receiving Randolph, Jefferson, and
Hamilton's advice, Washington then signed the bill into law.6' Thus,
soon after ratification of the Constitution, the House, the Senate, and
the President each engaged in constitutional interpretation even
though that document nowhere specifically granted them the
authority to do so. Such authority is implied in the limited nature of
the Constitution.
57. For a fuller discussion of this episode of constitutional debate, see R.K.
Moulton, Legislative and Documentary History of the Banks of the United States 1-
30 (1834); Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modem Judicial Review: From
Constitutional Interpretation to Judge-Made Law 25-32 (1994). Professor David
Currie is currently chronicling congressional and presidential consideration of
constitutional issues from the first Congress forward. See generally David P. Currie,
The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801 (1997) (detailing
Congress's interpretations of the Constitution in the first through sixth congressional
sessions); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered
Branch, 1801-1805, 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 219 (1998) (arguing that the legislative
and executive branches, not the judiciary, implemented the original understanding of
the Constitution).
58. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1944-52 (Joseph Gates ed., 1834).
59. See id. 1952-59 (Joseph Gates ed., 1834) (providing speech of Representative
Ames in support of the bank bill); Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 32, at 229-32.
60. See Moulton, supra note 57, at 13.
61. See Walter Dellinger & H. Jefferson Powell, The Constitutionality of the Bank
Bill: The Attorney General's First Constitutional Law Opinions, 44 Duke L.J. 110, 112
(1994). Both Randolph and Jefferson opined that Congress did not have the power to
incorporate a bank. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 32, at 232. Both advocated a
narrow definition of implied congressional power. See id. Hamilton, who proposed
the bank bill, argued for an expansive reading of Congress's implied powers, which
would include the power to create a national bank. See Alexander Hamilton, Final
Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb.
23, 1791), in 8 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 97-134 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1965).
62. See Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to
the Civil War 118-22 (1957). For Jefferson's arguments against the bank bill, see
Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 24 January to
31 March 1971, at 275 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974).
1120 [Vol. 68
AMBITION'S PLA YGROUND
The national bank episode shows little dispute about Congress's or
the President's authority to determine the meaning of the
Constitution in performing their assigned tasks under the
Constitution.' If either branch had believed that a national bank was
unconstitutional, that determination effectively would have bound the
other branches of government. If Congress had refused to pass the
bank bill, the President or the Courts could not force Congress to do
so. If the President had refused to sign the bank bill, neither the
courts nor a bare majority of Congress could force the President to do
so. If Congress overrode the President's veto, the President could
refuse to administer the bank. In either case, Congress or the
President would have the last word on what the Constitution means.
It is unproblematic for Congress or the President to have the final
word on the Constitution's meaning in some contexts. But, the
Constitution's text nowhere explicitly grants these branches the power
to do so. In that case, how can the President and Congress get away
with doing so?' The answer here is the same as the answer should be
for the judiciary-such power is inherent in the system of checks and
balances. As is discussed below, the system of checks and balances
requires that each branch act to keep the other branches from abusing
their power. For this system to work, each branch must be able to
resort to the Constitution and determine for itself whether the other
63. As one commentator has noted, Congress takes past congressional
constitutional decisions seriously, treating them as a form of precedent. See Geyh,
supra note 56, at 260 ("Members of Congress have likewise used their constitutional
interpretations as a form of precedent to influence, if not control, subsequent
interpretations."). This practice recently gained new prominence when, for only the
second time in United States history, the House impeached and the senate tried a
President for high crimes and misdemeanors. For example, the issue arose whether
articles of impeachment approved by one Congress could carry over to the next
Congress. In support of allowing such articles to carry over, lawyers working in the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress appealed to the precedent
of past impeachment proceedings where articles approved by a House in one
Congress were tried by a Senate in the next Congress. See Memorandum from
Elizabeth B. Bazan, Legislative Attorney at American Law Division of Congressional
Research Service, to House Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 7, 1998)
<http:lwww.house.gov/judiciary/ crs.html> ("[P]ast precedents suggest that either an
impeachment proceeding or an impeachment inquiry may be continued from one
Congress to the next."). Members of Congress also acknowledged that what they did
and said in this impeachment and trial could serve as precedent in future proceedings.
See, eg., The Impeachment and Trial of President Clinton: The Official Transcripts,
from the House Judiciary Committee Hearings to The Senate Trial of President
Clinton 419 (Feb. 6, 1999) (Rep. Ed Bryant said that the House Managers are "here
to help the Senate in this constitutional process do the constitutional thing not only
for the precedent of this Senate, but for the precedent of the future generations in
terms of how the courts now and later will view obstruction of justice and perjury.")
64. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 75 (1989) ("If judicial review is always
slightly suspect because it is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution's text,
majority rule should be even more so because the Constitution seems so heavily
oriented against it.").
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branches have gone too far. The text's silence turns out to be
irrelevant.
C. The Judiciary as Equal Partner
One of the most common arguments for judicial restraint-and for
the federal courts as less-than-equal partners in constitutional
interpretation-is that there is something wrong in a democracy with
an unelected, unaccountable judiciary preventing democratic
representatives from making law. Simply put, judges should not get in
the way of democracy. Supreme Court justices and commentators
warn of the danger judicial review poses to democracy.65 The notion
is that there is something inherently suspect about a court holding that
a duly enacted statute violates the Constitution.'
There are two main problems with the argument that robust judicial
review-the idea that courts should interpret the Constitution with no
necessary deference to other constitutional decision-makers-is out of
place in American democracy. First, this argument assumes that,
under our Constitution, it is a graver error for judges to incorrectly
find a law unconstitutional than to incorrectly find a law
constitutional. This assumption rests upon the further assumption
that there is little or no difference between making ordinary law and
failing to make ordinary law under the Constitution.67 Subsection 1
below identifies the assumptions, and Subsection 2 offers a historical
critique.
Second, the argument both assumes that federal judges are
unchecked in the federal system and undervalues the role of the
judiciary as a check on other branches. Subsection 3 explains why
both of assumptions points are false.
1. The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty
Professor Alexander Bickel has bequeathed us the counter-
majoritarian difficulty.68 Like a mathematical conjecture or puzzle,
65. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300-01 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("This Court need not, and has no authority to, inject itself into every
field of human activity where irrationality and oppression may theoretically occur,
and if it tries to do so it will destroy itself."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-
95 (1986); Bickel, supra note 22, at 16-23; Bork, supra note 2, at 139-41.
66. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 138-42 (1893); see also Sylvia Snowiss,
Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution 13-44 (1990) (discussing judicial
review in late Eighteenth Century America). See generally One Hundred Years of
Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
67. On the distinction between "ordinary law" and the Constitution, see infra note
89 and accompanying text.
68. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 16-23; Brown, supra note 8, at 531-32. Learned
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the counter-majoritarian difficulty simultaneously tantalizes
constitutional theorists and casts a shadow over the legitimacy of
judicial review. 9 Bickel stated the problem as follows:
[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned
in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it
be denied that the policy-making power of representative
institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing
characteristic of the system. Judicial review works counter to this
characteristic.7'
Others have restated the point in different language.7t For example,
Robert Bork refers to the "Madisonian dilemma" that an
unaccountable judiciary must be reconciled with a predominantly
democratic government. In either case, the main objection is that
unaccountable decision-making, and especially judicial review of
constitutional questions, is inherently suspect or illegitimate?3
Hand had expressed a similar idea in an earlier work. See Hand, supra note 55, at 1-
31.
69. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
Yale L.J. 1013, 1014 (1984) (accepting the counter-majoritarian difficulty as the
"starting point" for analysis of judicial review); Brown, supra note 8, at 531-32;
Chemerinsky, supra note 64, at 71 ("Bickel's 'counter-majoritarian difficulty' set the
terms for the contemporary debate over judicial review."); Stephen M. Griffin, What
Is Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned
Tradition, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493,506 (1989).
70. Bickel, supra note 22, at 19.
Elections permit the voice of a majority of the people on a regular basis to
participate in government and achieve political goals that, in the aggregate,
they favor. Deliberation, checks and balances, and buffers notwithstanding,
it is a small next step to conclude that the principle of accountability, in
general, is intended to achieve the maximization of majority preferences. It
is only a small leap from that conclusion to the conviction that the
Constitution itself embodies a principle of majoritarian satisfaction and that,
almost definitionally, any body which does not further that end is an
embarrassment, a deviant institution, a difficulty.
Brown, supra note 8, at 557-58.
71. See Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 Cato J. 703, 707
(1985) (arguing for a "restricted view of the courts' role in a democratic society");
William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke LJ. 1,
29.
Where Congress has considered the issue and has interpreted the
Constitution in the course of adopting relevant legislation, however, the
matter is properly foreclosed to the courts which are not to oppose
themselves to Congress which is itself fully answerable to the people. The
Court is not similarly answerable, of course, and thus certainly ought not
supererogate a power of judicial review for which it is politically
unaccountable in what we believe to be a democratic republic.
Id
Justices of the Supreme Court have expressed the same sentiment. See supra note 65.
72. Bork, supra note 2, at 2-4.
73. Professor Bruce Ackerman disputes that judicial review of constitutional
questions is a counter-majoritarian act. See Ackerman, supra note 69, at 1049-51.
Professor Ackerman argues: "When the Court invokes the Constitution, it appeals to
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The implication of Bickel-like concern with judicial review is that
the judicial branch of government is given a lesser role than the other
branches in deciding constitutional questions. Recall the discussion
above of judicial supremacy, where we saw that all three branches of
the federal government have the power to perform constitutional
review, and, in different cases, each branch has the final word on the
issue. Yet, under the Bickel view, Congress and the President get to
decide these issues for themselves, while the courts must defer to the
other branches unless they find a clear constitutional error. In the
familiar terms of appellate standards of review, the President and
Congress decide constitutional questions de novo, but the courts are
limited to a clearly erroneous standard. In the typical case, by passing
a bill and signing it into law, Congress and the President make their
constitutional judgments that the bill is constitutional. The question is
whether federal courts owe any deference to those judgments, or
whether the federal courts also are allowed to address constitutional
questions de novo. Because Bickel's adoption of the former view has
dominated much of constitutional discourse, let us examine that view.
Continuing the analogy to appellate standards of review will help
isolate the crux of Bickel's argument. Consider that for purposes of
appellate standards of review, courts generally distinguish between
questions of fact and questions of law.74 An appellate court will
generally decide questions of law for itself, exercising de novo
review.75 Questions of fact, however, are different, with an appellate
court playing a limited role, usually giving great deference to the trial
court.76 In the latter cases, the appellate court defers to the trial court
legal enactments that were approved by a whole series of majorities-namely the
majorities of those representative bodies that proposed and ratified the original
Constitution and its subsequent amendments." Id. at 1046. Ordinary law-making,
however, has only the "soft" support of the people. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at
240-43. Because citizens are busy people who cannot do extensive research before
voting, elections do not represent the "considered judgment" of the People, but
rather only a soft vote of confidence for those elected. See id. at 243. Courts, then,
should have no problem preferring the People's considered judgments, reflected in
the Constitution, over the People's not-so-considered judgments, reflected in the
ordinary laws made by their representatives. See id. at 262-63 ("Given the 'softness' of
normal public opinion, it is simply impossible to say how the people of today would
decide an issue if they mobilized their political energies and successfully hammered
out a new constitutional solution."). Professor Ackerman thus argues that judicial
review is not counter-majoritarian. Conversely, this Article simply argues that
judicial review, even if counter-majoritarian, is not a difficulty.
74. See Fleming James, Jr., et al., Civil Procedure § 12.9, at 668-69 (4th ed. 1992).
Of course, any generalization is subject to qualifications. For present purposes,
however, such qualifications are not relevant.
75. See id. at 668 ("[A]n appellate court reviews questions of law.").
76. See id. at 668-69 ("[A]n appellate court... may not substitute its own view of
the facts or make new fact findings."). By "questions of fact," I am referring to a trial
court's findings of fact after a trial on the merits of the issue. Thus, I am not referring
to other types of fact determinations, such as summary judgment or other summary
dispositions, where the appellate court engages in more aggressive review of the trial
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unless the trial court was "clearly erroneous" or abused its
discretion.'
The different standards of review for questions of law and fact are
justified by institutional differences and similarities between trial and
appellate courts. Regarding questions of law, trial and appellate
courts are similarly situated because we have no reason to believe that
either is more skilled than the other in legal research, analysis, and
writing." Thus, we deem both types of courts competent to read the
law and say what the law is-each gets to decide for itself.
Conversely, trial and appellate courts are differently situated
regarding questions of fact; trial courts are thought to be better
situated to decide such questions. For example, being present at the
trial, the trial judge can observe factors such as a witness's demeanor
and tone of voice, that help in assessing the credibility of testimony. 9
Because such factors are not captured on the bare page of the
appellate record, the appellate court has a distinct disadvantage in
evaluating such evidence.80 As the old adage goes, practice makes
perfect: The trial court's "major role is the determination of fact, and
with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise."' For these
reasons, the trial court is believed to be in a better position than the
appellate court to weigh evidence and find facts. Consequently,
appellate courts generally defer to a trial court's determinations of
court's judgment.
77. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
78. For a period of time, there was an exception to this rule when federal courts
interpreted state law. In such cases, federal courts of appeal would defer to the
district court's interpretation of state law. The courts of appeal did so out of a belief
that the district courts, which sat in the state whose law they were applying, had more
experience with and more exposure to that state's law. See Dan T. Coenen, To Defer
or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Deference to District Court Rulings
on State Law, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 899, 910-12 (1989). This difference in experience was
thought to justify giving some deference to the district court's judgment. The
Supreme Court, however, has since rejected this position, reasoning that there is no
relevant difference between courts of appeal and district courts when it comes to
interpreting state law. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225,231 (1991).
79. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) ("[O]nly the trial
judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so
heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in what is said."); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412,434 (1985).
80. See James et al., supra note 74, § 12.9, at 669 ("[Tlhe trial judge ha[s] the
opportunity, not available to the appellate court, to see and hear the witnesses"). Of
course, this argument rests on an empirical assumption-that people are better at
detecting lies in person than from transcripts-that might be challenged. See Olin Guy
Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1075-76 (1991) (disputing the
empirical basis for deference to trial court fact finding). Regardless of the accuracy of
this assumption, the central point for current purposes is that standard of review
depends in part on the relative institutional competencies of the reviewing body
(appellate court) and the reviewed body (trial court).
81. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574.
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questions of fact.82
Our detour into appellate standards of review draws out an
important point: The role a decision maker plays in performing a
given task will be determined, in part, by the relative competence of
the decision-maker to that task. For present purposes, the relevant
task is constitutional interpretation, and the relevant decision-maker
is the federal judiciary relative to the other branches of the federal
government. Our question now becomes whether the federal
judiciary, relative to Congress and the President, is less competent to
the task of constitutional interpretation? To answer this question, we
need to ask whether the federal judiciary is differently situated from
the legislative or executive branches-in a respect relevant under the
Constitution83-when it comes to deciding constitutional questions.
The most common answer is that the judiciary is differently situated
because it is unaccountable. This argument follows several steps, and
we now examine each step separately to properly evaluate its logic.
First, the argument starts from the reality that most constitutional
questions do not have clear answers.' If such questions have clear
answers, judicial review poses no problem: The Constitution is
supreme, and the clear commands of the Constitution bind each
branch.8 5 This much Bickel would concede.8 6
The lack of clear answers to most constitutional questions leads us
to the second step in the logic: decision-makers will sometimes err in
82. See James et al., supra note 74, § 12.9, at 668-70.
83. Several authors have noted non-constitutional reasons for leaving
constitutional interpretation to the legislature or the executive. See, e.g., Brown, supra
note 8, at 541-46 (collecting and reviewing authors who advocated such reasons).
84. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 3 ("[A] statute's repugnancy to the Constitution is
in most instances not self-evident; it is, rather, an issue of policy that someone must
decide."); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 Yale L.J. 821, 821 (1985). At one
time, Justice Roberts suggested that judicial review was a largely discretionless act
that merely required a straightforward comparison of the challenged law to the
Constitution. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936).
85. Marshall makes this point in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171-
78 (1803), when he gives examples of statutes that would clearly violate the
Constitution. See infra notes 256-71 and accompanying text.
86. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 45. In part, Bickel agrees with James Bradley
Thayer, who argued that judicial review should be limited to clear cases of
unconstitutionality, as where the government acts in a patently irrational manner. See
id.; Thayer, supra note 66, at 150. But, Bickel believed that Thayer's theory of judicial
review was incomplete. In addition to clear cases of unconstitutionality, Bickcl
believed that Courts were to strike down laws that violated clearly defined principles.
See Bickel, supra note 22, at 41-43. According to Bickel, judges could act on principle
because they were the only government actors well-suited to do so: "[Tihe root idea is
that the process [of judicial review] is justified only if it injects into representative
government something that is not already there; and that is principle, standards of
action that derive their worth from a long view of society's spiritual as well as material
needs and that command adherence whether or not the immediate outcome is
expedient or agreeable." Id. at 58.
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determining what the Constitution requires, or there will be no answer
to constitutional questions, or different constitutional decision-makers
will reasonably disagree!' Various sources of constitutional
meaning-such as text, structure, history, precedent-may point to
different answers or no answer at all. The question is whether, given
this uncertainty, we ought to credit (or give greater weight to) the
constitutional interpretations of one branch over the others. Here, we
come to the third step of the argument: Given uncertainty as to
constitutional meaning, unaccountable federal judges ought to defer
to the accountable branches of government.
The third step rests to a great extent on the assumed priority of
accountable decision-making under the Constitution. An additional,
related assumption underlies this view: Given the choice between
accountable ordinary law-making and no ordinary law-making, the
framers preferred accountable ordinary law-making. If the federal
courts defer to Congress and the President (by upholding the
constitutionality of a statute), we have accountable ordinary law-
making; if the federal courts strike down a statute based on their view
of the Constitution, there is no ordinary law-making. The question is
whether the Constitution prefers ordinary law-making over no
ordinary law-making, or vice versa. Put differently, is there anything
special about accountability that requires us to prefer ordinary law-
making over no ordinary law-making? I believe the answer is not only
"no," but that the Constitution is better read to prefer no ordinary
law-making over ordinary law-making.m The next section develops
this point.
2. Law-Making Versus No Law-Making Under the Constitution
Before moving forward, it is important to distinguish between, on
the one hand, preferring accountable law-making to unaccountable
law-making, and, on the other hand, preferring no law-making to law-
making. A judicial finding that a statute is unconstitutional is more
properly categorized as no law-making, not unaccountable law-
making. This reflects the long-held distinction between fundamental
or organic laws-the laws that create, organize, and limit the
government and its powers, such as a constitution-and ordinary laws
87. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 57-58 (1997) ("As the Court
attempts to implement the Constitution, its task is much complicated by the
phenomenon of reasonable disagreement in constitutional law.").
88. Professor Rebecca Brown has recently criticized this assumption with great
insight. See Brown, supra note 8, at 565-71. She argues that the Constitution uses
accountability as a means to check tyrannical law-making, not as a means to assess
and implement the law making preferences of the majority. See id. at 546 ("[Plolitical
accountability was not viewed as a disembodied value to be elevated over others
simply for its own sake, for fidelity to some deified concept of democracy.").
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created pursuant to the fundamental or organic law, such as the
statutes found in the United States Code. 9 When the Supreme Court
strikes down a federal statute as unconstitutional, it has prevented
ordinary law-making.
Conversely, the federal judiciary cannot create ordinary law. 0
While the Constitution grants Congress the power to "make law" 91
and the President the power to "make treaties,"92 both of which are
species of ordinary law, the Constitution does not grant the judiciary
ordinary law-making power. Of course, to say that judges do not
"make law" in some sense when they apply the Constitution is
incorrect. Judges make a form of constitutional law by setting forth
rules and doctrines they will follow in future cases.93 The above point
is that Madison and the framers were worried about a certain type of
law-making by the federal government-ordinary law-making. The
following two premises were important to the framers: (1) they were
suspicious of ordinary law-making power, especially democratic law-
making power,94 and (2) when in doubt, they preferred no ordinary
law-making to ordinary law-making.95  Specifically, the framers
worried that factions would be most able to assert their selfish
interests in the ordinary law-making process.
The following sections develop the framers' thinking on ordinary
law-making. Section (a) explains the origin and nature of the framers'
deep suspicion of ordinary law-making. Section (b) explains how the
89. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 6-7 (distinguishing between ordinary and
"higher" law-making); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 78-81 (1961) (distinguishing
between primary (ordinary) and secondary (organic) rules); Hans Kelsen, Pure
Theory of Law 193-95 (Max Knight trans., 1967) (distinguishing the 'basic'
presupposed norm from other, lower norms).
90. Federal courts were at one time allowed to make federal common law in
deciding diversity cases. This power, however, has since been repudiated. See Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938). Also, it would be naive to say that
federal judges do not in some sense make ordinary law when they interpret statutes.
See The Federalist No. 22, at 118 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Laws are a dead letter without courts to expand and define their true meaning and
operation."). But, the important point is that some act of Congress and the President
(for example, enactment of a statute) is necessary before the judiciary can play its
anticipated role of applying the statute to a concrete set of facts. Thus, application of
a duly enacted statute is a form of judicial law-making anticipated by the
Constitution; wholesale judicial writing of legal codes (like statutes), however, is not
part of the Constitution's design.
91. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers .... ).
92. See id. art. II, § 2 ("The President shall... have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties .....
93. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1403-04.
94. See Brown, supra note 8, at 569-71.
95. See James MacGregor Bums, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party
Politics in America 22 (1963) ("Government, in short, was a necessary evil that must
be curbed, not an instrument for the realization of men's higher ideals or a nation's
broader interests.").
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structure of the federal government-specifically, the systems of
federalism and separation of powers-was crafted to address the
concerns raised by democratic ordinary law-making. Section (c)
explains how robust judicial review fits within the system of checks
and balances by placing another, essential check on democratic
ordinary law-making. It is this account of judicial review that part II
uses to re-interpret Marbury v. Madison, and that part III uses to
critique the role of grand theory in constitutional law.
a. The Framers' Suspicion of Ordinary Law-Making
The founders came to constitution-making in 1787 with a deep
suspicion of democratic assemblies. This suspicion arose from the
destructive actions many states had taken toward their citizens,
toward one another, and toward the new federal government.' The
framers did not want to reproduce the powerful destructive forces
they saw at work on the state level. To understand their Constitution,
then, we must first understand these forces. Each type of state action
is described briefly in turn.
First, state legislatures were passing laws that disturbed existing
commercial arrangements s Most notably, several states passed
debtor-relief legislation, making certain debts unenforceable in state
courts or prohibiting remedies like foreclosure for non-payment of
debts.9 Also, several states were coining or printing their own money,
further eroding the value of debts owed. 00 For Madison, who served
in the Virginia state legislature during this period, such laws showed
96. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
97. Madison's paper entitled Vices of the Political System of the United States
catalogues many of these failures under headings like "Encroachments by the States
on the federal authority," "Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other," and
"Injustice of the laws of the States." James Madison, Vices of the Political System of
the United States (Apr. 1787), reprinted in 1 The Founders' Constitution 166-69 (Philip
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) [hereinafter Madison, Vices]; see also Jack N.
Rakove, Original Meanings 46-56 (1996); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic 368-69 (1969) [hereinafter Wood, Creation]; Gordon S. Wood,
Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in Beyond
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 69, 75-77
(Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter Wood, Disinterestedness].
98. See Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the
United States 52-53 (Transaction Publishers 1998) (1913); Elkins & McKitrick, supra
note 32, at 11 ("The state legislatures, as Madison and many another viewed them,
had become a babel of narrow-minded parochial concerns, their members men of
selfish interests and untutored understanding, oblivious of minority rights, passing
unjust laws (such as legal tender acts whereby debts people owed each other could be
paid in worthless currency), and all unchecked by any overriding vision of the public
good or what it might consist of."); Janet A. Riesman, Mone', Credit, and Federalist
Political Economy, in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and
American National Identity 128, 150-56 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
99. See Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 167-69.
100. See id.; Riesman, supra note 98, at 150-56.
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the darkly irresponsible side of democracy.' As Madison saw it, such
laws were enacted by legislators who served nothing other than their
constituents' narrow, selfish interests.102 In the states, neither the
rulers nor the ruled would see the bigger picture:
Is it to be imagined that an ordinary citizen or even an assemblyman
of R. Island in estimating the policy of paper money, ever
considered or cared in what light the measure would be viewed in
France or Holland; or even in Massts or Connect. [sic]? It was a
sufficient temptation to both that it was for their interest .... 103
In asking this rhetorical question, Madison set the pessimistic tone
about local democracy that helped shape the resulting Constitution."°
Madison's unfavorable experiences with state politics later
coalesced into an important aspect of his theory of government,
articulated in his famous Federalist No. 10. Madison warned of the
dangers of "faction:" "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community."'' 5  Madison explained that differences in wealth,
occupation, religion and general loyalties will be among the important
cause of faction.1 °6
101. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787) in 1 The
Republic of Letters: The Correspondence Between Jefferson and Madison, 1776-
1826, at 495-507 (James M. Smith ed., 1995) [hereinafter Madison Letter]; Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police
Powers Jurisprudence 28-30 (1993); Rakove, supra note 97, at 46-56; see generally
Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97. Madison wrote to Jefferson that this problem
was the primary impetus toward the constitutional convention:
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The
injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most
steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying
that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness
which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general
reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from
the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects.
Madison Letter, supra, at 500. See Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography 86-
87 (1990) ("The root evil.., was the overwhelming tendency of the existing
governments, obsessed with their selfish interests, to lose sight of the general welfare
and the need for disciplined respect for the law."); Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at
166-169; Rakove, supra note 97, at 28-30; Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at
74 (Madison's time in the Virginia legislature was "perhaps the most frustrating and
disillusioning years of his life, but also the most important years of his life, for his
experience as a Virginia legislator in the 1780's was fundamental in shaping his
thinking as a constitutional reformer.").
102. See Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at 74-76. Wood notes that
Madison's sentiment was shared by many of the members of the Philadelphia drafting
convention. See id. at 76.
103. Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 166-69.
104. See Rakove, supra note 97, at 39-56.
105. The Federalist No. 10, at 45-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
106. Id. at 47; Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 169.
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In these interests lies the "spirit of faction;" the danger for society is
that government will be used as a tool to promote the interests of one
faction at the expense of another.1" For example, the framers saw
laws promoting manufacturing or granting debtor relief as the product
of faction."" In each case, selfish interests-those of manufacturers
and debtors respectively-stood to benefit from the government's
action. One of the great aims of governing is to reign in the self-
interests that derive from faction and instead to pursue the "public
good."'" Madison, not so naive as to think that faction could be
avoided, argued for a lawmaking process he believed would minimize
the opportunity for factions to make law." 0
Second, the framers were discouraged by the states' treatment of
each other."' Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress did not
107. Id.
10& See Gillman, supra note 101, at 20 ("Those who supported the Philadelphia
Constitution used [the idea of faction] in the hope of delegitimizing certain kinds of
laws passed by democratic state legislatures in the 1780's, laws such as debtor-relief
legislation and wage and price controls.").
109. Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 168. Madison drew a line between faction
and the public good. The main question is what differentiates mere faction from the
public good. For Madison and others, the difference was tied to a free market: Laws
that restrained commercial competition were the product of faction and thus did not
serve the public good. See Gillman, supra note 101, at 114 ("Market freedom, or
'liberty of contract,' was linked inextricably with the commitment to faction-free
legislation."). This faith in the free market was based on the assumption that
unrestrained commercial activity would inure to the benefit of society as a whole.
One commentator has explained the logic as follows:
[M]any at the time of the founding considered the exercise of public power
illegitimate precisely to the extent that it was designed merely to advance
the special interests of particular classes or to interfere with the common-law
(natural and just) obligations imposed on competing participants in the
market economy on behalf of favored classes. This sensibility was
predicated on the assumption that the social relations constructed by the
common-law regime of contract and property were essentially fair and
liberty loving-or at least would be in the United States, with its expansive
frontier-and that the enforcement of common-law obligations would not
result in certain classes having to suffer under conditions of dependency or
servitude vis-a-vis competing classes that might make reasonable requests
for special government favors.
Id. at 27.
110. See The Federalist No. 10, at 50-51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). An important part of this scheme was a national government that
encompassed a large geographical area. See id. A large nation would likely consist of
many different regions with many different interests. The different regions with their
different interests would be factions, but each faction would likely be small. Madison
argued that a large nation with a large number of small factions would minimize the
opportunity for any single faction to make law to promote its factious interests. See id.
Thus, Madison believed that a large nation was an important safeguard against
faction.
111. See Andrew McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 137-
147 (1936); Rakove, supra note 97, at 46-47 (discussing James Madison's critique of
the Articles of Confederation); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 43, 53 (1988) ("Interstate rivalry was the
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have power to regulate interstate commerce.112 Without any central
regulation, states waged economic warfare that threatened the
stability of the new nation. 113 The framers particularly focused on
conflicts between states that produced and exported goods and some
coastal states whose main commerce was the trade that flowed
through their ports. 4 A state with few resources other than its
location as a trade center could exact a great toll to allow passage of
goods to other states or foreign markets."5 Many states did so, either
closing their ports to or imposing prohibitive taxes on goods from
other states.' 16  In doing so, the taxing states pursued their own
Convention's greatest concern."); Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at 69, 72.
As Gordon Wood reasons, while the inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation
may explain why the Philadelphia Convention convened to amend that document,
those problems do not fully explain the push for an entirely new document. See
Wood, Creation, supra note 97; Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at 72; Elkins
& McKitrick supra note 32, at 10.
112. See Articles of Confederation art. IX (setting forth the powers of "The United
States, in Congress assembled").
113. As the Supreme Court has noted, the economic opportunism practiced by the
states after the revolution threatened the continuing survival of the newly created
United States. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)
("When victory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had
exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states began."). A
federal power over interstate commerce was thought necessary to keep the peace.
The sole purpose for which Virginia initiated the movement which
ultimately produced the Constitution was 'to take into consideration the
trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and trade of the
said States; to consider how far a uniform system in their commercial
regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their permanent
harmony' and for that purpose the General Assembly of Virginia in January
of 1786 named commissioners and proposed their meeting with those from
other states.
Id.
114. See Beard, supra note 98, at 29 n.1 (noting how New York took advantage of
its status as port of entry to New Jersey and Connecticut); Max Farrand, The Fathers
of the Constitution 29-30 (1921) [hereinafter Farrand, Fathers]; 3 Farrand, supra note
22, at 519, 542; Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional
Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 432,448-49 (1941).
[Tihe states were using their imposts as weapons against each other, either
offensively, as where the importing states imposed tariffs the ultimate
incidence of which was calculated to fall on others not blessed by geography
with as good and accessible harbors, or defensively, as by strengthening their
tariff walls against each other to compensate for revenue deficiencies
resulting from diversion of foreign shipments to the states with the least
onerous imposts.
Id.; Collins, supra note 111, at 53.
115. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 7, at 30 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping
from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their
more fortunate neighbors."); see also The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison)
(discussing conflicts between states relating to trade).
116. See IV Jonathan Elliott, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 254 (1888); V Elliott, supra, at 119; David
Hutchison, The Foundations of the Constitution 103 (1975).
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economic advantage at the expense of their neighbors.
The exploitative state taxes posed several negative consequences
for the new nation. First, if goods could be taxed as they passed
through each state border, trade would effectively cease; each tax
would increase the price of the good to the point that it would no
longer be purchased." 7 Also, the border taxes might cause producing
states to choose alternate, less efficient trade routes to avoid
exploitation. 8  Finally, trade wars could escalate into violence."'
Thus democratic law-making threatened the existence of the nascent
nation.
Third, in going about ordinary law-making, states neglected their
obligations to the United States. Many states ignored their share of
the debt incurred to wage the Revolutionary War.Y- Similarly, when
the new nation tried to conclude treaties with other nations, many
states would not abide by those documents unless a particular treaty
happened to coincide with their economic interests."' When other
nations took coordinated action against the United States, the several
states could not be relied upon to put aside their individual interests in
favor of a common response.1t Coordinated national action was
ineffective because states consistently placed their own narrow,
factious interests above the interests of the nation as a whole.
In short, the state lawmaking processes were captured by self-
interest-by Madison's feared factions.' The problem was that
democracy, even representative democracy, was a mirror of human
117. See, e.g., Case of The State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232, 280 (1872)
(noting that this is the benefit of having of having Congress as the sole regulating
body).
118. See The Federalist No. 42, at 236 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining that state taxes could cause exporting states "to resort to less
convenient channels for their foreign trade").
119. See id. (noting that retaliatory trade measures "would nourish unceasing
animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public
tranquility"), No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States 259-60 (abr. ed. 1833) (detailing retaliatory trade
measures that would "threaten at once the peace and safety of the Union").
120. See The Federalist No. 15, at 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
121. See Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 167 (Madison complained of states'
"[v]iolations of the law of nations and of treaties."); The Federalist No. 15, at 74
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
122. Shortly after the Revolutionary War, Britain closed its ports to American
ships. To regain access, the United States wanted to implement a national response,
closing its ports to British ships until such time as Britain re-opened its ports.
Because the federal government did not have power over the subject, the coastal
states acted in their best interests by keeping their ports open, and the United States
could not coordinate a successful response. See Rakove, supra note 97, at 26-27.
123. See Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at 76 (describing "the democratic
politics of state legislatures" as "scrambling of different interest groups, the narrow
self-promoting nature of much of the lawmaking, the incessant catering to popular
demands").
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nature, transmitting the wants and desires of the People into law.124
Experience had shown, however, that human nature was hopelessly
flawed-people are inherently selfish and will pursue their personal
interests given the chance."2 But, the People could not be cut out of
the law-making process. A Revolutionary War had been fought in
part over the right of people to actually consent to the laws that
controlled them. 26 A central challenge of the Philadelphia drafting
convention was to construct a government based on consent of the
governed that safeguarded against human nature's tendency toward
faction. 127 The next section explains how the framers tried to solve
this problem with a system of checks and balances that made ordinary
law-making difficult. The last section then explains how robust
judicial review-without deference-fits within this system.
b. The Role of Checks and Balances
Part of the framers' solution to the challenges of faction was to
make ordinary law-making difficult-very difficult. They did so by
dividing government power both vertically and horizontally. Both
divisions of power make federal law-making less likely.
First, the framers divided power vertically between the state and
federal governments. This is the structure of federalism created by
our Constitution. The People are the ultimate sovereign in the United
States, and, as the sovereign, they have delegated some power to the
national government and left themselves free to exercise (or not) the
remaining of power in their respective states, within limits set forth in
124. See The Federalist No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?"). Bernard Bailyn describes how the pre-Revolutionary colonists adopted a
view of representation that made representatives the mirrors of their constituents'
desires. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 173
(enlarged ed. 1992) (discussing the view that representatives be "an accurate mirror of
the people, sensitively reflecting their desires and feelings").
125. See Douglass Adair, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science: David Hittme,
James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, in Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays
by Douglas Adair, 132, 141 (Trevor Colbourn ed., 1974); Madison, Vices, supra note
97, at 169 (Madison argues that the "evils" he saw in the state governments arose, in
part, from problems "among the people themselves."); James P. Scanlan, The
Federalist and Human Nature, 21 Rev. Pol. 664-69 (1959).
126. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 161-75; Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: The
Rediscovery of American Federalism 163-94 (1993) (describing colonists' struggle to
gain greater representation and control over local interests of the colonies); Wood,
Creation, supra note 97, at 36-45; Wood, Disinterestedness, supra note 97, at 77.
127. See Adair, supra note 125, at 142-43 (noting that Madison looked extensively
to the work of Scottish philosopher David Hume, who tried to construct "a
government to be based on the consent of the 'people' and at the same time obviate
the danger of factions."); cf The Federalist No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[Y]ou must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.").
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the Constitution."2
Federalism is an important limitation on both national and local
power. For national power, federalism means that the national
government may exercise only those powers the People delegated to
that level of government.12 9 This was originally a relatively small set
of powers.130 For state power, federalism means that the Constitution
is supreme whenever it addresses the states.3 1 Thus, states must obey
the Constitution's prohibitions on laws impairing the obligations of
contracts'32 or ex post facto laws.'- a Also, the national government
may pre-empt state law when acting within its limited sphere of
authority." 4
128. The Tenth Amendment briefly states this principle: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X.
129. See, eg., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1994) ("The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers."); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (same); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405
(1819) (same).
130. See II Elliotts Debates, supra note 116, at 468 (at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, James Wilson responded to the charge that Congress's powers are
"unlimited and undefined" by arguing that Article I Section 8 sets forth powers that
are "accurately and minutely defined"); see also The Federalist No. 45, at 269 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."). Since the founding.
however, rapid changes in transportation and communication technology have meant
that more activities now come within the scope of various federal powers, such as
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. See Lopez., 514 U.S. at 556-57;
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583-84 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
131. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.").
132. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.").
133. See id. ("No State shall ... pass any... ex post facto Law").
134. This is done by the Supremacy Clause: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Congress need not expressly state that it
is pre-empting state law; courts may infer that Congress has pre-empted state law
when state law conflicts with or impedes the functioning of federal law. See
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (stating
that courts will find that federal law pre-empts an entire subject when "the scheme of
federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation"); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (maintaining that state law is pre-empted when it "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress"); Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 469, 532 (1993); Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?
Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 Case W. Res. L Rev. 823,
830-841 (1995).
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The second, horizontal division of power occurs within the national
level of government, where the framers further divided power among
three branches-the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. 35 In
Federalist No. 51, Madison articulated this great American notion of
separation of powers 3 6 that was intended to protect the liberty of the
people by keeping factions from making ordinary law.137 To do so, the
framers had to take precautions against the possibility that a faction
might momentarily take control of any single branch of the national
government. If that happened, the other branches must have the
interest and ability to defeat the faction-controlled branch. 3
135. Bernard Bailyn explains that the British constitution had a similar notion of
separation of powers, under which the three estates-the crown, the House of Lords,
and the Commons-shared power to make law. See Bailyn, supra note 132, at 70-77.
According to Bailyn:
So long as each component remained within its proper sphere and vigilantly
checked all efforts of the others to transcend their proper boundaries there
would be a stable equilibrium of poised forces each of which, in protecting
its own rights against the encroachments of the others, contributed to the
preservation of the rights of all.
Id. at 70.
136. See The Federalist No. 51, at 288 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the "necessary partition of power among the several departments, as
laid down in the Constitution"). For an intellectual history of separation of powers,
see generally W. B. Gwyn, The Meaning of Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the
Doctrine from Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (1965).
137. See Madison, Vices, supra note 97, at 169 ("Whenever ... an apparent interest
or common passion unites a majority what is to restrain them from unjust violations
of the rights and interests of the minority, or of individuals?"). Madison argues that a
concentration of all government power in one person or body means the end of
liberty:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary
to inspire a universal reprobation of the system.
The Federalist No. 47, at 269 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
138. This is the parallel notion to when a faction posed a threat. Madison's
Federalist No. 10 was not concerned with the existence of faction simpliciter. Rather,
he feared the ability of a faction to put its will into law. See The Federalist No. 10, at
48 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("If a faction consists of less than a
majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to
defeat its sinister views by regular vote."). A faction would pose such a threat only
when the "impulse and the opportunity" to faction "coincide" in a majority of the
public. Id. at 49. In other words, factions could make law only when a majority of
people subscribed to the factious belief or interest and those people could act in
concert to put their belief or interest into law. Id. At the time, Madison argued that a
large nation would minimize the likelihood that either the impulse or the opportunity
to faction would ever coincide. As to impulse, a large nation with many different
regions would likely yield many different, minority factions, preventing the impulse to
faction from existing in a majority of the voting population. Id. As to opportunity,
given the relatively primitive state of communication and travel at the time, a large
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Separation of powers, then, is a series of securities against faction built
into the Constitution.
The first such security against abuse of power was to make each
branch independent of the other as much as practicable. One aspect
of such independence was that members of each branch would play as
little a role as possible in selecting members of the other branches.139
Another aspect of independence is that each branch "should be as
little dependent as possible on those of the others" for their
compensation. 140 By maintaining independence between the
branches, each branch remains free to check the power of the other if
necessary. In doing so, the framers hoped to avoid a domino effect
whereby a faction capturing one branch of government would
inevitably lead to the fall of the other two branches.
The second security against faction was to construct the branches so
that they would have the ability and the interest to check the other
branches. Madison expressed this crucial point as follows:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The
nation would make it practically impossible for a faction to organize and act on a
national scale. Id.
Madison further argues that separation of powers will work only if all branches of
government are given the impulse and opportunity to defend themselves. See id. No.
51, at 289-90 (James Madison). Madison in fact uses the words "means" and
"motive." Id This point is discussed further in the text that follows above.
139. See U.S. Const. art. I § 2 ci. 1 (election of the house); id. § 3 cl. 1 (senators
selected by state legislators); id. art. II § 1 cl.s 2-3 (President selected by electoral
college); see also The Federalist No. 51, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("[T]he members of each [branch] should have as little agency as possible in the
appointment of the members of the others."). As Madison concedes, the Constitution
does not strictly follow this principle. Id. ("Some deviations, therefore, from the
principle must be admitted."). For example, the President and the Senate both have a
role in selecting the members of the judiciary. See U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating
that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law."). Madison explained why this exception to the
independence principle was acceptable:
In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be
inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar
qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration
ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these
qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the
appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of
dependence on the authority conferring them.
Federalist No. 51, at 289 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
140. Id; see U.S. Const. art. II § 1 cl. 7 (President's compensation cannot be
changed during a term in office and President may not receive "any other Emollient"
from the state or national governments while in office); id. art. III § 1 (federal judges'
compensation cannot be decreased).
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provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made
commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the
abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the
greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige
it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
1F,
According to Madison, self-interest, which was the source of faction,
was to be channeled in ways that served the public interest. 42 This
was done by giving each branch the "constitutional means and
personal motives" to check encroachments by each other branch. The
constitutional means would be certain of the powers granted to each
branch under the Constitution. For example, the House of
Representatives has power to check the President by not passing a bill
(and thereby depriving the President of an opportunity to exercise the
power to enforce the laws) or, in extreme cases, by impeaching the
President.'43 The House of Representatives has power to check the
federal judiciary by impeaching members of the judiciary,144 as well as
141. Id. at 289-90.
142. See id. at 290 ("[T]he private interest of every individual may be a sentinel
over the public rights.").
143. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives... shall have
the sole Power of Impeachment."); cf. 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 209-12
(discussing Congress's use of the impeachment power to resolve its dispute with
President Andrew Johnson over Reconstruction); Michael Les Benedict, The
Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson 139 (1973) ("To a large extent...
impeachment [of President Andrew Johnson] had succeeded in its primary goal: to
safeguard Reconstruction from presidential obstruction."). The House's
impeachment power is checked by involving the Senate and the judiciary in the
process: The Senate tries the impeachment with the Chief Justice of the United States
presiding. See U.S. Const. art I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments.... When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside .... "). Hamilton argued that the Senate would play an
important role in checking any politically motivated impeachments emerging from the
House. According to Hamilton, only the Senate "would possess the degree of credit
and authority which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling
the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by
their immediate representatives." The Federalist No. 65, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
144. In Federalist No. 81, Hamilton set forth his belief that the House's power of
impeachment was the most effective check against judicial abuses of power:
[T]he important constitutional check which the power of instituting
impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of determining upon
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sharing power with the Senate to create the lower courts,'45 establish
the number of Supreme Court justices,146 and establish the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.1 47  The President has the power to veto
them in the other, would give to that body upon the members of the judicial
department. This is alone a complete security. There never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the
legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it,
while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption
by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to remove all
apprehensions on the subject it affords, at the same time, a cogent argument
for constituting the Senate a court for the trial of impeachments.
The Federalist No. 81, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Shortly after Marbury v. Madison was decided, the Democrat-Republican House of
Representatives impeached the Federalist Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. See
1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 276-82 (1926). The
impeachment was supposedly driven by Chases's partisan political activities and
statements. See id at 273-82. The Senate, however, was not able to muster the two-
thirds vote needed to convict. See id at 291.
In modem times, the House and the Senate have removed federal judges largely for
illegal behavior while in office. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234-38
(1993) (holding that impeached federal judge's challenge to Senate's trial process was
nonjusticiable political question). Some politicians have recently threatened renewed
use of impeachment as a check against so-called activist judges. See Geyh, supra note
56, at 246 n.16 (quoting Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans Out to Impeach "Activist"
Jurists, Wash. Times, Mar. 12, 1997, at Al (quoting representative as vowing, "[a]s
part of our conservative efforts against judicial activism, we are going after judges")).
145. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.").
146. See id.
147. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1868); Freund, supra
note 34, at 94 ("Congress ... enjoys considerable authority over the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, which it can exercise to cut off the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, as it did in the Reconstruction era, or to place limits on the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts." (footnote omitted)); Geyh, supra note 56, at
246 (discussing jurisdiction-stripping legislation under active consideration). For a
variety of views on the scope of Congress's power to regulate court jurisdiction, see
generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III. Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); Paul M. Bator, Congressional
Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 Vill. L Rev. 1030 (1982); Henry
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit te Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362 (1953).
Congress has also attempted to check judicial power by canceling terms of the
Supreme Court. An example is the aftermath of the election of 1800. Prior to the
election, the Federalist Congress passed the Circuit Court Act of 1801 which created
new lower federal courts. Predictably, the Federalist President John Adams and the
Federalist-controlled Congress filled these new judgeships with Federalists. See 11
George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Foundations of Power. John Marshall, 1801-15, at 129 (1981). Another
part of th6 Act eliminated the need for Supreme Court justices to "ride circuit"-to
have to travel the country to hear trial court cases. See id. at 114. The practice of
riding circuit had been an onerous burden on the justices. See id. ("The almost
unbearable hardships of circuit riding, which were caused in part by the scarce and
primitive transportation facilities in undeveloped portions of the country, continued
to result in accidents, delays, and fatigue."). When Thomas Jefferson's Democratic-
Republicans took over the executive and legislative branches in 1801, they faced a
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legislation, which protects against abuse of the legislative power. 48
Once each branch has the necessary constitutional means to check
other branches, the members of each branch must also be motivated
to do so. 149 The unexercised power to check is useless. 5 ° So, how did
the framers hope to motivate each branch to exercise its checking
function? A simple phrase from Federalist No. 51 provides the
answer: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."'' The
primary ambitions of the members of each branch will be to remain in
office and to expand the power of members of that branch. 52
newly enlarged Federalist judiciary and a newly energized Federalist Supreme Court,
led by Chief Justice John Marshall. See id. at 126-35. One of the new Congress's first
acts was to repeal the Circuit Court Act of 1801, effectively sending the Supreme
Court back out riding circuit and abolishing the new judgeships created by that law.
See id. at 163-68. Congress, however, had doubts about the constitutionality of its
repeal of the Circuit Court Act of 1801. See id.; James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 Stan.
L. Rev. 219, 224-27 (1992). Fearing that the Federalist courts would hold the repeal
unconstitutional, Congress canceled two successive terms of the Supreme Court to
prevent the case from being heard. See Haskins & Johnson, supra, at 184. The
cancellations also delayed the Court from hearing Marbury v. Madison for over a
year, though historical evidence suggests that a challenge to the repeal of the Circuit
Court Act of 1801 was the direct impetus behind the cancellations. See id. ("In 1802,
while the Marbury case was pending before the Court, Congress, by a strictly partisan
vote, repealed the 1801 Act and then passed a law postponing the next session of the
Supreme Court for over a year, apparently out of fear that the Court would declare
the repealing Act unconstitutional."). The Court later heard the matter and upheld
the constitutionality of the repeal. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 298 (1803).
148. See U.S. Const. art. I § 7 cl. 2. It has fallen to each President to determine how
he would exercise the veto power. For example, President George Washington
reserved the veto for legislation he believed to be unconstitutional. See Forrest
McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 184-85 (1974). More recently,
however, Presidents have used the veto power as a tool in forming public policy. See 1
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 68 ("Today's Presidents use their veto power to further
their programmatic ambitions.").
149. See Scanlan, supra note 125, at 660 ("What confronts us in The Federalist is
not so much a comprehensive theory of 'human nature' as a theory of 'human
motivation,' related to political action.").
150. See id.
In judging a plan of government, the authors of The Federalist consider
'human nature' because the acceptance and successful operation of any
system of government depends in countless ways upon human action. For
the proposed Constitution to prosper, an intricate network of supporting
actions is required; and for the Constitution to promote the public good,
some of the possible actions of men must be encouraged and others
discouraged.
Id.
151. The Federalist No. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
152. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 56 ("Most commonly the discussion of power
centered on its essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its endlessly propulsive
tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries."); see also The Federalist No.
48, at 276 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It will not be denied, that
power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from
passing the limits assigned to it."). Bailyn also noted the colonists' belief that human
nature was the propelling force behind the expansion of power: "[W]hat turned power
into a malignant force, was not its own nature so much as the nature of man-his
susceptibility to corruption and his lust for self-aggrandizement." Bailyn, supra note
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Hamilton argued that one of the "inducements to good behavior"
under the Constitution was a desire to remain in office because "the
desire of reward is one of the strongest incentives of human
conduct."' 3 The recent literature on public choice theory and positive
political theory has emphasized this point.Y' The second ambition is a
restatement of the wel-worn political maxim that power corrupts.
The colonists recognized this point: "Most commonly the discussion of
power centered on its essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its
endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate
boundaries." 5 Pursuit of these two ambitions would be shaped by
each branch's constituency as well as the anticipated response from
the other branches.us Consider each in turn.
Each branch of the federal government, as well as each chamber of
Congress, answers to a different constituency.151 First, consider
132, at 59 (emphasis added).
153. The Federalist No. 72, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see Rakove, supra note 97, at 285 (discussing Hamilton's argument); Scanlan,
supra note 125, at 676 ("The Constitution provides for frequent elections, assuring the
continuing operation of these motives.").
154. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 22 (1991) ("The core of economic models is a jaundiced view of
legislative motivation. [E]conomists ... postulate that legislators are motivated solely
by self-interest. In particular, legislators maximize their likelihood of reelection. A
legislator who is not reelected loses all the other possible benefits flowing from
office.").
155. Bailyn, supra note 124, at 56; see Adair, supra note 125, at 140-48; Robert A.
Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 8 (1956) (describing a Madisonian hypothesis
that underlay the theory of government behind the Constitution) ("Men are
instruments of their desires. They pursue their desires to satiation if given the
opportunity. One such desire is the desire for power over other individuals, for not
only is power directly satisfying but it also has great instrumental value because a
wide variety of satisfactions depend upon it."); Hamilton, supra note 53, at 6 ("The
Framers believed that the distribution of power was the best insurance against
tyranny because power by its very nature is propulsive."). Speakers expressed this
sentiment at the drafting and ratifying conventions. See IV Elliot's Debates, supra
note 116, at 204 (William Lenoir speaking before the North Carolina ratifying
convention: "We ought to consider the depravity of human nature, the predominant
thirst of power which is in the breast of every one, the temptations our rulers may
have, and the unlimited confidence placed in them by this system."); 1 Farrand, supra
note 22, at 82 (Benjamin Franklin speaking before the federal drafting convention:
"[Tihere are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men.
These are ambition and avarice; the love of power and the love of money."); id. at 284
(Hamilton speaking at the federal drafting convention: that "Men love power" is one
of "the great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government."); id. at
578 (George Mason speaking at the federal drafting convention: "From the nature of
man we may be sure, that those who have power in their hands will not give it up
while they can retain it. On the contrary we know they will always when they can
rather increase it.").
156. See Rakove, supra note 97, at 282 ("Federalist 51 does not so much explain
how these ambitions will work as assume that differences in election and tenure
among the branches will foster the desired attachment between 'personal motives'
and 'constitutional rights."').
157. See The Federalist No. 60, at 336 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
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Congress. The House answers directly to the people, with its
members elected by direct popular vote unmediated by state
institutions.158 Conversely, the Senate originally answered to the
states, with its members elected by the respective state legislatures.'59
Consequently, "[n]o law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then of a majority
of the States."1" Senators, however, were not conceived as mere
pawns of the state legislatures. Indeed, senators were given longer
terms-six years, as opposed to two-year terms in the House-to give
them some distance from their electors and time to persuade their
electors of the wisdom of their policy choices. Yet, in the end, the
decision whether to return a senator still lay with the state
legislatures.
Second, the President answers to the nation as a whole. With such a
1961) ("The House of Representatives' being to be elected immediately by the
people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that
purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to
cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of
electors."); see also 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 184 (describing different ways that
the branches "represent" the People); Douglass Adair, "Experience Must Be Our
Only Guide": History, Democratic Theory, and the United States Constitution, in Fame
and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair 107, 113 (Trevor Colboum ed.,
1974); Beard, supra note 98, at 161-63 (analyzing the framers' intent in establishing
separate branches government).
158. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States...").
159. The Seventeenth Amendment, enacted in a moment of intense populist spirit,
changed the Senate rule to direct popular election of each senator by all voters in the
state. See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the
Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 165, 169 (1997). Even with this change, though, the senators retain a state-
wide constituency-representing the interests of an entire state-while House
members represent the local interests of the people, undifferentiated by state
affiliation. See infra note 161.
160. The Federalist No. 62, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
161. This Article focuses on the Constitution's original design, leaving for a later
project the implications of intervening changes such as the Seventeenth Amendment(direct election of the Senate) and the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet, even after the
Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate remains linked to state-wide interests while the
House is tied more closely to local concerns. This point was made by a House
committee considering a constitutional amendment to require election of the House
by districts:
The popular branch of the National Legislature should exhibit a faithful
image of the people. When, for example, a State is divided in its interests
and opinions, when some districts are agricultural, some manufacturing, and
some commercial, and, if you will, when some are republican and some
federal, each of those districts of people should have a fair representation in
Congress. Because one interest or one party happen to be predominant in a
State, it is no adequate reason that the rest should be disfranchised and have
no voice in the national councils. This, indeed, would not be a
representation of the people, but of the States ....
38 Annals of Cong. 855 (1823).
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large constituency, the President would be least affected by factious
interests. A nation as large as the United States would have many
small factions, and a majority of the population was unlikely to form
around a factious interest or belief.11 The President, then, would not
likely be captured by faction. Instead, the President would need to
appeal to a large cross-section of the country, seeking compromise or
common ground.16 This need for compromise would push candidates
for the Presidency to view the world and every problem from the
perspective of the welfare of all of the nation, making the executive a
moderating influence on Congress. 64
Third, the judiciary does not directly answer to any constituency.
Instead, given the presumed learning and background of judges, they
are to act on judicial "judgment," which Hamilton directly opposed to
the political "will" motivating the President and Congress.65 The
ability to exercise "judgment" comes from the judges' training in the
substance and method of the law." Thus, while judges are not
directly accountable to any constituency, they are constrained not
merely by the Constitution's prescribed role, but also and importantly
by their legal training.167
162. See The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Even if a majority faction existed, Madison argued that it could not recognize itself
and adequately organize to make law. At the time, this was an accurate picture, given
the state of national communication and transportation. Today, of course, those
obstacles have been substantially lessened.
163. It is probably for this reason that President Richard Nixon remarked that to
win the Presidency a Republican candidate must run to the right in the primary and to
the center in the general election. See Richard Stengel, Bob & Bill's Beltway Bake-
Off. How Do You Cook Up Laws and Roast Each Other at the Sante Time? Dole and
Clinton Are About to Show What Happens When the Campaign Conies to Washington,
Time, Mar. 25, 1996, at 53 ("It was Nixon's commonplace advice to run to the right in
the primaries, then back to the left in the general election."). According to Nixon,
this switch is required because the Republican primaries are dominated by
conservative voters while the general electorate is more mainstream. This problem,
of course, is not new. Thomas Jefferson assumed this point when he ran for
President:
Jefferson's system [of governing] assumed that in a nation like the United
States, where sectional, economic, and other group lines cut across parties in
a maze of overlapping memberships, and hence where neither major party
could abuse any major interest without alienating people in its own ranks-
that a governing majority in such a nation could not afford politically to be
immoderate, because it could not afford to alienate moderate voters holding
the balance of power.
Bums, supra note 95, at 40. This problem is inherent in the Presidency in a party
system, which may require a candidate to appease a particular faction to get
nominated, but will require approval of the moderate general electorate to gain
office. Cf. The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing mode of electing
the president).
164. See Burns, supra note 95, at 40.
165. See The Federalist No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
166. See infra notes 299-31 and accompanying text.
167. See Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 163-70, 179.
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The judiciary also has the advantage of insulation from the political
process that caters to petty, selfish interests. Federal judges, have life
tenure and thus do not depend directly on the People to keep their
jobs."6 For this reason, we trust the courts to decide "cases" and
"controversies"-which naturally will have selfish interests or factions
represented on each side-according to the law. Judges will look to
something beyond what the majority of people want in a given case;
presumably, what they believe the law provides.'69 In doing so, judges
will remain faithful to their professional training, which includes
instruction in both the substance and the method of the law. The
judiciary, then, is itself a check on faction.1 70
Each branch, then, has a different motivation derived from the need
to please a different constituency or, in the case of the judiciary, the
relative freedom from a constituency coupled with its legal training. 171
Ambition being what it is, the framers believed that members of each
branch would not be shy about exercising their delegated powers in
pursuit of their ambitions. If the ambitions of different branches
come into conflict, those branches will check one another, and no
ordinary law will be made. 72
168. See The Federalist No. 78, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions in the
minor party in the community.
169. Of course, the laws applied by the courts will in many cases be the product of
bodies that indirectly reflect majority will. Also, as discussed below, the other
branches and the People can register their disagreement with judges' decisions or
methods and, in doing so, can exert an attenuated check on the judiciary.
170. See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 325 (1991):
Many, including Madison in his later years, concluded that the judiciary was
the only governmental institution that came close to resembling an umpire,
standing above the marketplace of competing interests and rendering
impartial and disinterested decisions. It seemed the only public place left in
democratic America where a trace of classical aristocracy and virtue could
be found. Some even thought that the very "existence" of America's
elective governments depended on the judiciary-the institution most
removed from the people and most immune to the pressures of private
interests.
171. In addition, the different tenures in office set for each branch-two years for
the House, four years for the President, six years for the Senate, and life for federal
judges-ensured "that a complete renewal of the government at one stroke is
impossible." Beard, supra note 98, at 162.
172. Some commentators have suggested a helpful caveat to this principle. While
each branch has the power to check the other, that does not preclude less antagonistic
inter-branch interchange. See Geyh, supra note 56, at 246-48; see generally Robert A.
Katzmann, Courts and Congress (1997). These commentators rightly note that the
branches might foster a spirit of comity, as well as a spirit of restraint before resorting
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The Court's recent Commerce Clause case, United States v.
Lopez,'73 is an example of these checks and balances at work." In
Lopez, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Gun
Free School Zones Act of 1990. The Act, which prohibited possession
of a firearm within a thousand feet of a school, was like baseball and
apple pie-what red-blooded American could possibly object? 1" It is
hard to imagine a politician leading the opposition, sounding the
battle cry, "Put guns back in our schools!" To paraphrase a favorite
slogan of movie reviewers, the Gun Free School Zones Act was the
"feel good" law of the year.176 This plays directly into Madison's
argument about ambition. Following their ambition to stay in office,
Congress had passed a bill that had great public appeal, cost the
taxpayers little if any money, and that largely duplicated state laws on
the topic. Additionally, Congress made no attempt, either in the
statute's text or its legislative history, to tie the statute to any
constitutional grant of law-making power, such as the Commerce
Clause.'7
In the Supreme Court, ambition checked ambition. The Court was
sensitive to the criticism that it no longer seriously reviewed federal
statutes passed under the Commerce Clause. Commentators, as well
as members of the Court, had complained that the Court would allow
Congress to pass virtually any law in the name of regulating interstate
to the arsenal of checks and balances. See Geyh, supra note 56, at 255-57. Such a
spirit, if successfully cultivated and maintained, might forestall abuses of power and
thus abate the need to check such abuses. The wise decision-maker will recognize this
facet of the system of checks and balances.
173. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
174. For discussion of other examples, see Devins & Fisher, supra note 27.
175. A task force of the ABA's Criminal Justice section appointed to examine the
criminalization of federal law has found:
The Task Force was told explicitly by more than one source that many of
these new federal laws are passed not because federal prosecution of these
crimes is necessary but because federal crime legislation in general is
thought to be politically popular. Put another way, it is not considered
politically wise to vote against crime legislation, even if it is misguided,
unnecessary, and even harmful.
James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, A.B.A. Sec. Crim. Just. 2
(1998). For more information, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L Rev. 26, 71
(1994) ("There are few interest groups to derail feel-good, do-something federal
crime bills .... ); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws:
The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke LJ. 1, 1 (1997) ("Criminals are not popular. No
politician in recent memory has lost an election for being too tough on crime.").
176. Given that almost every state had a similar law on the books, it is difficult to
imagine what practical impact the law would have. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Instead, the law provided a good opportunity for
lawmakers to put on a good show, while costing the taxpayers little, if any, extra
money. The implementation apparatus was already in place, though would be
somewhat more burdened by this new criminal law.
177. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-63.
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commerce, effectively removing all limits on Congress's power.78 As
the Gun Free School Zones Act exemplifies, Congress had become
emboldened by that prospect.
In Lopez, however, the Court served notice that the Commerce
Clause did indeed have judicially enforceable limits. After reviewing
several factors, the Court concluded that the Act did not have the
requisite connection with interstate commerce. 179 Lopez could signal
the Court's renewed willingness to aggressively interpret the
Commerce Clause.1 80  Or, Lopez might simply be a warning shot
across Congress's bow that the Commerce Clause has some limits. 8'
Either way, the case shows Congress's ambition (pass a popular law to
get re-elected) checked by the Court's ambition (to assert some role in
defining the scope of federal power). When these ambitions
conflicted, the federal government made no law.
To the three branches of government, we must also add the over-
arching check envisioned by the framers: the People.'12 It is no
accident that the Constitution's Preamble says that "We the People of
the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America." '83 As discussed later, one of the framers'
great innovations was to place ultimate sovereignty in "the People" of
178. See Tribe, supra note 1, §§ 5-7, at 313 ("The doctrinal rules courts currently
employ to determine whether federal legislation is affirmatively authorized under the
Commerce Clause do not themselves effectively limit the power of Congress.");
Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal
Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 Yale L.J. 1273, 1283 (1977) ("For
decades the limiting doctrine of delegated and enumerated powers has been eroded,
and the scope of national government has been vastly expanded."); see also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307-08 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Although it is clear that the people, through the States,
delegated authority to Congress to 'regulate Commerce... among the several
States,' ... one could easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal
system exists only at the sufferance of Congress." (citations omitted)). Prior to
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the Court's opinion in that case, had
consistently warned against such a result in prior cases. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Jeff Powell, The Compleat
Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 Yale L.J. 1317, 1346-51 (1982)
(discussing Rehnquist's many separate opinions warning against undue expansion of
federal power).
179. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-68.
180. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 643,
643-44 (1996) (describing initial reactions of some commentators to the Lopez
decision).
181. See Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 877, 881-83
(1996).
182. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 65 (describing the colonists' belief that "the
preservation of liberty rested on the ability of the people to maintain effective checks
on the wielders of power, and hence in the last analysis rested on the vigilance and
moral stamina of the people"); Hamilton, supra note 21, at 6 (describing the people as
"the invisible fourth branch, a branch that is just as important as any of the other
three federal branches .... ).
183. U.S. Const. preamble.
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the nation and not, as Britain had done, in a branch of government. s
As the sovereign, the People had created a Constitution that
delegated some power to the new federal government, restricted state
power in some ways, and left themselves free to exercise all remaining
power in their respective states. In their states, the People also
pursued limited government by enacting constitutions that delegated
and limited power.1" Thus, in delegating only limited power to their
rulers, the People placed the first check on government power.
Once the delegation was made, the People retained three main
checks over the exercise of that power. The first check was the
accountability of all government officials. In different ways, the
President, the House, and the Senate are all accountable to the
People.1" If any branch of government attempts to abuse its power,
the People stand ready to exert their influence at periodic elections.187
As Professor Rebecca Brown has shown, this was to be the main
function of accountability-protecting against abuse of power."
Human ambition reinforced this check. As mentioned before, a part
of human ambition would be the desire to remain in office, to
maintain one's power. To do so, a politician must not incur the ire of
her constituents. Thus, politicians have a natural incentive to consider
the wishes of their constituents to different degrees.19
Even the judiciary is indirectly accountable to the People. The
People's representatives appoint the judiciary, and those
representatives hold the ultimate power of impeachment and removal
from office. 19  Also, the many political checks discussed above-
refusal to increase salary, manipulation of docket or jurisdiction-can
be enacted at the insistence of the People.1 91 Ultimately, the courts
depend on the cooperation of the coordinate branches, which are
accountable to the People, for enforcement of their judgments."9 In
184. See infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
185. See Rakove, supra note 97, at 30-31; Wood, Creation, supra note 97, at 150-54.
186. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
187. See Brown, supra note 8, at 565 ("Elections provide the people with an
opportunity to punish those who have violated their duty by invading the liberties of
the people. The problem with unaccountable government is that there is no one to
blame if oppression ensues.").
188. See generally Brown, supra note 8.
189. As the framers intended, some members of the federal government %%ill be
tied to their constituents more closely than others. See supra notes 156-71 and
accompanying text.
190. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 91-98; Walter F. Murphy & Joseph
Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985, 992
(1990); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitinmacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights,
43 Duke L. 703,715 (1994).
191. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
192. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 94 ("Lacking the power to appropriate
funds or command the military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that
garners public acceptance.").
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short, the judiciary cannot ignore the People or their
representatives. 193
In addition to periodic elections, Article V gives the People a
second check over government abuse of power: The power to amend
the Constitution acting through their states. 94 If Congress proposes
an amendment to the Constitution, 5 three-fourths of the states must
ratify the amendment.19 6 Or, upon the request of two-thirds of the
states, a "Convention" shall be called to propose amendments for
ratification by the states.1" In both instances, the People, acting
through their state and federal representatives, retain power to
change the Constitution itself.198 Ultimately, "Our revolutions are to
be peaceful."' 99
If Article V provides a peaceful means of revolution, the Second
Amendment, the People's third check on the federal government,200
acknowledges that violent means might someday be required.
Framers who had just concluded a violent revolution to break from a
government they opposed could not ignore this contingency. Thus,
while many checks were built in the system, violent revolution was a
failsafe. For this reason, the Second Amendment guarantees "the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms" in order that "[a] well
regulated Militia" could safeguard "the security of a free State. '20'
The "militia" mentioned by the amendment referred to members of
193. Cf. Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 (1901) ("[T]h' supreme
court follows th' iliction returns."). Also, the Supreme Court should be able to rely
on the People's respect for the law as an aid to keeping other branches in check. As
one commentator has explained: "America is a legalistic country. As soon as
reformers attempt an end run around established principles and procedures, they will
hand their opponents a potent political weapon." See 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at
12-13.
194. See U.S. Const. art. V. The People's recourse to the amendment process was
not intended to be a common occurrence. See The Federalist No. 49, at 282 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A]s every appeal to the people would carry
an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in great
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on
everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would not
possess the requisite stability.").
195. See U.S. Const. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . ").
196. See id. (proposed amendment "shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress .... ).
197. See id. ("Congress... on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments ... ").
198. One commentator has also noted the importance of the First Amendment
rights of petition and assembly to this aspect of self-government. See Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1146-57 (1991).
199. Goldstein, supra note 11, at 6.
200. See Amar, supra note 198, at 1163 ("History... connected the right to keep
and bear arms with the idea of popular sovereignty.").
201. U.S. Const. amend. II.
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the community who would stand ready to defend their locality against
oppression by a distant and detached national government. '
Neighbor would fight along side neighbor to defend their homes and
their liberty. Citizens must possesses near constant vigilance in case
all other checks fail. And if all other checks fail, Americans might
have to go to war again to fight for their freedom. To ensure that this
check retained its bite, the Second Amendment does not allow the
federal government to defang the People. 3
In their role as the ultimate check, the People also play a role when
the branches disagree about the proper meaning of the Constitution.
In that event, the system of checks and balances could become
deadlocked, or could descend into chaos, if different branches
disagree with one another and none is prepared to back downl 4 The
potential for gridlock is the source of an important criticism of the
check and balances approach. Professor John Pomeroy gives a
concise statement of this criticism:
What ruinous, destructive consequences would immediately result, if
it should be practically admitted that the several departments might
independently judge and decide as to the extent and character of the
powers conferred by the Constitution! The collisions would as
readily and as often arise between the Executive and the legislature
as between either and the Judiciary. To illustrate: Congress passes a
statute, which the President, deeming unconstitutional, vetoes. It is
passed again, notwithstanding his objections, and thus becomes a
law. The duty devolves upon the President to execute this law; but
he, still regarding it as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution,
and judging thereof independently, refuses to carry it into operation,
although perhaps the courts may have pronounced it valid, and have
adjudicated upon rights created by it; the law is thus made a dead
letter. How often must such circumstances arise to render the
government an object of contempt, rather than of veneration and
202 See Amar, supra note 198, at 1166 ("In 1789, when used without any qualifying
adjective, 'the militia' referred to all Citizens capable of bearing arms.").
203. See id. at 1163.
An aristocratic central government, lacking sympathy with and confidence
from ordinary constituents, might dare to resist [the will of the People]-
especially if that government were propped up by a standing army of lackeys
and hirelings (mercenaries, vagrants, convicts, aliens, and the like). Only an
armed populace could deter such an awful spectacle. Hence the need to bar
Congress from disarming freemen.
Id
204. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 8 (asserting that each branch interpreting the
Constitution for itself would lead to "utter chaos-everyone at every juncture
interprets and applies the Constitution for himself"); Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury
v. Madison and Judicial Review 1-30 (1989) (describing the checks and balances view
as "at best a prescription for constitutional anarchy"); Pomeroy, supra note 27, § 140,
at 94 (allowing each branch of government to interpret the Constitution for itself
would make "a mockery of government"); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 94-101; Anthony
Lewis, Law or Power, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23 (allowing each branch to
interpret the Constitution for itself "invite[s] anarchy").
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love? 205
Another commentator has leveled a similar charge against the
checks and balances view, labeling it "arbitrary review. ' '21 According
to this commentator, "[a]rbitrary in this theory denotes that chance
must inevitably determine the outcome of any contest over who has
the power to give a final authoritative interpretation of the
Constitution. ' '2°7 In short, these critics complain that the checks and
balances view does not offer meta-rules that-like in the game rock-
scissors-paper-decide which branch's interpretation trumps that of
the other branches. 2
As their writings show, Madison and Jefferson did not foresee a
need for a meta-rule of interpretation. Rather, they accepted the
possibility that the different branches would disagree about the
meaning of the Constitution.2 9 Madison wrote:
It may happen... that different independent departments... may,
in the exercise of their functions, interpret the constitution
differently, and thence lay claim to the same power. This difference
of opinion is an inconvenience not entirely to be avoided. It results
from what may be called... a concurrent right to expound the
constitution. 210
Elsewhere, Madison argued that each branch of the federal
government "must, in the exercise of its functions, be guided by the
text of the Constitution according to its own interpretation of
it .... ,,211 If the different branches disagreed, "the prevalence of the
one or the other department must depend on the nature of the case, as
receiving its final decision from the one or the other .... "212 Jefferson
put his faith in "the prudence of the public functionaries, and
authority of public opinion [to] produce accommodation" in the event
the branches disagreed.213 In these controversies, the People would
205. Pomeroy, supra note 27, § 138, at 93.
206. Clinton, supra note 204, at 25.
207. Id.
208. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 27, at 1361-62.
209. See Snowiss, supra note 66, at 98 ("The absence of any mechanism for
authoritative exposition of the Constitution meant that differences among the
branches would have to be resolved by some form of concurrent review.... Madison
and Jefferson accepted this solution, even though it entailed practical difficulties.").
210. James Madison, Letter of Helvidius No. II (Aug. 24, 1793), in 4 The Founders'
Constitution 71 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
211. Unaddressed letter from James Madison (1834), in 4 Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 349 (J.B. Lippincott ed., 1865) [hereinafter Unaddressed
Madison Letter]. In a debate over whether Congress could limit the President's
removal power, Madison asked on what basis one could argue that "any one
department draws from the Constitution greater powers than another, in marking out
the limits of the powers of the several departments." 1 Annals of Cong. 500 (1789).
212. Unaddressed Madison Letter, supra note 211, at 349.
213. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. Torrance, June 11, 1815, in 9 The
Writings of Jefferson 518 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
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break the deadlock when it became clear which side of the debate had
gained their confidence.1 4 If the People are hopelessly divided,
however, then deadlock will continue. Given the framers' pre-
disposition against ordinary law-making, reviewed above,2 5 deadlock
is not necessarily a bad thing. If government and the People are
divided, then perhaps it is best that no ordinary law is made, rather
than permitting the possibility that a faction might make ordinary law.
The above criticism misses the point. The Constitution does not
ordain one branch as interpreter document, nor does it establish rules
of priority for one branch's interpretation over that of another.
Instead, the Constitution sets forth a carefully crafted set of
procedures for the system of checks and balances, and the play of that
system will yield constitutional decisions.
While the outcomes of the checks and balances process might not
be predictable beforehand, they are in no sense arbitrary, as one
commentator has charged.2 16 In this way, the system of checks and
balances could be analogized to a sporting event, such as a baseball
game. Before the game, one cannot know with certainty who will win,
but that does not mean that the final score will be arbitrary. Rather,
the players will follow pre-set rules that tell them what moves are
permissible. Within that framework, certain strategies vill make
sense and others will not, and certain abilities will be valued over
others.217 Within the rules, the team with the better strategy, ability,
and execution will win the game. The outcome will not be arbitrary;
214. Bruce Ackerman has discussed how deadlock among the different branches
will cause each branch to decide whether to switch its position or continue fighting for
what it believes. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 125. Specifically, he describes how
the People decided constitutional disputes between the branches during the
Reconstruction and New Deal eras. See id. at 44-57. During Reconstruction,
President Andrew Johnson believed that the Republican efforts at Reconstruction
were beyond Congress's power, Congress, obviously, disagreed. This constitutional
disagreement came to a head in the impeachment of President Johnson. Professor
Ackerman argues that the People ultimately decided this constitutional impasse
during the election of 1868, putting their electoral weight behind the Republicans and
Reconstruction. See id. at 48; 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 209-12. Similarly,
President Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court disagreed over the proper scope
of federal power to regulate the national economy: Roosevelt backed broad federal
power in his New Deal legislation, and the Court favored narrow federal power in its
rulings striking down pieces of that legislation. Once again, the constitutional impasse
led to an inter-branch confrontation as Roosevelt proposed a plan to pack the
Supreme Court with sympathetic justices. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 47-49.
As Professor Ackerman tells the story, in the 1938 elections, the People backed
Roosevelt's expansive view of federal power and the Supreme Court backed down in
its famous "switch in time." Id at 49. Professor Ackerman examines each of these
episodes in much greater detail in the second volume of his work We the People. See 2
Ackerman, supra note 11.
215. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
216. See Clinton, supra note 204, at 25.
217. See generally Tim McCarver, Tim McCarver's Baseball for Brain Surgeons
and Other Fans (1998).
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after the game, we will be able to determine why one team won and
the other did not and draw lessons from the outcome. Similarly, the
system of checks and balances anticipates that the three branches of
government will play by the rules in the Constitution and pursue
advantageous strategies to the best of their ability. By playing this
game, one branch's constitutional interpretation ultimately will
prevail over the others. While we could not predict which branch
would win, their win was not arbitrary, but rather was the result of a
finely wrought process.
This section has shown how the framers' suspicion of democratic
law-making led them to create a system of checked and balanced
power. Each branch of the federal government has both the means
and motive to check abuses by the other branches, and the People
stand as an overall check on the system. For this system to work, each
branch must stand ready to fulfill its constitutional function. Only
when a law-makes its way through this minefield can it bind the
People. Not surprisingly, the framers intended law-making to be rare.
The next section begins by explaining this point, and then explains
why a rule of judicial deference would upset the system of checks and
balances.
c. Making Ordinary Law-Making Difficult: The Role of Judicial
Review
As the above discussion shows, both in theory and in practice, the
Constitution establishes an elaborate set of interlocking powers that
allow each branch of the federal government to check the other and
the People to check all three. This system was born of the framers'
suspicion of popular law-making-the fear of faction."' 8 To thwart
faction, the framers built a status quo bias, through the system of
checks and balances, into the Constitution.219 Political scientist James
MacGregor Burns summarizes these points well:
The key to Madison's thinking is his central aim to stop people from
turning easily to government for help. Today, when many people
want protection by or through government, and not just protection
from government, the power of a minority to stop the majority from
218. See supra notes 97-35 and accompanying text; see also Stephen Macedo, The
New Right v. The Constitution 28 (1987) ("Direct democracy and majoritarianism
were decisively rejected by the Framers, and the system of government established
by the Constitution embodies this rejection."); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of
Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L.J. 1503, 1522 (1990) ("If the Constitution's Framers
were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre manner of demonstrating
their affection.").
219. See Macedo, supra note 218, at 28 ("Staggered elections, long terms for
senators and the president, the system of separated powers, and the embrace by one
national government of a large or 'extended' republic were all designed by the
Framers to make it difficult for a national majority to gain effective control of the
government.").
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acting through government may be as arbitrary as majority rule
seemed to Madison. The fact is that Madison believed in a
government of sharply limited powers. His efforts at Philadelphia to
shift powers from the states to the new national government were
intended more to thwart popular majorities in the states from
passing laws for their own ends than to empower national majorities
to pass laws for their ends. For the new national government was
supposed to tame and temper popular majorities-which some
states had been unable to do. This meant weaker government-but
it was Madison, after all, who said that the necessity of any
government was a misfortune and a reflection on human nature.
Government, in short, was a necessary evil that must be curbed, not
an instrument for the realization of men's higher ideals or a nation's
broader interests.22°
Ordinary law-making was a "necessary evil," to be used in the
service of greater liberty. With the specter of faction always lurking
nearby, that power was to be used sparingly. Ultimately, faction was
checked by piling roadblock upon roadblock in the way of ordinary
law-making. As shall be explained later, robust judicial review is an
essential roadblock on the path of ordinary law-making.
We can now return to the question that began this section."' Recall
that we were analyzing the logic behind judicial deference to Congress
and the President on close constitutional questions. When Congress
and the President join to enact a statute, we have an instance of
accountable ordinary law-making. If the federal courts believe the
statute is unconstitutional, they can prevent ordinary law-making by
striking down the statute.m Thus, when Congress and the President,
on the one hand, and the courts, on the other hand, disagree about the
meaning of the Constitution, the question is whether there is anything
special about the accountability of Congress or the President that
requires us to prefer accountable ordinary law-making over no
ordinary law-making? The preceding discussion should show that the
answer is "no" for several reasons.
220. Bums, supra note 95, at 21-22 (emphasis added); see Richard Hofstadter, The
American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It 8-9 (1948) ("A properly
designed state, the Fathers believed, would check interest with interest, class with
class, faction with faction, and one branch of government with another in a
harmonious system of mutual frustration."); Brown, supra note 8, at 553 ("At every
turn, they buffered majority will, insulated representatives from direct influence of
majority factions, and provided checks on majority decision making. The framers of
the Constitution were afraid of government, even if made up of officials elected by
the people."); Jonathon Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L Rev. 795, 803
(1997) ("The Framers created a government perfectly suited to do virtually nothing.
Every avenue to power is checked and balanced; every possibility to create a cohesive
political movement is weakened or criminalized. The Founders realized this.").
221. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
222. Justice Scalia notes, though with disapproval, that the tendency of greater
judicial review is to prevent ordinary law-making. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 41-44 (1997).
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First, within each branch, ambition is to counteract ambition,
suggesting that no branch owes necessary deference to the judgments
of any other branch. If deference is given, it must be out of a
pragmatic or political judgment that such action is necessary to
forestall retaliation by another branch.' A general rule of judicial
deference, however, is not part of the Constitution's design.
Second, the framers deliberately set out to place obstacles in the
path of federal ordinary law-making. The bias in the system is against
ordinary law-making2 4 In close cases, then, the default position in
the system should be to prefer no ordinary law-making to ordinary
law-making, or at least to prefer greater checks to lesser checks. For
this reason, the federal courts should act on their own understanding
of the Constitution in deciding cases (as with robust judicial review).
Bickel's objection to judicial review ignores these important points.
Recall that the framers' overriding fear was that faction would take
hold of government to make ordinary law. Only in doing so could a
faction oppress the liberty of the People. The only way that the power
of judicial review could pose such a threat would be to uphold abusive
laws passed by factions.' Indeed, outside of perhaps statutory
223. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 175. Professors Eskridge and Frickey
argue that such "institutional rationality and interdependence" is common:
[LJaw is an equilibrium, a state of balance among competing forces or
institutions. Congress, the executive, and the courts engage in purposive
behavior. Each branch seeks to promote its vision of the public interest, but
only as that vision can be achieved within a complex, interactive setting in
which each organ of government is both cooperating with and competing
with the other organs. To achieve its goals, each branch also acts
strategically, calibrating its actions in anticipation of how other institutions
would respond.
Id. at 28-29. This point is further elaborated in Part III.D, in the discussion of the role
of constitutional theory. See infra notes 353-395 and accompanying text. Also,
Professor Philip Bobbitt has explained that the Supreme Court will often justifyjudicial inaction with regard to concern about its own legitimacy or place in the
federal government. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 13, at 59-73; see also
Bickel, supra note 22, at 111-98 (discussing the "passive virtues," whereby the Court
takes itself out of a case out of concern for its political legitimacy).
224. See The Federalist No. 73, at 411-12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that
of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to
the other. But this objection will have little weight with those who can
properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the
laws, which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our
governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the
excess of lawmaking, and to keep things in the same state in which they
happen to be at any given period as much more likely to do good than harm;
because it is favorable to greater stability in the system of legislation. The
injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be
amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
Id.
225. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 192 (noting that the "danger" of judicial
review is that, "despite their life tenure, [judges] will be unduly timid when a master
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interpretation, the federal judiciary does not have any power to make
factious ordinary law.' Instead, it stands as a bulwark against such
ordinary law-making:
[The judiciary] can never attack with success either of the other two
[branches]; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to
defend itself against their attacks. [T]hough individual oppression
may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general
liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter, I
mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislature and the executive. . . . [A]s, from the natural feebleness
of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of bein overpowered,
awed, or influenced by its coordinate branches ....
The main threat of the judiciary to the People occurs when, and only
when, the judiciary joins with the other two branches to make
ordinary law in response to faction. The judiciary does not threaten
liberty by performing the constitutional check of robust judicial
review, which merely prevents ordinary law-making.
Third, rejecting judicial deference does not mean courts will be free
to write their own factious interests into the Constitution. Rather, the
politician somehow induces our so-called representatives to betray the People's
constitutional commands"); The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Bickel
recognizes a related point, when he argues that courts should take seriously their
power to not decide cases:
The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court wields a
threefold power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with
principle. It may validate, or, in Charles L. Black's better word, "legitimate"
legislation as consistent with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do
neither, and therein lies the secret of its ability to maintain itself in the
tension between principle and expediency.
Bickel, supra note 22, at 69. According to Bickel, a judicial holding that a law is
constitutional adds special legitimacy to that government action. See id. at 29-30, 70.
Bickel, however, does not use this point to argue for giving judges a freer hand in
judicial review. Rather, Bickel makes the point in discussing situations where the
Constitution clearly prohibits the challenged government action, yet the Court
believes that upholding the action would seriously undermine its power or legitimacy.
See id at 70-71. In such cases, Bickel urges judges to not decide the case (by either
declining review or dismissing the case on any number of justiciability grounds). See
id. at 111-98 (discussing the legal doctrines, which Bickel refers to as the "passive
virtues," that allow the Court to avoid deciding the merits of a case). Better that than
uphold the government action and give it the judiciary's seal of approval. See id. at 70-
72, 206 ("The passive devices are thus justified as lesser rational alternatives to an
otherwise unavoidable principled judgment, which would, in turn, be unwise in the
given circumstances.").
226. See The Federalist No. 47, at 270-71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing the danger of the judiciary combining its powers with those of
another branch as a significant threat to liberty); Brown, supra note 8, at 571
(asserting that the federal judiciary "is not enabled to go out and take life, liberty, or
property from people, and, given its political insulation, would have very little reason
to do so").
227. The Federalist No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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play of checks and balances will also constrain the judiciary in
interpreting the Constitution. As mentioned above, each branch
should have its say about the meaning of the Constitution within its
carefully circumscribed sphere of power. Thomas Jefferson described
this point in response to a correspondent who assumed that the
Supreme Court was to decide all constitutional issues:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the
validity of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has
given them a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the
Executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally
independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The judges,
believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine
and imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by
the Constitution. But the Executive, believing the law to be
unconstitutional, was bound to remit the execution of it; because
that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That
instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on
each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to
decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and
Executive also, in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic
branch3 8
For courts, this means that a constitutional question must be
presented in a "case" or "controversy." Unless and until that
happens, the courts must remain out of the fray.2 9 When within that
sphere, federal courts should speak their mind; outside that sphere,
they should remain silent.23°
Of course, if the justices decide to go beyond their sphere of power
by deciding constitutional issues not presented in a case or
controversy, there is nothing to stop them from doing so in their
decision of an individual case. Consistent with Madison's vision of
ambition countering ambition and Hamilton's view of the judiciary's
weak position, however, Congress and the President are more than
armed to defend themselves231 1  Congress can limit the courts'
228. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 310 (M. Ford ed., 1897). In this letter, Jefferson
specifically addressed his power to pardon those convicted under the Alien and
Sedition Acts. This episode is discussed supra at notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
229. See Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 32, at 352 (describing episode where the
Supreme Court refused to answer questions posed by President Washington
regarding the legality of certain rules of neutrality being prepared by the President's
cabinet).
230. This limitation suggests that instead of dwelling on issues of judicial deference
and constitutional method, we ought to pay more attention to the proper scope ofjudicial power. In doctrinal parlance, we ought to take issues of justiciability much
more seriously than we currently do. These doctrines ensure that courts have their
say only when acting within their constitutionally created sphere of power.
231. See Brown, supra note 8, at 575-76 (describing ways in which Congress and the
President might attempt to check the federal courts).
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jurisdiction or, in an extreme case, impeach the offending judges. The
President can refuse to enforce the Court's judgments or pardon those
convicted under a prior administration.' 2 Or, acting in concert,
Congress and the President could try to pack the Court with new
judges who will respect the proper limits of judicial power, as
President Franklin Roosevelt tried to do earlier this centuryp
Underlying the whole system, the People stand ready to review the
actions of all participants in the system of checks and balances- u The
federal courts would ignore these threats at their peril; to do so could
mean that their opinions would not be worth the paper on which they
are printed.
d. Coda
Part I has defended robust judicial review as an essential part of the
system of checks and balances. The framers were suspicious of
ordinary law-making and thus crafted government processes under
which such law-making would be difficult and rare. They did so, in
part, by creating a system of checks and balances in which each branch
of government had the means and the motive to both defend itself
from encroachments and check abuses of power by the other
branches. Robust judicial review-judicial review without necessary
deference-is the means by which the judiciary works within this
system.
The next part uses the framework developed in part I to help us
better understand, and defend, John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison. Part III then concludes by explaining what the checks and
balances approach has to say about the proper role of constitutional
law scholarship: Constitutional law commentators should not be
concerned with discovering or deriving the "correct" theory or
method of interpreting the Constitution. Rather, we should direct our
energies at analyzing and synthesizing specific doctrinal areas, clauses,
and cases or lines of cases, providing the type of critique that the
members of each branch and the People can use in the constant play
of checks and balances.
232. On Jefferson's use of the pardon power, see supra notes 42-43 and
accompanying text. On other presidential attempts to check the judiciary, see infra
notes 330-62 and accompanying text.
233. See infra notes 346-62 and accompanying text.
234. See Brown, supra note 8, at 574 ("[]f the executive refused to enforce the
orders of the court, or if the legislature tried to impeach the members of the court
without warrant, the people would still stand outside of those actions and could pass
judgment on them through their retained political powers by holding elected officials
accountable for any such breach of trust.").
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II. MARBURY REVISITED
The preceding part developed two important propositions. First,
nothing about the accountability of Congress or the President requires
federal courts to defer to those branches in deciding what the
Constitution means. Second, federal courts should speak on the
meaning of the Constitution only when deciding cases and
controversies. This part explains how Marbury v. Madison 35 one of
the hoariest chestnuts of constitutional law, is best understood in light
of these two propositions. Indeed, most of the conventional criticisms
of Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning dissolve in their light.
A. The Standard Criticism of Marbury
In the shortest part of his Marbury opinion, Chief Justice Marshall
framed the following question: "[W]hether an act, repugnant to the
constitution, can become the law of the land?" 6 Part and parcel of
that question is the further question whether federal courts should
decide cases based on their own interpretation of the Constitution. 7
Marshall made five arguments in support of the Court's authority to
do so.?38
According to the standard criticism, 9 each of Marshall's arguments
in support of judicial review begs the central question: Why should the
judiciary have the final word on the Constitution's meaning?20 This
235. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
236. Id. at 176. Marshall spends over twenty-two pages of his opinion on the
questions whether William Marbury had a right to his commission, whether he had a
remedy for a violation of that right, and whether existing federal statutes and the
Constitution gave the Supreme Court the power to hear a mandamus filed originally
in that Court. After deciding that Congress had authorized an original mandamus but
that Article III did not, Marshall posed the above question, which he disposed of in
less than four pages.
In his critique of Marbury, Professor Bickel notes that in this question Marshall
"had already begged the question-in-chief, which was not whether an act repugnant to
the Constitution could stand, but who should be empowered to decide that the act is
repugnant." Bickel, supra note 22, at 3.
237. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Marshall also later asks: "If an act of
the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its
invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?"
238. The most insightful and sustained criticisms of Marbury include Bickel, supra
note 22, at 1-14; David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The First
Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 69-74 (1985); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide
to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1 (collecting and reviewing varied criticisms of
Marshall's opinion).
239. See O'Fallon, supra note 147, at 256 n.129 ("The weaknesses in Marshall's
argument are notorious .... ).
240. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 2 ("Marbury v. Madison in essence begs the
question."); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 1.4, at 8-9
(5th ed. 1995); Tribe, supra note 1, § 3-2, at 25 ("As critics have repeatedly noted,
Marshall's justification for his assertion of federal judicial power to interpret and
apply the Constitution is not conclusive." (footnote omitted)); Felix Frankfurter, John
Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 219 (1955) (noting that
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criticism assumes that Marshall was arguing for judicial supremacy, in
which the Court would be the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.
This view misunderstands Marshall, who simply argued that the
judiciary should interpret the Constitution in addition to, not instead
of, the other branches of government. Thus, far from advocating
judicial supremacy, Marshall argued that the judiciary should not be
excluded from the project of constitutional interpretation, which must,
under the theory of checks and balances, include all three branches of
government.
Marshall's argument becomes clearer when his Marbury opinion is
viewed through the lens of history. The United States Constitution
was an innovation in government and for the first time placed
enforceable limits on government power. This scheme stood in stark
relief against the British system, which placed unquestioned, final
legal authority in Parliament and thus made Parliament supreme.2 '
Conversely, under the new American view, all three branches of
government could invoke the Constitution against one another, with
each branch having a say on constitutional matters within its narrow
sphere of power.242
The next five sections review each of Marshall's arguments in
support of judicial review. Each section addresses three main points.
First, each section gives a brief summary of Marshall's argument and
why Marshall believed that argument supported judicial review.
Second, each section briefly describes the standard response made to
Marshall's argument. As stated above, the standard criticism
invariably concludes that Marshall has begged the question. Third,
each section shows how the standard criticism misunderstands
Marshall's main point. While the standard response assumes that
Marshall was defending judicial supremacy, his claim was much more
modest. Again, Marbury is best read as saying that judges are entitled
to interpret the Constitution in addition to the other branches, not
instead of them.
1. The Nature of a Written Constitution
Marshall begins his discussion of judicial review with the
observation that the Constitution created a limited government, and
thus, any governmental act exceeding those limits is void!'
Marbury's "reasoning is not impeccable and its conclusion, however wise, not
inevitable").
241. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 67-69, 175-98; Beer, supra note 126, at 145-47;
Wood, Creation, supra note 97, at 346-49; see also The Federalist No. 53, at 299
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he authority of the Parliament is
transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the
ordinary objects of legislative provision.").
242- See infra notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
243. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (-Certainly all
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According to Marshall, the Constitution is a meta-rule above and
beyond ordinary rules made by legislatures and courts. The very fact
that the Constitution was written down, leaving a fixed document
whose terms could not be "mistaken[] or forgotten" and could be
referred to and invoked against the government, was further proof of
this important point.a" If, however, a law contrary to the Constitution
was not void, the Constitution did not limit government and was itself
effectively void. 45
The standard criticism to Marshall's first argument is, "So what?"
Commentators willingly concede that a limited, written constitution
must bind the government or else it is effectively a non-entity.46 The
fact that a limited constitution restricts government action does not
tell us who decides what those restrictions mean. 47 Nothing in
Marshall's first argument supports placing that authority in the
judiciary instead of Congress or the President.
The standard criticism logically rests on a crucial assumption-that
Marshall was defending judicial supremacy with the judiciary as the
sole, final interpreter of the Constitution.2 48  By the time Marbury
filed his case, both Congress and the President had already spoken on
the constitutional issue before the Court: Congress by enacting the
challenged statute and the President by signing the statute. So, by
those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every
such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void.").
244. Id. at 176; see also Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the
Constitution 24-26 (1990) (noting that written constitutions are "superior" to ordinary
law).
245. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77 ("The distinction between a
government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed, are of equal obligation.").
246. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 3 ("[O]ne may grant to Marshall ... that the
Constitution is a paramount law, and that ordinary legislative acts must conform to
it.").
247. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 3-4; O'Fallon, supra note 147, at 256 n.129 ("[Ijt
does not follow from the fact that an act repugnant to the Constitution cannot be law
that the judiciary's view of repugnancy should control"); Van Alstyne, supra note 238,
at 17.
248. Professor Bickel states the point as follows:
Marshall knew (and, indeed, it was true in this very case) that a statute's
repugnancy to the Constitution is in most instances not self-evident; it is,
rather, an issue of policy that someone must decide. The problem is who:
the courts, the legislature itself, the President, perhaps juries for purposes of
criminal trials, or ultimately and finally the people through the electoral
process?
Bickel, supra note 22, at 3. Under the checks and balances approach, the response is,
"Why not all of the above?" There is no justification for any single actor receiving
the final say on questions of constitutional interpretation. Rather, all three branches
of government and the People must play their role in the system of checks and
balances, acting on their own, deliberate interpretation of the Constitution.
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merely reviewing the constitutional issue presented in Marbury, the
Court was doing no more than what Congress and the President had
already done. Critics attack the Court as having no support in the
Constitution while leaving the actions of Congress and the President
unchallenged. Thus, for this criticism to make any sense, the
commentators must view Marshall as doing something different from
Congress and the President. These commentators must view Marshall
not as merely registering the Court's opinion on the constitutional
issue in deciding a specific case, but rather as trying to somehow
generally pre-empt the views of the other branches on that
constitutional question. Simply put, they view Marshall as claiming
judicial supremacy on constitutional issues.
In light of the checks and balances view articulated earlier, Marshall
is better read as arguing that the judiciary can interpret the
Constitution in addition to Congress and the President, not instead of
those branches. The judiciary can do so only when acting within its
limited sphere of authority-deciding cases or controversies. Under
this view, the proper response to Marshall's critics is to ask why the
judiciary should be the sole branch disqualified from interpreting the
Constitution.
2. Judges Decide Cases
Marshall turns next to the nature of the judicial function. In one of
his more famous passages, Marshall explains: "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 249
Judges do so because of their unique role among the three branches of
government. The legislature "makes" law,m0 the executive enforces
the law." and the courts apply the law to concrete facts in deciding
cases. 52 As Marshall argues, judges interpret the Constitution not out
of some special grant of power unique to this Constitution, but
because that is what courts must do: "Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."
Thus, the power of judicial review is a byproduct of the judicial
function (deciding cases), not some separate power given to federal
judges above and beyond their normal duties.
249. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
250. See, eg., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, c1.14 ("Congress shall have power to ... make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."); id. at cl. 18
("Congress shall have Power To ... make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers .... (emphasis added)).
251. See U.S. Coast. art. II, § 3 (stating that the President "shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed").
252. As noted above, this statement is oversimplified because each branch is given
some hand in the selection of the other. See supra note 139. Additionally, the
President is given some law-making power by the grant of authority "to make
Treaties" with the "Advice and Consent of the Senate." U.S. Coast. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
253. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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The standard criticism to Marshall again asks, "so what?"
Commentators concede Marshall's central point-judges must say
what the law is in deciding cases. Once again, Marshall begs the
central question-why is "the law" that judges apply not simply the
legislature's interpretation of the Constitution? 4 If the legislature is
the appropriate interpreter of the Constitution, then "the law is"
whatever the legislature decides, and the judiciary should "say" that
the legislature's interpretation is "the law." Marshall has not
explained why judges should apply their interpretation of the
Constitution. We could just as easily assign the legislature or the
executive that function, and judges would still retain the power to "say
what the law is."
The standard criticism again assumes that Marshall is arguing for
judicial supremacy over the other branches, and reads Marshall's
statements that judges must "say what the law is" to mean that judges
do so tot he exclusion of legislators. In reality, however, each branch
must interpret the Constitution in performing its job and, in doing so,
gets to "say what the law is." 5  This point is elaborated further in
section B.
3. Easy Cases
Marshall's next argument may be his most compelling. He
identifies three relatively clear clauses of the Constitution-the
prohibition of ex post facto laws, the prohibition of taxes on state
exports, and the requirement of two witnesses for a conviction for
treason-and asks what would happen if Congress and the President
enacted laws directly contrary to one of those clauses.26 If the courts
could not strike down such laws, the Constitution effectively would
not limit federal power. Like Marshall's first argument, this argument
posits that constitutional limits that can be violated with impunity are
no limits at all. 7
254. See Currie, supra note 238, at 72 n.55 (noting that Marshall's argument "did
not, of course, answer the critical question whether the judges were to accept
Congress's interpretation of the Constitution rather than adopting their own").
255. See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
256. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179. Of course, there will be difficult cases
under each of the above-listed clauses. But, for purposes of his argument, Marshall
selected three clauses for which one could easily imagine a federal law that violated
the provision. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Ex Post Facto Clause); id. at cl. 5 (no
tax on "Articles exported from any State"); id. at art. III, § 3 (Treason Clause).
257. Bickel suggests that this argument only supports judicial power to interpret
constitutional provisions defining the scope of judicial authority. Stated more
generally, each branch should have the power to interpret provisions that define and
limit that branch's sphere of authority. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 7. For example,
Marshall argues that the Court should have power to void a law that allowed
conviction for treason without the testimony of two witnesses. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 179. According to Bickel, the treason provision is a rule of evidence
directed to the courts. Bickel, supra note 22, at 7 (arguing that the Treason Clause is
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There are two standard responses to this argument. -' First, as
above, the existence of clear cases of unconstitutionality does not,
standing alone, determine which branch of government has the power
to declare such violations 59 Bickel puts the argument as follows:
The case can be constructed where the conflict between a statute
and the Constitution is self-evident in accordance with Marshall's
general assumption. Even so, Marshall offers no real reason that the
Court should have the power to nullify the statute. The function in
such a case could as well be confided to the President, or ultimately
to the electorate?60
Second, one could concede that courts should strike-down clearly
unconstitutional statutes without extending that power beyond clear
cases of constitutional violations.6 1 Closer questions should be left to
accountable decision-makers. This argument was identified in part I
as Bickel's argument from the counter-majoritarian difficulty. As the
discussion in Part I showed, this argument has no place in the system
of checks and balances.
4. Oath of Office
Marshall next cites the Oath Clause as evidence that the framers
intended courts to interpret the Constitution. That clause states:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States,
shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;
but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
one instance "when the Constitution addresses itself with fair specificity to the
judiciary branch itself"). Marshall's argument is not so narrow. He also refers to the
Constitution's prohibition on federal taxes on state exports. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 179. This rule would be directed at Congress and, under Bickel's
argument, would seem to be within Congress's power to interpret. Yet Marshall cites
that provision as one that the courts should interpret. This example shows that
Marshall argued for a general power of judicial review, not a narrow power to review
constitutional provisions concerning judicial power.
258. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 240, at 8 (discussing Marshall's easy cases
argument).
259. Professor Van Alstyne has noted that other nations with written constitutions
do not have judicial review. See Van Alstyne, supra note 238, at 18-19. Based on this
observation, he argues that it is not as self-evident as Marshall would have us believe
that a written constitution without judicial review effectively serves no purpose. See
id. While this argument is correct as far as it goes, this Article argues that the framers'
self-conscious departure from the British notion of a constitution, coupled with the
view of checks and balances articulated above, indicates that Marshall was correct:
This Constitution would be effectively void, for the purposes the framers had
envisioned for it, if we did not have robust judicial review.
260. Bickel, supra note 22, at 4.
26L But see Van Alstyne, supra note 238, at 18-19 (noting that several countries
with written constitutions do not give judges the power to strike down laws that
directly contradict their constitution).
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Office or public Trust under the United States.262
Judges would violate their oath if they were not permitted to strike
down statutes that violated their understanding of the Constitution.263
According to Marshall:
Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule
for his government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be
inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn
mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a
crime.264
The Oath Clause, then, supports judicial review.
Critics correctly note that federal judges are not the only branch of
the federal government required to take an oath to uphold the
Constitution. 265  Rather, as the Oath Clause states, officials of each
branch of government are required to take a similar oath. So, the
standard response asks, why are judges special-why do they get the
power to interpret the Constitution? 266 Even if judges must obey the
Constitution, what if the legislature is supposed to be the ultimate
interpreter of that document?267 If that is so, federal judges, to fulfill
their oath, would have to abide by the legislature's interpretation of
the Constitution, not their own.
The standard criticism again assumes that Marshall is claiming the
262. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
263. At the time Marbury was decided, Congress had prescribed the following oath
for federal judges:
I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as __ , according to
the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and
laws of the United States.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
264. Id.
265. See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 352 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) ("The oath to support the constitution is not peculiar to the judges, but is
taken indiscriminately by every officer of the government.").
266. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 8-9; Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 240, at 8
("[W]hile this oath might give judges some support in choosing not to apply a specific
act of Congress in a decision, it furnishes no claim to superior powers regarding
constitutional interpretation because the legislators and executive take similar
oaths."); Thomas Reed Powell, Vagaries and Varieties in Constitutional
Interpretation 16 (1956) ("The fact that the Constitution requires the judges to take
an oath to support it cannot go further than to warrant them to interpret it as a guide
to their own action, because many other officers, state as well as national, are
required to take a corresponding oath.").
267. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 8 (characterizing Marshall as arguing that
"everyone's oath to support the Constitution is qualified by the judiciary's oath to do
the same, and that every official of government is sworn to support the Constitution
as the judges, in pursuance of the same oath, have construed it, rather than as his own
conscience may dictate.").
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sole power to interpret the Constitution. Importantly, the words of
Chief Justice Marshall contradict that assumption: "[Tihe framers of
the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the
government of courts, as well as of the legislature."2  In this passage,
Marshall expressly argued that courts should interpret the
Constitution in addition to, not in place of, the other branches of the
federal government. Thus, Marshall argued that because judges also
take an oath to abide by the Constitution, as do members of the other
two branches, judges should be allowed to interpret the Constitution,
as do members of the other two branches.
5. Supremacy Clause
Marshall's final argument examines the Supremacy Clause,21 about
which he observes: "in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the
land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the
United States generally, but those only which shall be made in
pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.""-  The Supremacy
Clause expressly provides that the Constitution takes precedence over
ordinary laws, and thus ordinary laws contrary to the Constitution are
void.271
The standard criticism should be predictable. All concede that the
Constitution is supreme, but this begs the all-important question of
whose interpretation of that document is supreme.' The Supremacy
268. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80; Powell, supra note 266, at 7 (noting that
the above passage from Marbury "is open to the possible inference that each body is
to interpret for itself").
269. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
270. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
271. See id. ("Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void .... ").
272. See II William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History
of the United States 990-1007 (1953); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 240, at 8
("Marshall's argument, that only laws made in pursuance of the Constitution are the
supreme law of the land, assumes the point in dispute: who determines which statutes
are not in pursuance of the Constitution?"); Powell, supra note 266, at 16 ("The
judicial power over national legislation cannot adduce support from the supremacy
clause."); Van Alstyne, supra note 238, at 22 ("Assttning that an act repugnant to the
Constitution is not a law 'in pursuance thereof' and thus must not be given effect as the
supreme law of the land, who, according to the Constitution, is to make the
determination as to whether any given law is in fact repugnant to the Constitution
itself? ... Marshall never confronts this question."); id. at 21 ("Under this view, acts of
Congress, like acts of Parliament, are the supreme law and not to be second-guessed
by any court, state or federal, so long as they postdate ratification of the
Constitution.").
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Clause does not answer that question.
This Article's response also should be familiar. The standard
criticism again assumes that Marshall is claiming judicial supremacy.
Marshall's ambitions, however, are much humbler. His argument is
only that the Constitution is supreme, "and that courts, as well as
other departments, are bound by that instrument. '27 3  In his own
words, then, Marshall is merely claiming parity for the judiciary, not
supremacy.
B. A Revised Account of Marbury
As recounted in the preceding sections, the standard criticism of
Marbury is that Marshall's opinion ultimately begs the question he set
out to answer-why should the judiciary be the supreme interpreters
of the Constitution? 74 This criticism mischaracterizes Marshall as
making a "we're the one" argument, under which the courts claim the
exclusive power to finally determine the Constitution's meaning.275
This reading is a mistake. Instead, Marshall makes a "me too"
argument, under which the federal judiciary merely joins the other
branches in playing a role, within its sphere of power, in constitutional
interpretation.
The "me too" reading of Marbury makes sense for two reasons.
First, this reading accurately describes how government works under
our Constitution. As discussed above, all three branches will have
final say on the meaning of the Constitution in some cases.27 6
Granting federal courts the power of judicial review does not change
that fact. Thus, in practice, the argument over judicial review was not,
and cannot, be about which branch will necessarily have the final
word on the Constitution's meaning.
Second, the "me too" approach acknowledges the relevant history.
The founding generation radically reconceived the notion of a
273. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (emphasis added).
274. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 3-4 (asking why the federal courts, as opposed to
Congress, should "set the limits" on government power imposed by the Constitution);
id. at 7 (discussing whether each branch of government "may be the final arbiter of
the meaning of the constitutional commands addressed to it." (emphasis added)).
Indeed, to some commentators the best that can be said about Marshall's opinion is
that while each of his arguments alone is unpersuasive, they may in combination have
enough force to carry the day. See Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 240, at 8
("Although Marshall's decision can be divided and attacked, it still stands as an
impressive argument when taken as a whole."); Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitutional
Law 33 (2d ed. 1991).
275. One commentator states that he reviews Marbury "partly to see whether it
provides anything of a convincing character that the determination of whether an act
of Congress is repugnant to the Constitution shall be made by the courts." Van
Alstyne, supra note 238, at 23.
276. See supra Part I.A. For example, if the House does not pass a proposed bill
because it believes the bill to be unconstitutional, the House has the final say on the
constitutionality of the proposed bill. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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"constitution," rejecting the traditional British view of a constitution,
under which Parliament was supreme, in favor of a new idea, under
which the constitution was higher law that limited the power of all
branches of government, including the legislature.- Only by
understanding the prior, British notion of a constitution and the
innovation of the founding generation can we appreciate the full
meaning of Marshall's opinion and see the full wisdom of his
reasoning.
The following two sections develop two points. Subsection 1 briefly
discusses the British and American notions of a Constitution. The
discussion is far from exhaustive and merely outlines the main ideas
necessary for this Article's discussion of Marbury.27 Subsection 2
explains how reading Marbury against the background of the framers'
understanding of a "constitution" allows us to see Marshall's
arguments in a new light. This new vision of Marbury fits well with
the checks and balances view of robust judicial review.
1. The Nature of a "Constitution"
Today, when Americans hear the word "constitution," the image
that inevitably comes to mind is the United States Constitution
ratified in 1788, and amended twenty-seven times thereafter 7 9 As we
are taught in civics lessons, the Constitution both creates the three
branches of government and limits their authority. The American
Constitution, then, stands above government, both authorizing and
controlling its power. It is a charter the People may invoke against
the government, and each branch of government may invoke against
the other.
The British notion of a constitution was quite different. The British
"constitution" was merely a description of the existing framework of
277. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 175-98 (describing evolution of colonists'
thinking on the nature of a constitution); Beer, supra note 126, at 92-94; Pomeroy,
supra note 27, § 141, at 94 ("The American Constitution is not, like that of Great
Britain, traditional and elastic, consisting only in the acts and precedents of
Parliament, which that legislature may either follow or avoid."); Wood, Creation,
supra note 97, at 259-68.
278. The origins and developments of the founders' thinking is more profitably
discussed in the three seminal works in the area: Bailyn, supra note 124; Rakove,
supra note 103; and Wood, Creation, supra note 97.
279. Admittedly, there is some debate over the validity of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment. U.S. onst. amend. XXVII ("No law varying the compensation for the
services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened."). The amendment was proposed in 1789,
along with the amendments that compose the Bill of Rights, but the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment was not ratified until 1992, over 200 years later. The main question is
whether such a long period between proposal and ratification is allowed under Article
V. See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Tert: On the Purported Twenty-
Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. Commentary 101, 102-03 (1994).
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government as then constituted by the supreme Parliament. 280  As
Bernard Bailyn describes, the British understood by
the word 'constitution' not, as we would have it, a written document
or even an unwritten but deliberately contrived design of
government and a specification of rights beyond the power of
ordinary legislation to alter; they thought of it, rather as the
constituted-that is, existing-arrangement of governmental
institutions, laws, and customs together with the principles and goals
that animated them.281
No law or set of rules thus constrained Parliament's law-making
power; Parliament was the supreme sovereign-the ultimate legal
authority.' Thus, British citizens had no meta-rules to invoke against
Parliament, or for the crown or the courts to invoke against that
body.' Rather, their "constitution" was purely descriptive, merely
describing the then-existing operations of Parliament. Under this
view of a constitution, judicial review could not exist.285
In one of its great innovations, the founding generation reconceived
a "constitution" as a form of law that set enforceable limits on
government power. 6  This innovation derived from a prior
280. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 175 (the British notion of "constitution"
referred to "the existing arrangement of governmental institutions, laws, and customs
together with the animating principles, the stamina vitae, that gave them purpose...
."); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Foundations of American Constitutionalism 13-14(1932); Corrine C. Weston, English Constitutional Theory and the House of Lords,
1556-1832, at 1-8 (London 1965); Charles Inglis, The True Interest of America:
Strictures on a Pamphlet Entitled Common Sense 18 (Philadelphia 1776) (referring to
constitution as "that assemblage of laws, customs, and institutions which form the
general system according to which the several powers of the state are distributed and
their respective rights are secured to the different members of the community."(cited
in Bailyn, supra note 132, at 175)).
281. Bailyn, supra note 124, at 67-68. Bailyn also notes that the pre-Revolutionary
colonists started with the same notion of a "constitution" before evolving to their
own, different notion described below. Id.
282. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 69, 180-81.
283. See Wood, Creation, supra note 97, at 292 ("[F]or all English Whigs,
Trenchard and Gordon as well as Burgh, the fundamental law they believed in was
one enforceable only by the people's right of revolution, a final sanction that
dissolved the contract of government, leaving the people free to do as they would in
the future.").
284. See Pomeroy, supra note 27, § 143, at 95 ("The powers of that legislature are
not limited; the constitution is, in effect, what Parliament may at any time pronounce
it to be.").
285. See id. § 143, at 95 ("[T]he courts of Great Britain do not possess this high
attribute [of judicial review of constitutional questions], but only because there is no
written British constitution superior to Parliament.").
286. Bernard Bailyn describes the importance of the concept of a "constitution" to
American revolutionary thought:
The word "constitution" and the concept behind it was of central importance
to the colonists' political thought; their entire understanding of the crisis in
Anglo-American relations rested upon it. So strategically located was this
idea in the minds of both English and Americans, and so great was the
pressure placed upon it in the course of a decade of pounding debate that in
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innovation-lodging ultimate sovereignty in the People of the nation
generally, and not in some branch of government (as the British had
done with Parliament). Consequently, the People were the highest
authority in the new United States, and acts of the People as a
whole-the Constitution-bound all law-makers in the nation.
Madison explained this point at length:
The distinction so well understood in America, between a
Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the
government, and a law established by the government and alterable
by the government, seems to have been little understood and less
observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of
legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power
to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain,
where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most
discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution,
it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent
and uncontrollable as well with regard to the Constitution as the
ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in
several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the
most fundamental articles of the government. They have in
particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and,
on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in place of
triennial elections, but by the same act, continued themselves in
place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the
people. An attention to these dangerous practices has produced a
very natural alarm in the votaries of free government, of which
frequency of elections is the cornerstone; and has led them to seek
for some security to liberty, against the danger to which it is
exposed.287
Hamilton similarly remarked on the importance of a limited
constitution.m So, when Marshall wrote in Marbury that the
Constitution is "law," he was explaining the American innovation in
the end it was forced apart, along the seam of a basic ambiguity, to form the
two contrasting concepts of constitutionalism that have remained
characteristic of England and America ever since.
Bailyn, supra note 124, at 67.
287. The Federalist No. 53, at 299-300 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
288. The Federalist No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in
a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no er post facto laws, and
the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.
Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would
amount to nothing.
2000] 1169
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
constitution-making, not stating the obvious.
Under the new, American conception of a constitution, judicial
review became possible. Judicial review only makes sense if
government power is constrained by some set of legal rules. Without
such rules, the courts have no standard against which to measure the
validity of legislative or executive action. By reconceiving of a
constitution as such a set of rules, the framers provided the judiciary-
as well as Congress, the President, and the People-a standard against
which to measure one another's conduct. 9
2. The American Conception of a Constitution in Marbury v.
Madison
The standard criticisms of Marbury fall away when considered in
the context of the differing British and American views of a
constitution. Marshall wrote against the background of the British
experience, where Parliament shaped the British constitution as an
ongoing project, and the courts played very little role in that
process.29 At that time, then, it was accepted that a legislature would
consider the constitution in deciding whether to make law. The open
question remained whether the legislature's constitutional judgments
were final, as in Britain, making the Constitution nothing more than a
description of what Congress (and the President) chose to do, or
whether the new, American conception of a constitution meant that
the judiciary would now play some role in defining the Constitution?
Marshall's argument from the oath of office now makes eminent
sense. Recall that he argued that the judiciary should interpret the
Constitution because its members take an oath to uphold the
Constitution.29' The standard response has been that officers of the
legislative and executive branches take the same oath, thus the oath
requirement does not support judicial review.292  The standard
criticism misreads Marshall. If Marshall were arguing for judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation, then, indeed, the fact that
judges also took an oath does not explain why judges should be the
Constitution's sole interpreters. But that was not Marshall's
argument. Instead, he argued that the American Constitution, unlike
the British Constitution, anticipated an interpretive role for judges in
289. See Wood, Creation, supra note 103, at 291-92; Powell, supra note 8, at 887
n.11 ("The use of constitutions as written fundamental laws subject to judicial
interpretation and enforcement.., was an essentially new creation of the American
Revolutionary period.").
290. British courts could pronounce their opinion that an act of Parliament violated
a tenet of natural law. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 177-80. But, the courts would go
no further, leaving it to Parliament to repeal the law if Parliament agreed with the
court's judgment. Id.; Beer, supra note 126, at 148-53.
291. See supra notes 262-78 and accompanying text.
292. See Bickel, supra note 22, at 8.
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addition to the legislature. The Oath Clause now becomes relevant
because it is evidence that judges, in addition to the legislature, are
bound by the Constitution.
Similarly, Marshall's "easy cases" argument takes on new meaning
when considered in light of the British conception of a constitution.
Recall that Marshall asked what would become of the Constitution if
Congress could pass laws that were directly contrary to that
document? 93 If the courts did not step in, the Constitution would
become whatever Congress made of it, transplanting Parliamentary
sovereignty to America. For the American Constitution to be
different, Congress could not be the sole arbiter of its meaning.
Instead, the other branches must play a role in that process. The
system of checks and balances articulated in Part I establishes that
each branch should do so within its sphere of authority.
Marshall's invocation of the Supremacy Clause also makes sense in
light of the historical background. In Britain, Parliament was
supreme, and the British constitution was merely descriptive. In the
United States, however, the Constitution is prescriptive, setting forth
rules that bind the government. Thus, the Supremacy Clause restates
the framers' crucial departure from Britain-the Constitution is
supreme over government, and not vice versa.
We can now see how several of the threads in this Article join in
Marshall's arguments. Recall that Marshall argued that courts will
necessarily interpret the Constitution as a byproduct of deciding
cases--courts necessarily "say what the law is." This argument blends
the checks and balances approach with the American reconception of
a constitution. The checks and balances approach encourages each
branch of the federal government to interpret the Constitution when
acting within its sphere of power. The judiciary's sphere of power is
to decide cases, which requires courts to determine the applicable law.
The American Constitution is "law" that binds all government actors,
including judges. Thus, in carrying out their assigned function in the
system of checks and balances, federal judges interpret the
Constitution. Federal judges are not unique in this respect; the
members of each branch should interpret the Constitution in
performing their constitutionally assigned roles.
C. Conclusion
Part II has argued that the checks and balances approach to judicial
review, along with an understanding of the British and American
views of a constitution, shed new light on Marbury. Reconsidered in
that light, Marbury is a vivid statement of first principles and
innovations embodied in the American Constitution. Robust judicial
293. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803); see supra notes
256-71 and accompanying text.
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review is an important part of that system. The next part discusses
how constitutional commentators can best serve that system.
III. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
As a matter of fact and theory, this Article has maintained that the
federal courts owe no necessary deference to the other branches on
constitutional issues. As a matter of fact, history illustrates this
reality, with each branch of government at times refusing to acquiesce
in the constitutional decisions of the other branches.294 As a matter of
theory, judicial deference would upset the system of checks and
balances. Thus, this Article has defended a constitutional principle of
robust judicial review-judicial review without necessary deference.
Yet, the principle of robust judicial review does not mean that
deference on constitutional issues is not a part of the Constitution's
design. While no branch owes a constitutional duty of deference, each
branch might, at some point, find deference (or, perhaps acquiescence
or accommodation) a desirable strategy when operating within the
system of checks and balances. 295 As discussed earlier, the framers
constructed each branch of government with the power and motive to
check the others.296 Electoral accountability operates as an ultimate
check on the entire system.297 To avoid a check from a coordinate
branch or from the electorate, one branch may find it desirable or
advisable to defer to or acquiesce in the constitutional judgment of
another branch. This interplay of actions and anticipated responses is
built-in to the checks and balances system. Thus, while deference is
not constitutionally required as a general rule or in any particular
case, political circumstances may dictate deference as an act of
political survival.298
294. See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
295. This raises an important point, discussed later, regarding the role of deference.
Professor Philip Bobbitt has criticized some authors who urge deference for elevating
that method of interpretation-which he calls prudential-over all others on some
normative grounds. See Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 126-40. This Article
does not urge judges to exercise deference for some normative reason. Rather, this
Article argues that judges will on occasion exercise deference (as will members of the
other branches of government) because of the practical necessities of the system of
checks and balances.
296. See supra notes 142-80 and accompanying text.
297. See Brown, supra note 8, at 565-71; supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
298. See Bickel, supra note, at 111-98 (discussing the "passive virtues," whereby the
Court takes itself out of a case out of concern for its political legitimacy). The justices'
occasional invocation of the political question doctrine is an example of such
behavior. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (what it means for the
Senate to "try" an impeachment is a political question committed to the discretion of
the senate); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (propriety of House's refusal
to seat a member for lack of qualifications was not a political question); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (whether state legislative apportionment that did not
proportionally reflect the state's population violated the Equal Protection Clause was
not a political question); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (issues concerning
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The same can be said for constitutional theory. The Constitution
itself does not prefer or require any specific constitutional theory or
method. Rather, the interplay of checks and balances pushes federal
judges to follow a theory or method if doing so will forestall checks
from the other branches or the People. Part III develops this point in
five sections.
The first three sections explain that the framers trusted the judicial
branch to interpret the law because they assumed that federal judges
would be lawyers and thus would possess the skill, knowledge, and
discipline of a legal training. A judge's training in the legal method
would constrain and guide the judge's discretion in deciding cases. In
short, judges would do law, not politics. Consequently, the other
branches and the People could check the judiciary if judges failed to
do law. Thus, whatever arguments or actions constitute "doing law"
at any given time will be the product of judges reacting to pressures
exerted in the system of checks and balances.
The fourth section explains what implications the checks and
balances approach to judicial craft and legal method have for
constitutional scholarship. Ultimately this article concludes that
constitutional scholars should stop their search for some overarching
theory or method of interpretation, focusing instead on the real stuff
of a living legal system, doing law. The fifth section concludes by
examining two examples of how the system of checks and balances has
shaped judicial review, suggesting where the scholarly focus should be.
A. Federal Judges and Legal Craft: The Intended Connection
The history of the drafting and ratification of the Constitution
shows that the framers defined the role of federal judges by reference
to the unique qualifications of those who were to hold the new
positions. Federal judges were to be learned in the law, chosen for
their knowledge of substantive law, their skill in applying legal
method, and their personal integrity. Integrity was the ability to
subordinate personal, selfish interests (the causes of faction) to the
dictates of judicial craft. Presumably, as long as judges acted like
lawyers, they would not incur a retaliatory check from the other
branches or the People. If they strayed, however, they could be
checked.
Hamilton makes this point when he compares the judge's role to
that of the legislator. He argues that judges will be guided by
"JUDGMENT" while legislators will be mere creatures of political
"WILL."2  Hamilton explains further that the "judgment" exercised
by the judiciary will be the product of the judges' knowledge of and
the amendment process are political questions committed to discretion of Congress).
299. The Federalist No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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skill in the law.3°° Those selected as federal judges will presumably be
lawyers, who have gained extensive knowledge of the precedents and
statutes that constitute the law, as well as the accepted methods for
applying that knowledge to concrete cases.30' The grant of Article III
judicial power, then, rests on the expectation that federal judges will
act like lawyers in deciding cases." 2
Hamilton makes the same point in defending the structure of the
federal judiciary and responding to the argument that either Congress
or the President, not the Supreme Court, should sit in review of lower
court decisions. Hamilton explains the folly in having politically
accountable actors review the decisions of law-trained judges:
There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the
first instance, to judges of permanent standing; and in the last, to
those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is still
greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their
knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the
revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage,
cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the
legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications
which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there
will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of
defective information, so, on account of the natural propensity of
such bodies to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear
that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of
303justice.
300. See id. at 439.
301. See id.; Powell, supra note 8, at 904 ("Although the Philadelphia framers did
not discuss in detail how they intended their end product to be interpreted, they
clearly assumed that future interpreters would adhere to then prevalent methods of
statutory construction.").
302. Professor Philip Bobbitt derives the same point from the fact of a written
Constitution:
By relying upon a written instrument to perfect the constitutional
understanding, the framers of the United States Constitution introduced the
modalities of legal argument into the politics of the state. This has had a
profound importance for constitutional interpretation. Since the
Constitution was a written law, it had to be construed, and this was to be
done according to the prevailing methods of legal construction.
Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 5; see also Powell, supra note 8, at 902("America's innovation was to identify 'the Constitution' with a single normative
document. . . and thus to create the possibility of treating constitutional
interpretation as an exercise in the traditional legal activity of construing a written
instrument.").
303. The Federalist No. 81, at 451-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (emphasis added). Lord Coke made a similar argument against allowing the
crown to take from the judges whatever cases it pleased for decision: "[T]he King in
his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal, as treason, felony, etc., or
betwixt party and party, concerning his inheritance, chattels or goods, etc., but this
ought to be determined and adjudged in some court of justice according to the law
and custom of England...." Prohibitions del Roy (1607), in Coke, Twelfth Report,
quoted in J.R. Tanner, Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, 186-87
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According to Hamilton, federal judges will be selected for their legal
training-their qualifications as lawyers. To find highly qualified
lawyers, Hamilton acknowledged that the national government would
have to encourage "such characters [to] quitf a lucrative line of
practice to accept a seat on the bench ..... " The federal
government by guaranteeing that federal judges have life tenure;'
and that their "Compensation... shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."'
In his notes from the drafting convention, Madison recognized the
special qualifications expected of federal judges, in comparison to
legislators. During the convention, Charles Pinkney and Roger
Sherman proposed that both houses of Congress appoint federal
judges.30 Madison explained his objection to the Pinkney-Sherman
proposal as follows:
[I] objected to appt. by the whole Legislature. Many of them were
incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too
much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was
present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative
field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of
their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means,
would without any of the essential qualifications for an erpositor of
the laws prevail over a competitor not having these
recommendations but possessed of every necessary accomplishment.
[I] proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate,
which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more
competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify
such a confidence in them. 3N
Madison distinguished between the qualifications for a federal judge
and "a talent for business in the legislative field."" Once again, the
concern is that people skilled at law will be appointed to the federal
bench.
Elbridge Gerry, Massachusetts delegate to the federal drafting
convention, drew a similar distinction in arguing against including the
Supreme Court in a council of revision. t0 William Randolph
proposed a council of revision composed of the President and certain
(1930). This was so because court cases were "not to be decided by natural reason but
by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long
study and experience before that man can attain to the cognizance of it .... " I
(emphasis added).
304. The Federalist No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
305. See id.
306. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
307. See I Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 232
(1966).
308. Id. at 232-33 (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 232.
310. See id at 97-98.
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federal judges." The council would review bills passed by Congress
and could, on majority vote, veto any such bills.312 Gerry argued
against the proposal:
Mr. Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of [the
council of revision], as they will have a sufficient check agst.
encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the
laws, which involved the power of deciding on their
Constitutionality. . . . It was quite foreign from the nature of ye.
office to make them judges of the policy of public measures.313
According to Gerry, a council of revision would evaluate "the policy
of public measures," and federal judges would perform a different
task.314 Once again, there is a distinction between the work of the
legislature and the work of judges.
Among current constitutional commentators, Justice Antonin Scalia
has echoed the framers' expectation that lawyers-people who "do
law"-would fill the federal bench. Specifically, Justice Scalia urged
that judges approach the Constitution as a legal document, as a lawyer
would, not as a blanket invitation to construct a just society:35
The people will be willing to leave interpretation of the Constitution
to lawyers and law courts so long as the people believe that it is (like
the interpretation of a statute) essentially lawyers' work-requiring
a close examination of text, history of the text, traditional
understanding of the text, judicial precedent, and so forth. But if the
people come to believe that the Constitution is not a text like other
texts... -well, then, they will look for qualifications other than
impartiality, judgment, and lawyerly acumen in those whom they
select to interpret it.316
Regardless of whether one agrees with Justice Scalia's own
approach to interpreting the Constitution,317 his larger point is
sound.3 18 Constitutional interpretation must bear some relationship to
311. See id. at 21.
312. See id.
313. Id. at 97-98.
314. Rufus King, also in the Massachusetts delegation, made a similar objection:
"[T]he judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free
from the bias of having participated in its formation." Id. at 98.
315. See Scalia, supra note 222, at 46-47.
316. Id. (emphasis added).
317. On constitutional interpretation, as well as on statutory construction, Justice
Scalia describes himself as a textualist. See id. at 23-25, 37. By textualist, Scalia means
a decision-maker who seeks to give the words of a document (constitution or statute)
the meaning that those words had at the time they were drafted. See id. at 23-25.
318. Justice Byron White made a similar point in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 194 (1986): "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in
the language or design of the Constitution." (emphasis added). The idea is that the
Court must restrict itself to sources of law in making its decisions. To get away from
such sources is to open the Court to criticism, making the Court "vulnerable" to
political checks. Again, one does not have to agree with Justice White's holding in
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a lawyer's work, otherwise the American legal system has gained
nothing by entrusting that function to judges.
B. What Does It Mean to "Do Law"?
While a strict separation of legal craft from other influences seems
impossible, or even naive, the framers' focus on legal craft provides a
workable conception of the judicial role. At any given time, there is a
loose consensus among the legal community-and among
sophisticated non-lawyers-as to what counts and what does not count
as "legal reasoning" or "legal argument." 1 9 We do not receive "law"
in some ideal form that has a priori roots.-2 "Law is something we do,
not something we have as a consequence of something we do."' ' In
doing law, the legal community forms certain practices to the
exclusion of others. To give an obvious example, consensus exists that
ad hominem attacks are not proper legal argument, but that analogies
are often appropriate.3a
Bowers to agree that judges should be doing law, however that task is defined at a
given time.
319. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 11, at 39.
I believe that American law in general, and constitutional law in particular,
is a relatively autonomous part of our culture.... It is relatively autonomous
in that, at any moment of time, even the most powerful of our lawyers and
judges are profoundly constrained by the patterns of argument built up by
the legal community over the past two centuries of disputation-more
powerfully than the judges themselves recognize, for they do not consciously
interrogate many of the core elements of their legal culture. They simply
take them for granted as they go about their business deciding cases.
Ld.; see also J.M. Balkin, A Night in the Topics: The Reason of Legal Rhetoric and the
Rhetoric of Legal Reason, in Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 211-24
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (discussing the relationship between
rhetoric and reason in law); Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at 985; Bobbitt,
Interpretation, supra note 13, at 37-39 ("[Ain interpretive community will determine
the truth functions of a particular proposition .... ); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 37
(describing "widespread acceptance of certain rules of legal interpretation during the
period in which the Constitution was framed and put into effect . .
320. Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth 137 (1996).
There is nothing more to constitutional law (or any other body of doctrine)
than the use of the six modalities of argument [established by the practice of
constitutional law]. For jurisprudence, both constitutional and general, the
lesson is clear. the essential task of jurisprudence is the accurate description
of our legal practices of argument. Theory is banished not because it is
wrong, but because it is irrelevant. If law is an argumentative practice
composed of the six modalities of argument, then the key to understanding
law lies in understanding how these forms are deployed in legal argument.
(footnotes omitted).
Id.
321. Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 24.
322 See Wolfe, supra note 57, at 37 (arguing that while the prevailing "rules of
interpretation do not resolve all problems of interpretation," they "do narrow the
range of differences greatly and provide a common standard for deciding issues").
Professor Bobbitt illustrates the point in distinguishing between legal and political
arguments:
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Debates over the proper practices in law take place over time.323
For example, legal scholars are engaged in an ongoing debate over the
proper method(s) for interpreting statutes.324 Is text the primary, or
sole, focus? Should judges consult legislative history? What role
should legislative purpose, as opposed to legislative intent, play?
According to many commentators, different practices prevailed at
different times in English and American history. At any given time, a
practitioner, commentator, or judge would be criticized for not
following the prevailing view. This potential for criticism-to be seen
as unlearned or an outlier-has a check on discretion. A tendency
toward conformity influences judges no less than the rest of society,
and is an intended influence on the judiciary: Judges would largely
conform to the conception of legal method prevailing at the time they
make their decisions.
What counts as legal argument will change over time.32  Some
Not just any argument will do, and a political argument per se will never do.
Law is a political structure just as a painting is a piece of furniture. But the
standards of painting-perspective, figure, composition-are not the
standards of interior decorators, and the standards of legal argument-
neutrality, generality, consistency-are not the standards of the political
operative.
Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 41. For other discussions of the prevailing
methods of constitutional interpretation, see Paul Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987).
323. See Nourse, supra note 18, at 1412-14.
324. These debates are explained and critiqued with great insight in William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
Another example is the propriety of the so called "Brandeis Brief." A Brandeis
Brief is an appellate brief that offers extensive empirical evidence to a court about
social conditions that underlie the issue before the court. See Freund, supra note 34, at
151-54. So named for its prominent proponent Louis Brandeis, such a brief earned
acceptability during the New Deal as the Supreme Court began to realize that social
and political changes wrought by the industrial revolution changed assumptions that
underlay many of the Court's doctrines.
325. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 39 ("[Wjhat counts as a plausible legal
argument does indeed change, and change profoundly, over time."); Nourse, supra
note 18, at 1412-14. Professor Lawrence Lessig has written extensively on what he
calls contested and uncontested discourses. See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-effects of
Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1785,
1801-07 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365,
1421-26 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 426-38 (1995). An
"uncontested discourse" is a discourse where:
[pleople don't, in the main, disagree about fundamentals. In the main, they
don't think much about fundamentals at all. People act, or argue, instead,
taking these fundamentals for granted.... One could conceivably question
fundamentals; one could legitimately express doubt. But if one insisted
upon these doubts, or was relentless in these questions, then one would
mark oneself as odd; somehow outside the discourse.
Lessig, Fidelity, supra, at 1393. At any given time, lawyers, as a group engaged in a
common practice, will largely agree on what arguments are acceptable in practice.
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practitioners, judges, and commentators will subject the current
consensus to sustained criticism and, in doing so, will upset that
consensus and may, in time, push us to a new consensus.? 6 Those
advocating an outlying method bear the burden of proof within the
community. As one commentator has aptly stated:
[I]t is important to distinguish between things taken for granted, and
things up for grabs. Things taken for granted can be used in an
argument, in a sense, without argument; things up for grabs must be
defended. One can question things taken for granted, but the
questions (ordinarily) don't get one far. One can assert things up for
grabs, but what is said (usually) feels as if it is simply being asserted.
It feels, that is, as if it is just one view among many-respectable, but
not compelling.3 27
There is nothing inherently special about the then-prevailing methods
of legal argument; they are held in place merely by an existing
consensus. Thus, everything is potentially on the table-we are in a
constant dialogue over what constitutes the legal craft. The current
consensus is contingent, and there is no way to end the debate.
C. "Doing Law" as a Check on the Judiciary
To be seen by others as properly exercising Article III judicial
power, then, federal judges must interpret the Constitution in a way
that the coordinate federal branches and the People perceive as
lawyer-like. Federal judges must persuade others that they are "doing
law," or else those others will question the judiciary's authority to
interpret the Constitution.
We have seen this rhetoric before. A common criticism of judicial
nominees, and a war cry of some politicians, is that a judge should
"interpret the law" and not "make law."m While this distinction is
too simplistic to be sustained on its face, it really appeals to an
underlying disagreement over both the methods used in and outcomes
of judicial decisions. For example, in some cases, politicians use the
argument to criticize non-originalist decisions, suggesting
disagreement with constitutional method. In other cases, politicians
use the argument to criticize particular case outcomes-such as the
This agreement, I think, would be an uncontested discourse in the legal community.
A contested discourse, on the other hand, is "a discourse where fundamentals in that
discourse appear up for grabs; that participants in that discourse acknowledge the
legitimacy of disagreement about these fundamentals; that disagreement is a sign of
normalcy for a participant, not oddness." Id. At any given time, the acceptability of
some methods or arguments might be "up for grabs" in the legal community. Only
time will tell whether these methods or arguments will become part of the
community's accepted practices, or whether they will be discarded.
326. See Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 325, at 1392-93.
327. Lessig, supra note 13, at 1837.
328. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 91-93.
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Court's recognition of an abortion right in Roe v. Wade-suggesting
disagreement solely with the Court's result. In either case, the
criticism often reduces to the same thing: Judges are not properly
doing law.329
Presidents Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln,
and Franklin Roosevelt, among others, have used such arguments to
criticize the Court. First, consider Jefferson's main criticism of
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison,33 which focused on
Marshall's violation of a standard practice of legal decision-making.
Recall that Marbury arose from a series of judicial appointments
made by President John Adams and the Federalist-controlled
Congress on the eve of Jefferson's inauguration.331 As the final acts of
the appointment process, the President would sign the judge's
commission, and the commission would be delivered to the appointee.
When Jefferson took over as President, however, some of the
commissions had yet to be delivered, and Jefferson ordered his
Secretary of State, James Madison, to withhold those commissions.
One of the undelivered commissions appointed William Marbury as a
Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. When Madison
refused to deliver his commission, Marbury sought a writ of
mandamus from the Supreme Court directing Madison to deliver the
commission. The suit set up a showdown between the Federalist-
controlled Supreme Court and the newly elected Republican-
Democratic President.
Marshall's opinion for the Court held, in the following order, that:
(1) Marbury had a right to his commission, (2) Madison had violated
that right by not delivering Marbury's commission, (3) United States
law supplied a remedy for Madison's violation of Marbury's rights,
and (4) the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the case
because the federal statute that conferred jurisdiction was
unconstitutional. In criticizing Marshall's opinion, Jefferson rightly
329. Such objections are routinely the stuff of confirmation hearings. Though
tinged with political motivation, when the nominee holds or has held a judicial office,
the hearings often focus on the nominee's work as a judge. Or, if the nominee has
extra-judicial legal writings, these writings are consulted as examples of the nominee's
ability to "do law." Again, this is not to deny that criticisms of a nominee's legal
writings could not be used as cover for other motives, but it at least suggests that the
overt battle must be fought in those terms. When there is nothing in the nominee's
legal reasoning to attack, the other-motivated politician is left with little or no
ammunition for attack and the hearing must become overtly political. At that point,
the politician will face the cost of being perceived as politicizing the nomination
process, which includes criticism from the legal community and the mainstream
media. Professor Bobbitt has an insightful discussion of the confirmation hearings
over the nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court. See
Bobbitt, Interpretation, supra note 13, at 83-108.
330. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
331. See 3 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 2-3 (1919) (describing
political background to Marbury v. Madison); Powell, supra note 266, at 9-11 (same);
1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 234-45 (1926) (same).
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noted that a court without jurisdiction does not have power to hear or
decide the merits of a case. For this reason, it is accepted legal
practice for a court to first decide whether it has jurisdiction over a
case and, if not, end its consideration of the case. Yet, Marshall did
just the opposite in Marbury; he first addressed the merits of
Marbury's claims and, only then, asked whether the Court had
jurisdiction. Thus, even though the Court did not have jurisdiction,
Marshall addressed the merits and, in doing so, accused Jefferson of
acting lawlessly in refusing to deliver Marbury's commission.
Marshall's backwards consideration of the issues in Marbury was
poor legal method, and Jefferson rightly criticized Marshall on this
basis.33 In a letter to Justice Johnson written in 1823, Jefferson wrote:
This practice of Judge Marshall, of traveling out of his case to
prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the court,
is very irregular and very censurable .... [Tihe question before
them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what
the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case, to wit: that they
should command the delivery.... [C]ould anything exceed [this]
perversion of law?
333
In a separate correspondence, Jefferson complained that, in Marbury,
"the judges in the outset disclaimed all cognisance of the case; altho'
they then went on to say what would have been their opinion, had
they had cognisance of it."3' According to Jefferson, in Marbury,
Marshall was not doing law, or was doing law incorrectly, because the
Court's opinion broke with accepted legal practice.335 President
Jackson, contrary to the Court's holding in McCulloch v. Marylandf 6
332- See Powell, supra note 266, at 12 (describing all discussion in Marbury, other
than the holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction, as "obiter dicta
preliminaries"); Wolfe, supra note 57, at 87 ("Jefferson was furious that Marshall
would criticize him on the merits for many pages before saying that the Court had no
jurisdiction."). For a collection of contemporaneous criticisms along this line, see
Johnny C. Burris, Some Preliminary Thoughts on a Contertual Historical Theor' for
the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, 12 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 585, 63041 (1987).
333. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in 3 The
Republic of Letters, supra note 101, at 1862, 1864-65. In the same letter, Jefferson
also criticizes Marshall's holding that Marbury was entitled to the commission.
Specifically, Jefferson argues that the commission is like a deed to real property:
neither is effective until delivered. See id. at 1865. Because Marbury's commission
had not been delivered, his right to the judicial office had not vested. See id. In this
passage, Jefferson is faulting Marshall's legal reasoning-AMarbu'y was a failed (or
poor) attempt at doing law because the Court did not apply the proper analogy
between a judicial commission and a deed.
334. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Greorge Hay (June 2, 1807), quoted in
Donald 0. Dewey, Marshall versus Jefferson: The Political Background of Marbury v.
Madison 143 (1970).
335. In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson further criticized Marshall's opinion as
follows: "His twistifications in the case of Marbury ... shew how dexterously he can
reconcile law to his personal biasses." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (May 25, 1810), in 3 The Republic of Letters, supra note 101, at 1631, 1632.
336. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1832).
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contended that Congress did not have power to incorporate a national
bank and, on this basis, vetoed a bill renewing the Bank of the United
States.337 Also, when Chief Justice Marshall struck down Georgia
laws that effectively outlawed the Cherokee Nation,338 and the state
ignored the Court's order, President Jackson is to have said, "Well,
John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. '339 In
both cases, Jackson claimed that Supreme Court opinions only bound
the other branches of government to the extent that those decisions
were persuasive interpretations of the Constitution.340
President Lincoln made no secret of his disagreement with the
Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Sandford 4 which struck down
the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional. Lincoln argued that he
owed obedience to the judgment in that specific case, but was free to
reject the court's reasoning and rationale in future cases.342 According
337. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 576 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
338. See Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation 516 (1996) ("In
the late 1820s, when gold was discovered on the Cherokee lands in Georgia, the state
enacted a series of laws that abolished the Indian nation, distributed its territory
(some nine million acres) to the several adjacent counties, and declared that after
June 1, 1830, all Cherokee laws and customs would be null and void."); Joseph C.
Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev.
500, 523 (1969).
339. See Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 77 (Daniel J.
Boornstin ed., 1960) ("[T]he Court had... been defied in two spectacular cases by
Georgia, and President Jackson's unwillingness to back the judges had underlined the
Court's ultimate dependency on external support."); Smith, supra note 338, at 518; 1
Warren, supra note 331, at 758-60. Jackson biographer, Robert Remini, however,
casts doubt in the quotation:
It was later reported by Horace Greeley that Jackson's response to the
Marshall decision was total defiance. "Well: John Marshall has made his
decision: now let him enforce it!" Greeley cited George N. Briggs, a
Representative from Massachusetts, as his source for the statement. The
quotation certainly sounds like Jackson and many historians have chosen to
believe that he said it. The fact is that Jackson did not say it because there
was no reason to do so. There was nothing for him to enforce. Why, then,
would he refuse an action that no one asked him to take? As he said, the
decision was stillborn. The court rendered an opinion which abandoned the
Indians to their inevitable fate.
2 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and The Course of American Freedom, 1822-
1832, at 276-77 (1981). Yet, Remini concludes that Jackson, for several reasons, did
not support the Court's decision. See id. at 277-79.
340. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
341. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
342. See Abraham Lincoln, The Lincoln-Douglas Debates 291 (Harold Holzer ed.,
1993) (debate of Oct. 13, 1858) ("[W]e.. .oppose [Scott] as a political rule that shall be
binding upon the man when he goes to the polls to vote, or upon the member of
Congress, or upon the President, to favor no measure that does not actually tally with
the principle of that decision."). Lincoln explained in his First Inaugural Address:
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions
are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions
must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that
suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all
[Vol. 681182
AMBITION'S PLA YGRO UND
to Lincoln, the Constitution's meaning was not "irrevocably fixed" by
the Supreme Court's decisions. 3  It was with this understanding of
each branches' role that he was able to sign a bill prohibiting slavery
in the territories ' and, ultimately, unilaterally free southern slaves
with the Emancipation Proclamation."5 Both actions were wholly
inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Scott.
The Supreme Court similarly struck down large portions of
President Roosevelt's first two New Deals.- 6 In the face of these
parallel cases by all other departments of the Government. And while it is
obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case,
still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the
chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other
cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the
same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are
made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people
will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically
resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 Messages and Papers
of the Presidents 5 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897); see also Wolfe, supra note 57, at
114-15 (discussing limits of the precedential value of Supreme Court decisions).
343. See Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, supra note 342, at 9-10.
344. See Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 111, 12 Stat. 432 ("An Act to secure Freedom to
all Persons within the Territories of the United States"). The Act provided:
That from and after the passage of this act there shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in any of the Territories of the United States now
existing, or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired by the
United States, othervise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Id.
345. Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863), reprinted in
6 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 157, 158 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897). In
that document, Lincoln "order[ed] and declare[d] that all persons held as slaves
within said designated States... are and henceforward shall be free .... " The
"designated States" are, with certain local exceptions, -Arkansas, Texas,
Louisiana... Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, and Virginia .... 9
346. Many commentators describe the New DeallLochner narrative as a struggle
between a President and the Supreme Court. While this captures much of the picture,
it misses the fact that the prior President, Herbert Hoover, had had a similar
constitutional vision to the Lodner era Court. On policy grounds, President Hoover
was in favor of government intervention in the national economy. See 2 Ackerman,
supra note 11, at 281-82; William J. Barber, From New Era to New Deal: Herbert
Hoover, the Economists, and American Economic Policy, 1921-1933, at 190-91 (1985).
Yet, he believed that certain types of intervention, while economically sound, were
beyond Congress' power to enact. Barber, supra, at 190-91. For example, Hoover
believed that wage and price stability was necessary for recovery from the Great
Depression. Yet, he also believed that Congress did not have the power to enact such
laws. See id& Instead, he either used the prestige of the presidency to exhort
employers and sellers to do so, or he approached the problem indirectly through laws
that he believed were within Congress' power. See id. at 191. Thus, it would be wrong
to portray the Court as an aberrant institution throughout the Lochner era. Rather,
given that the Court's membership changes rather slowly, the Court was left behind
by the rapidly changing politics spurred by the Great Depression.
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decisions, Roosevelt mounted a political campaign against the
Supreme Court, which included a plan to pack the Court with new
justices sympathetic to his regulatory aims. 47 After an intervening
election that backed the President and Congress, the Supreme Court
backed down, with a single, crucial justice changing his vote, though it
is still disputed whether Roosevelt's political attack influenced this
dramatic switch.48  At least one Supreme Court Justice has
acknowledged that the Court properly yielded to the strong public
opinion Roosevelt had marshaled behind his New Deal.49
Whatever one thinks of the constitutional methods espoused by
these various Presidents and politicians, each plays on a theme dating
back to the framers: federal judges are given Article III power under
the expectation that they will "do law," and the coordinate branches
of the federal government, and the People, stand ready to check thejudiciary if they believe federal judges are doing something other than
law or have improperly done law. As discussed above, what it means
to "do law" at any given time will be a descriptive matter, not a
normative one.3 1° This will be true for constitutional law as it is in
other areas of law. There is nothing in the Constitution or in the
theory of checks and balances that defines the legal method. As
Philip Bobbitt explained in his book Constitutional Fate, at any time
there will be certain methods of argument that lawyers' and judges'
practices will show are generally accepted as legal arguments. While
the consensus of what counts as a legal argument, or what are proper
uses of the different accepted methods, will change over time,31 the
consensus at any given time will constrain judges. Judges who deviate
from accepted practices open themselves to attack-constitutional
check-by other branches and the electorate.5 2 Of course, judges can
347. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 317-33 (discussing the political context of
and debate over Roosevelt's plan to pack the Court).
348. See id. at 328-35.
349. See Owen J. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution: The Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures 61 (1951) ("Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could
have resisted the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for
what in effect was a unified economy.").
350. I do not argue that the framers held the view that legal method is inherently
contingent. Rather, regardless of the view of law they held, the framers expected
judges to do law, and, in practice, what counts as law is contingent. The framers'
intentions or expectations cannot change this state of things.
351. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at 985 (stating that what constitutes a
valid legal argument "alters over time").
352. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text. In the parlance of strategic
behavior, the Court could be seen as cultivating a reputation for doing law among the
other branches and the People. Cf. Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking
Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life 145-49
(1991) (describing reputation as an element of credibility); Eric A. Posner, The
Strategic Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis,
146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1185, 1190 (1998) (discussing value of reputation in the context of
commercial bargaining). Such a reputation would have two main benefits. First, it
would help maintain the Court's legitimacy in the long run, ensuring that the Court
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try to change or develop new methods of argument. Only time will
tell, however, whether these innovations are accepted as part of the
courts' legal function, or are rejected as a departure from that role.
The preceding discussion of judicial and legal method has profound
consequences for constitutional theory: The methods of constitutional
interpretation will be the product of the system of checks and
balances, and do not need independent justification under the
Constitution or some political theory or theory of justice.", This does
not mean that constitutional theory is irrelevant to the constitutional
role of judges. Rather, under the checks and balances conception of
the judicial role, constitutional theory may be part of the judiciary's
political arsenal. As noted above, courts must anticipate the actions
of other branches and the electorate when reaching their decisions.3
To gain acceptance and support from these constituencies, judges
must act like lawyers.3 55
remains an active player in the system of checks and balances. Second, such a
reputation would make the other branches and the People more tolerant of specific
court decisions with which they disagree, in turn forestalling any checks against the
judiciary. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court
as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957); Devins & Fisher, supra note
27, at 97-98 ("Rather than definitively settling transcendent questions, courts must
take account of social movements and public opinion. When the judiciary strays
outside and opposes the policy of elected leaders, it does so at substantial risk. The
Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits within the permissible limits
of public opinion."); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975); Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity,
Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 985, 992 (1990); Tom R. Tyler &
Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal
Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 Duke LJ. 703,
715 (1994); see generally David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the
Supreme Court, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 790 (1973) (observing that the Supreme Court
considers generally accepted methods of legal reasoning in addition to contemporary
popular and political culture).
353. Indeed, as one commentator has asked rhetorically, "What theory could
possibly provide a persuasive and coherent rationale for the entire body of American
constitutional law as well as provide persuasive guidance for all future cases?"
Griffin, supra note 6, at 1766.
Also, as Professor Ackerman has argued, constitutional law should not be an
abstract quest for justice in specific cases. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 10-16.
Rather, constitutional law should be about deriving and defining the unique aspects of
our Constitution. If this system yields unjust outcomes or patterns of outcomes, then
that is an argument for changing the Constitution. But, it is not an argument for
judges, or any other decision maker, to ignore the established system in practice.
Unless, of course, the argument is that the People should resort to their reserved
power to alter or abolish the system. See supra notes 194-11 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 228-44 and accompanying text.
355. Michael Dorfs thumbnail description of Philip Bobbitt's constitutional views
gives a useful analogy: "From his perspective, the question [which is the legitimate
method of constitutional interpretation] makes as little sense as asking why the rules
of English require that plural nouns take plural verbs. Those are simply the rules of
the game; if you do not abide by them, you are playing a different game." Michael C.
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J. 1765, 1790-91 (1997).
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D. The Implication for Constitutional Theory and Method
Legal commentators play a role in this constitutional system of
checks and balances, 3 6 though not the role many have claimed. Legal
commentators should relinquish the search for the method of
constitutional interpretation-the "Grand Unified Theory" of
constitutional law. The Constitution simply does not contemplate
such a theory and, as some commentators are suggesting, the search is
futile.357
Professor Bruce Ackerman's recent work provides a helpful
example because he, under this Article's view, has it partly right. In
the first two installments of his three-volume work We the People,
Professor Ackerman offers both a descriptive and normative account
of constitutional change in America. In the descriptive account, with
great care, he chronicles how the interplay of checks and balances
among the three branches of government and the People has led to
changed understandings of different constitutional provisions .3  For
example, the social and political upheaval after the Great Depression
and throughout the New Deal led to a vast expansion of Congress'
Commerce Clause power, extensive delegations of law-making power
to federal administrative agencies, and dramatic withdrawal of judicial
review under the Due Process Clause.35 9 These changes occurred over
time as Congress, the President, and the courts clashed over specific
constitutional issues, and the People made their voice heard through
periodic elections.36 On this much Professor Ackerman and I would
agree-the Constitution's meaning was determined in the give-and-
take of the system of checks and balances.
Professor Ackerman's project, however, is more ambitious. In his
normative argument, he develops a constitutional theory that
distinguishes constitutional changes that are legitimate from those
that are not. Professor Ackerman wants to identify something
356. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 96; Linda Greenhouse, Telling the
Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J. 1537, 1558-
61 (1996); Lawrence C. Marshall, Intellectual Feasts and Intellectual Responsibility, 84
Nw. U. L. Rev. 832, 842-50 (1990).
357. Lessig, supra note 13, at 1838-41.
358. The first volume, subtitled Foundations, offers brief introductory sketches of
descriptive accounts of the founding, reconstruction and New Deal eras, while the
second volume, subtitled Transformations, offers a detailed account of each era, as
well as other instructive historical events. See generally 1 & 2 Ackerman, supra note
11. A recent symposium addressed various aspects of Professor Ackerman's
historical account. See Symposium, Moments of Change: Transformation in American
Constitutionalism, 108 Yale L.J. 1917 (1999). The third volume will turn to how well
the Supreme Court has assimilated the lessons of our prior constitutional practice into
its constitutional doctrines. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 251,349.
359. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 47-50; 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 279-
311.
360. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 47-50; 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 279-
311.
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essential in constitutional change-in the ebb and flow of the system
of checks and balances-that will legitimate that change. This meta-
theory would allow political and legal actors to decide which
outcomes of the checks and balances process are binding (and
therefore part of the Constitution) and which are mere temporary,
ordinary laws that do not have constitutional status. 6 For example,
in discussing the changes wrought by the New Deal, he frames his
central inquiry as follows: "Should the Roosevelt revolution be
viewed as a constitutive act of popular sovereignty that legitimately
changed the preceding Republican Constitution?" He believes he
has found such a legitimating factor in his theory of constitutional
moments, which legitimates constitutional change outside the Article
V amendment process when all branches of the federal government
and the People concur with, or acquiesce in, the change after a period
of heightened debate.'
361. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 261-65.
362. 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 280; see, e.g., id. at 28 ("If Americans of the
1990's wish to revise their Constitution, what are the legal alternatives they may
legitimately pursue?"); 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 6 (describing how gradual
popular assent enhances the constitutional legitimacy of governmental action); id. at 9
(defining the standard for determining whether political movements can "rightfully
claim" to have changed the Constitution); id. at 22 (urging search for conditions that
give lawmakers the "democratic authority to make fundamental changes in our higher
law"); id. at 44 (searching historical episodes to determine how law-makers "fmally
earned the constitutional authority to speak in the name of the People").
363. Professor Ackerman summarizes the project as follows:
Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional
conditions. Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name
of the People, a movement's political partisans must, first, convince an
extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to take their proposed
initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to politics;
second, they must allow their opponents a fair opportunity to organize their
own forces; third, they must convince a majority of their fellow Americans to
support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time and again, in the
deliberative fora provided for "higher lawmaking." It is only then that a
political movement earns the enhanced legitimacy the dualist Constitution
accords to decisions made by the People.
1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 6. Professor Ackerman breaks this extra-Article V
process, which he calls "higher law-making," into four phases: "signaling phase,"
"proposal," "mobilized popular deliberation," and "legal codification." See id. at 266-
67. He explains how these functions have been performed during past constitutional
movements, such as during the New Deal era. In doing so, he addresses questions
such as when a movement has coalesced enough support to propose its higher law-
making agenda to the People, and when the People have given such a proposal
sufficient focused and serious consideration, and assent, to constitute successful
higher law-making. See id. at 272-90. For our current purposes, however, we do not
need a detailed picture of Professor Ackerman's theory. Rather, the important point
is that his work seeks to identify conditions under which the Constitution sanctions
extra-Article V higher law-making.
As seen in the preceding paragraph, Professor Ackerman's normative project
focuses on moments of strong popular consensus that lead to a successful
constitutional revolution. In the descriptive part of his project, Professor Ackerman
argues that three episodes-the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal Eras-all
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I would not join Professor Ackerman and others like him on their
normative quest.3" Under the theory of checks and balances
articulated in this Article, the Constitution has not anointed one
theory or method as the way to interpret the Constitution. Rather,
the Constitution has established the players (the three branches of the
federal government and the People) and the ground rules (e.g.,
Article I, II, and III procedures) for an ongoing project of
government. Constitutional methods and interpretations will be the
necessary byproduct of this process. Congress, the President, and the
People will expect judges to do law, and, if they fail to do so, or do
something else (like politics), judges should expect a retaliatory check.
Constitutional readings will emerge from this process, and it is the
process itself, not some normative theory that anoints some readings
but not others, that gives these readings their legitimacy.
The difference between the checks and balances approach and
Professor Ackerman's work, then, is slight but significant. We both
agree that the play of checks and balances has led to constitutional
change over time," and that such change is part of the proper
saw such successful constitutional revolutions. In contrast, Political Science Professor
James A. Morone paints a picture of these three eras as brief bursts of popular
lawmaking that ultimately failed to make any lasting, coherent change in American
law. See James A. Morone, The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the
Limits of American Government 9-15 (1990). According to Prof. Marone, popular
pressure for social or legal reform builds until it provokes a popular response in law
making. Id. at 9-11. Government then turns to implementing the new reforms
through new institutions, at which time popular sentiment fades. Id. at 11-13. While
these new institutions periodically expand the limits of government power, the public
spirit that created the institutions cannot be maintained. Id. at 12-13. With the new
institutions no longer in control of the reform movement that created them, the
reforms are limited, compromised, and, in some cases, reversed during the play of
normal politics. Id. at 13-15. Thus, contrary to Professor Ackerman, Professor
Marone argues that American reform movements ultimately fail to remake American
government or society in accord with their reform programs.
364. Like Professor Bobbitt, this Article rejects the search for normativejustifications for methods of constitutional interpretation. Also, like Professor
Bobbitt, this Article acknowledges that normative arguments must somehow justify
the system of government that uses its force to impose on the liberty of individuals.
The system of checks and balances, grounded in Madison's view of human nature and
the best way to make law given that view, is part of the normative underpinnings.
365. Professor Ackerman, however, makes the important point that the legal
community sometimes constructs narratives that hide constitutional change. For
example, he describes a legal narrative about the Lochner era. According to
Professor Ackerman, many lawyers and judges explain the Lochner era as a period
when the Supreme Court departed from the proper understanding of federal power
established in several opinions by Chief Justice John Marshall. See 1 Ackerman, supra
note 11, at 42-43; 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 8-10; Robert L. Stern, The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645 (1946) (setting
forth a version of the Lochner era narrative). The Court's rejection of Lochner and
embrace of New-Deal type legislation, then, can be explained as merely a return to
the proper understanding of the Constitution. 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 42-43.
This narrative denies any possibility of changed constitutional meaning. Id.
On the role of social narratives in law, see Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at
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working of the Constitution. Professor Ackerman and I divide,
however, on what comes next. Professor Ackerman proposes that we
search for a theory in the Constitution that would identify which
changes are legitimate and which changes are not.
Under the checks and balances approach, no constitutional change
is normatively privileged. Constitutional change occurred during the
New Deal era because the play of checks and balances pushed in that
direction. If the Court decides to retreat from the New Deal's
expansive view of federal power, there are only two permissible
breaks on such action. First, if the President, Congress, and the
People are still strongly aligned in favor of the New Deal vision, the
Court will face a check from those actors if its decisions erode that
vision. If the will no longer exists, the Court may act without threat of
retaliation. To say that the "will no longer exists" does not mean that
the President, Congress, or the People have rejected the new Deal
vision. Rather, even if support or agreement still exists for that vision,
it is not strong enough to motivate a check on contrary Court action.
Second, even if no check is forthcoming, the Court may be criticized
for not doing law. If the Court decides to reject New Deal precedents,
it must explain its decision to do so in terms of legal arguments. For
example, the Court must explain why the stare decisis preference for
precedent has been overcome. Professor Ackerman could argue that
patterns of actions by other decision makers, such as Congress, the
President, and the People, should be given weight as a form of legal
precedent. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall made such an argument in
upholding Congress' power to create a national bank.-'  But, the
argument would be that legal argument generally, not just
constitutional argument, should pay closer attention to such
"precedents." The Constitution does not privilege any prior extra-
Article V constitutional changes from the process of checks and
balances.367
987-91; Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 5-9 (1984).
366. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,353-56 (1819) (explaining
that passage of a national bank bill by the first Congress, which included members of
the federal drafting and state ratifying conventions, was entitled to weight in deciding
the constitutionality of a national bank).
367. Even amendments enacted through Article V processes are subject to change
through the process of checks and balances. While the texts of such amendments
would not, under current practice, be changed by extra-Article V means, the
implementation of these amendments in decisions of the three branches might change
their meaning over time. An extreme example of such transformative effect is the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Soon after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected only those "privileges" and "immunities"
already protected from state infringement elsewhere in the Constitution. Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-79 (1872). Constitutional commentators
widely agree that this was a misreading of the Clause, which effectively repealed part
of the newly-enacted Fourteenth Amendment. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
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Some might object that this Article's checks and balances theory of
constitutional government would legitimate even potentially
oppressive government action. This criticism is mistaken for two
important reasons. First, checks and balances does not legitimatize
outcomes.316 Rather, it identifies the processes and constitutional
structures that will themselves constrain government's pursuit of
different outcomes.3 69  The system itself is the restraint, not some
substantive standard against which to judge outcomes.
The Constitution contains clauses, such as the Contract Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause, that contain substantive commitments.
The meaning and efficacy of these substantive commitments is
determined only through their application by government actors
checking one another; that is the transcendent genius of the system.
The substantive clauses of the Constitution provide potent rhetorical
ammunition 370 to the members of the three branches of government as
they check one another's power and attempt justify their actions to
the People.37' Ultimately, if all four quarters are unwilling to defend
the Constitution's substantive commitments, those clauses are as good
as lost.
This raises the second response to the potential for oppression: To
paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, we have a constitutional government
only if we can keep it.372 Examples from Nazi Germany to the current
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies (1997) § 6.3, at 377 ("The privileges or
immunities clause was rendered a nullity by the Slaughter-House Cases and it has
been ever since."). Given the anti-Reconstruction political tide of the time, however,
the other branches and the People did not respond to this constitutional misreading.
368. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 13, at 6-9, 119
(constitutional decisions are legitimate to the extent that they employ the accepted
methods of interpretation).
369. Professor Ackerman has noted a distinction between constitutional process
and substance. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 228.
370. Of course, the potency of the ammunition will depend on the weight various
decision makers give textual arguments in constitutional interpretation. For example,
the Court has practically ignored the text of the Eleventh Amendment in applying
that provision. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996);
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("Despite the
narrowness of its terms... we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure
which it confirms."). Also, the Court has effectively read the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment out of the Constitution. See supra
note 367. Thus, to say that text has been dispositive, or even strongly weighed, in all
constitutional interpretation would be incorrect.
371. Professor Van Alstyne has suggested that Congress may use the Constitution
in a similar way: The Constitution's "written limitations may be useful politically; they
may figure in congressional debates, furnishing argumentative force as well as a
personal conscientious restraint, against the enactment of repressive bills." Van
Alstyne, supra note 238, at 19; cf. 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 416 ("Taken by
themselves, rules are lifeless things-marks on paper that neither control nor restrain.
Once placed within a setting of principles, institutions, and precedents, they can play a
useful supporting role.").
372. See Fred Barbash, The Founding 207 (1987) ("'Well, Doctor, what have we
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Russian Republic illustrate that a written constitution does not
guarantee any set of substantive outcomes.' In our own history, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
illustrates the frailty of constitutional text. 4  Since soon after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has interpreted
that Clause as largely duplicative of rights guaranteed elsewhere in
the Constitution7.3 5 Standing alone, then, the "mere paper" of the
Constitution cannot control government. 6  Rather, it is only the
vigilance and virtue of the People,' in the end, that can save
got? A republic or a monarchy?' someone asked Franklin in the summer of 1787.
[He] responded, 'A republic, if you can keep it."').
373. See William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich 56 (1960) (the
constitution of the Weimar Republic, under which the National Socialist party came
to power, was one of the most liberal ever written in Europe). Professor Ackerman
writes of Germany's constitutional innovation of writing into the German
Constitution that certain rights are unamendable. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at
320. In suggesting such an innovation for the American Constitution, he urges: "Why
not make our new Bill of Rights unamendable? Couldn't a Hitler arise in America,
no less than Germany?" Id. I agree, but urge that no paper Constitution would stand
in that ruler's way. The story of the Third Reich is rife with examples of the German
government and People ignoring, through apathy, ignorance, or intimidation, gross
violations of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic. Madison made a similar point
in noting that some state governments had violated the separation of powers
guarantees of their own state's constitution. See The Federalist No. 48, at 281 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The conclusion which I am warranted in
drawing from these observations is that a mere demarcation on parchment of the
constitutional limits of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of
government in the same hands."). It is unclear why a prohibition against amendments
would provide any more of a safeguard against abuse than an amendment provision
that was so easily circumvented. See Posner, supra note 4, at 218-20 (responding to
Ackerman's argument, noting irony that Ackerman proposes unamendable provisions
in the course of defending a theory that allows constitutional change outside the
amendment process). Ultimately, it is the People's constitution, not the Constitution
itself, that determines whether government descends into despotism. Ackerman
notes similar points when he refers to the need for a vigilant or virtuous People to
sustain the American commitment to constitutional government. See 1 Ackerman,
supra note 11, at 198 (discussing how we must economize on the resort to the limited
quantity of virtue that the framers believed the People possessed); id. at 291 ("IThe
American Republic is no more eternal than the Roman-and it will come to an end
when American citizens betray their Constitution's fundamental ideals and
aspirations so thoroughly that existing institutions merely parody the public meanings
they formerly conveyed.").
374. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States").
375. See 2 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 375-76.
[A]II legal historians recognize that the Reconstruction Republicans-both
in and out of Congress-placed their highest hopes on the Fourteenth
Amendment's solemn guarantee that no state shall "abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." And yet the courts have never
seriously redeemed the promise of this text.
Id.
376. See Federalist No. 51 (James Madison).
377. See Bailyn, supra note 124, at 65-66.
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American constitutional government. The framers assumed that
those in power, being mortal, would inevitably seek to expand their
power and designed a system to check those attempts. Essential to
every aspect of checks and balances is accountability to various
constituencies. Thus, if someday the People abdicate that role, the
system is set adrift.378 Ultimately, no constitutional theory can save
the People if they do not want to be saved.379
Because the quest for grand constitutional theories is illusory,
constitutional scholarship should instead evaluate the work of the
judiciary as a product of legal craft, as that function is understood at
any given time. Legal scholars ought to evaluate the Court's
arguments on their own terms. If the Court says that a particular
doctrine or rule promotes efficiency, we ought to evaluate that claim's
logic as well as its empirical support s0 Also, we ought to evaluate the
Court's goals-is efficiency the proper goal in a given context-given
the constitutional lawyer's currently-accepted tools-text, history,
structure, precedent, policy, etc.8  If the Court claims that one
interpretive method or another-for example, text, structure, history,
intent-supports or requires a particular result, we ought to examine
the Court's use of method.3" As academicians, we have the time and
378. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 27 (arguing that the "remarkable political
capacity" of the American people is essential to efficacy of the Constitution).
379. See id. at 236-37 (discussing hypothetical case where "Democracy has died in
America" due to extreme voter apathy). Professor Ackerman illustrates this idea
with two important turning points in American history. Regarding the
Reconstruction and New Deal eras, he asks: "Had the nation emerged from Civil War
only to fight again about the terms of Reconstruction? Would the country respond to
the Great Depression by following Germany down the road to dictatorship?" Id. at
211. In each case, the answer hinged on each branch's response to the constitutional
crisis that lay before it. And, "[r]ather than plunging down the path of total
revolution, the response both times was revolutionary reform." Id.
380. See Posner, supra note 19, at 2-10.
381. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate, supra note 13, at 3-8.
382. Professor Bobbitt refers to this as the "correct use" of method. Bobbitt,
Interpretation, supra note 13, at 177; see also Bickel, supra note 22, at 98-110
(reviewing instances where legal commentators have critiqued the Court's use of
history in deciding cases); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar,
72 Tex. L. Rev. 1771, 1775 (1994) (discussing Professor Bobbit's close scrutiny of the
Court's constitutional interpretation). Recently, Professor Akhil Amar has written
that such a review of method in action is the best way to assess the strength his
suggested method of "intratextualism":
Those readers looking for a general concluding section in this Article will
not find one. Intratextualism is one among many interpretive tools, and like
all tools it must ultimately be judged instrumentally. Does the tool work?
Can the tool generate important, incisive, and illuminating readings of the
Constitution? With this tool, can we see more clearly deep truths about the
meaning of our Constitution? These questions are best answered by
example rather than by a priori reasoning. If my examples have failed to
persuade readers of the power and elegance of intratextualism, little more
can be said. If, however, my examples have persuaded readers that a small
and simple tool can in fact generate large and rich insights across a broad
range of questions, little more need be said.
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the incentive to critique the work of federal judges and assess their
use of method. This work can then be used by others (members of
Congress or the President, or the People), if they so choose, to
evaluate the work of the judiciary and, in turn, respond to that branch.
Of course, on another level, commentators can and should analyze
and critique the currently-prevailing legal practices. - The critique,
however, should not proceed from the assumption that the
Constitution ordains a single method, but rather should compare the
merits of each method against the expectations of legal reasoning. We
should dwell on what makes reasoning "legal," as opposed to
"political," and ask which method, or combination of methods, is most
faithful to those values. This is the approach Justice Scalia takes in
defending his version of textualism. He does not argue that
something in the Constitution, its history, or its structure requires
textualism. Rather, he argues that textualism is a method well suited
to the training and expertise of lawyers, which is the reason lawyers
are chosen as judges,8 and that no other method or theory of
constitutional interpretation fits that bill.' According to Scalia, all
other methods merely ask a judge to register her vote on society's
values, a task more akin to the legislator.-'
Regardless of whether one agrees with Justice Scalia's defense of
textualism, it at least asks the right questions. Other authors have
defended other approaches to constitutional interpretation as a better
legal method. For example, Professor Jed Rubenfeld has argued that
clauses of the Constitution have paradigm cases they were meant to
address, and that interpretation should proceed by analogies to these
paradigm cases.' Again, this is a skill-reasoning by analogy-
commonly associated with legal reasoning. Similarly, Professor Cass
Sunstein has analyzed how judges who might disagree on first
principles of constitutional law nevertheless can agree on outcomes in
specific cases as well as opinions explaining those outcomes" s  In
doing so, Professor Sunstein has helped us further understand how
law is done in practice by judges charged with making legal
decisions.3" 9  Professor Richard Fallon's Harvard Law Review
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L Rev. 747,827 n.305 (1999).
383. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 36, at 995-97 (discussing the question of
how what is considered canonical in the law changes over time).
384. See Scalia, supra note 222, at 46-47.
385. See Antonin Scalia, Originalisimn The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L Rev. 849, 862-
63 (1989).
386. See id.
387. See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale L.J. 1119,
1169-71 (1995).
388. See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 37; Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
389. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L Rev. 953, 986-90 (1995);
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741,752-54 (1993).
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Foreword has examined the judge's complex task of implementing
vague constitutional commands through judicially workable rules. 90
Most recently, Professor Akhil Amar has articulated and defended
the method of "intratextualism," whereby one interprets words in one
clause by examining how the Constitution uses the same language in
other portions of the Constitution. 91  In each instance, the
commentator's work has helped us better understand the practices
that constitute the legal community.3"
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not commend the reader to
Professor Ackerman's discussion of constitutional interpretation over
generations.393  As he rightly notes, anyone interpreting the
Constitution faces a variety of sources of meaning deriving from
different time periods. A key challenge for the interpreter is to
assimilate these various sources into a coherent whole. For example,
the founding era left us the Constitution's original text as well as a
mass of materials regarding its meaning (e.g., debates of the drafting
and ratifying conventions, the Federalist Papers). About one-
hundred-fifty years later, the New Deal era left us with some changed
readings of the Constitution, though no formal amendments, as well
as a historical record of those changes. For Ackerman, the
interpreter's essential challenge is to articulate the constitutional
principles created during each era, and then to explain how the
principles of the later era (here, the New Deal era) fit with, and
possibly change, the principles of the earlier era (here, the founding
era).394 Professor Akhil Amar, a colleague of Professor Ackerman's,
390. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 57-58.
391. Amar, supra note 382, at 748.
392. Professor Lessig has recently explained one goal of his work in this way: "The
reason is not to find what underlies a practice; rather the reason is to see whether
something might be missing from an account of a practice." Lessig, supra note 13, at
1841; see also Posner, supra note 4, at 431 ("We should be pragmatic about theory. It
is a tool, rather than a glimpse of ultimate truth, and the criterion of a tool is its
utility.").
Stanley Fish has argued that we should further divide the legal community in
identifying discrete practices. For example, the practices of legal commentators will
differ from the practices of judges which will differ from the practices of practicing
lawyers. See Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1773,
1779 (1987). Indeed, as Judge Harry Edwards has recently complained, much of
constitutional scholarship is irrelevant to judges and practicing lawyers. See Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 42-57 (1992). Hopefully, part of this disjunction
would be addressed by abandoning the quest for grand constitutional theory.
393. Professor Ackerman addresses this question mainly in Chapter 6 of We the
People: Foundations; see also 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 131-62. See also
Friedman & Smith, supra note 6, at 77-92 (advocating constitutional interpretation
that looks to all of American history, not simply focusing on the founding era).
394. See 1 Ackerman, supra note 11, at 160.
[W]e are left to piece together the different contributions of different
generations-none of them complete, all of them important. While
Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats shattered the
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has proposed a similar undertaking for properly incorporating the Bill
of Rights against the states. 95 Both projects aid in bettering our
practice of constitutional interpretation.
In sum, legal commentators should focus on two main tasks. First,
we should analyze constitutional questions and decisions using the
tools of the legal craft, as currently conceived. Second, we should
consider what methods do or should constitute the legal role-what is
it that makes lawyers different from other professionals and
Founding vision, no generation has mobilized its political energies to
reconcile these disparate achievements into a comprehensive whole, in the
manner of the Philadelphia Convention.... Only one thing is clear. The
Supreme Court cannot simply shut up shop until this happens. The flow of
concrete cases forces the Justices to confront and reconcile ... the disparate
historical achievements of the American people.
Id.
Professor Ackerman devotes an entire chapter to explaining how one can read the
Court's landmark cases Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
that racially segregated public school system violated Equal Protection Clause), and
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that Connecticut statute that
prohibited the sale of contraceptives violated constitutionally protected privacy
interest), as attempts at inter-generational constitutional synthesis. See I Ackerman,
supra note 11, at 131-62. Professor Ackerman will devote the third volume of We the
People to further exploring how the courts have done and should do such inter-
generational constitutional synthesis. See id. at 162.
395. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 215-30
(1998) (proposing a better method of incorporating the Bill of Rights); Amar, supra
note 198, at 1131-33; Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 101 Yale LJ. 1193, 1196-97 (1992) [hereinafter Amar, Rights and
Fourteenth Amendment]. Soon after adoption of the Bill of Rights, the Court held
that the first eight amendments did not apply against the states. See Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,247-48 (1833). During the century after ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the question arose whether some provision of the
Amendment, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process
Clause, made the first eight amendments applicable against the states. See U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. In answering this question, members of the Court debated two
main approaches: total incorporation or selective incorporation. See Chemerinsky,
supra note 381, § 6.6.3, at 378-84. Under total incorporation, the Court would apply
all eight amendments against the states; under selective incorporation, the Court
would decide which rights in the first eight amendments were sufficiently fundamental
to be incorporated against the states. Id. Under either approach, however, almost all
the amendments that the Court ultimately incorporated would apply in the same way
to both state and federal governments. See id. at 384-85 ("From practical perspective,
except for the requirements of a 12 person jury and a unanimous verdict, the Bill of
Rights provisions that have been incorporated apply to the states exactly as they
apply to the federal government.").
Professor Amar has suggested a third approach, which he calls refined
incorporation, that would decide on a case-by-case basis, first, whether an amendment
should be incorporated against the states, and if so, second, whether that amendment
should apply in a different way against the states. Refined incorporation requires an
interpreter to determine the principles underlying the original enactment of an
amendment, and then to determine how those principles fit with principles embodied
in the Reconstruction Amendments. Refined incorporation, then, is a form of inter-
generational synthesis. See Amar, Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 409,
at 1196-97.
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politicians and thus entitled to exercise judicial power. The judiciary,
then is in part a mirror of the profession.
E. Two Examples from the Case Law
The checks and balances view means that federal judges will tend,
in varying degrees, toward pragmatic decision-making. In any given
case, they will need to anticipate the responses of numerous groups.
Specifically relevant to the present discussion, the courts must
consider possible responses by the coordinate branches of the federal
government and the People. The Court's recent decision in United
States v. Lopez39 6 is one example of the checks and balances in
action.397 Congress boldly passed the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, criminalizing the possession of guns near a school, to curry favor
with the electorate. The courts checked Congress's ambitions by
striking down the statute, warning that there are limits on Congress's
power. Ambition checked ambition.
Lopez also shows the justices' awareness that the judiciary can be
checked just as easily as it can check the other branches. In
concurring, Justice Clarence Thomas offered an originalist reading of
the Commerce Clause.398 According to Justice Thomas, an historically
faithful reading of the clause would distinguish between the
transportation and exchange of goods, which is within the historical
meaning of "commerce," and activities such as manufacturing,
agriculture, and mining, which are not within the historical meaning of
that term.399 Justice Thomas is clearly convinced that the framers
intended such a distinction when they used the word "commerce," and
that the United States has strayed substantially from that original
meaning during this century. Yet, despite his certitude, Justice
Thomas hedges at the end of his opinion. Specifically, he writes:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding,
I recognize that many believe that it is too late in the day to
undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past sixty years.
Consideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may convince us
that we cannot wipe the slate clean.400
The Court could not easily return to Justice Thomas's original
meaning without upsetting much of the United States Code. To do so
would be to upset layers of interlocking regulatory schemes, federal
and state, and leave large chunks of society unregulated. State law
and private conduct has built up in reliance on the new vision of
396. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
397. See supra notes 173-88 and accompanying text.
398. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas is the current Court's most aggressive proponent of
originalism.
399. See id. at 585-93 (Thomas, J., concurring).
400. See id. at 601 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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federal power, and uprooting that extensive system would cause great
damage to settled expectations. One of the law's great contributions,
providing certainty in human affairs, would be undermined by a
return to earlier Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If the Court did so,
it could risk a check or rebuke from other branches or from the
People, both of whom would be harmed. Justice Thomas, as well as
other Justices in Lopez, recognized these realities and tempered their
rhetoric accordingly.
The Court explicitly relied on similar considerations in upholding
Roe v. Wade. 1 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a three justice
joint opinion considered whether it should overrule Roe. While
indicating that they had doubts about Roe's validity as an original
matter, the joint opinion ultimately credited several arguments for
following the core of that precedent.4 3 Among those reasons, the
joint opinion reflected on the Court's place in the system of checks
and balances in which judges are entrusted with the judicial function
because they are expected to act like lawyers. According to the joint
opinion, frequent overruling of precedent, especially under political
pressure, creates the perception that judges are merely political actors,
bending and swaying in the political winds, rather than skilled
professionals exercising their craft.' If the People or other branches
believe the Court is abusing its power in this way, they may act to
check the Court's exercise of power. 5
The joint opinion's defense of Roe rings hollow to those who
believe Roe itself was a lawless decision.' If Roe itself was not the
product of legal reasoning, then refusing to admit the Court's original
mistake merely compounds the problem.' Also, overruling itself is
not an admission that a prior court was acting lawlessly. Rather,
reasonable disagreement is expected on difficult legal issues.' and a
401. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
402. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
403. In finding a due process right to terminate a pregnancy, Roe established a
constitutional test that allowed different levels of government regulation during
different trimesters of pregnancy. While Casey upheld the existence of an abortion
right, that case reformulated the test into a single rule: Pre-viability abortion
regulations may not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to terminate a
pregnancy. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. One commentator has argued that Casey
moved the Court's abortion test from the contested trimester approach in Roe to a
standard that more closely mirrored public opinion. See Neal Devins, Shaping
Constitutional Values: Elected Government, the Supreme Court, and the Abortion
Debate 73-74 (1996).
404. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 965-66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
405. See id (noting that Court's "legitimacy" is linked to "people's acceptance" of
the justices' decisions).
406. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf- A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 Yale LJ. 920, 943 (1973) (arguing that Roe "lacks even colorable support in the
constitutional text").
407. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 999 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
408. See Fallon, supra note 92, at 57-58.
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new consensus on the Court may lead to adoption of a different
holding.4"9
Lopez and Casey merely illustrate how justices sometimes explain
their decisions in terms of potential checks from other branches and
the People.4"' These justices are acting as the Constitution intended-
as actors within a complex system of checks and balances, ever-
conscious of the need to stave off attacks from the coordinate
branches and the People.
CONCLUSION
This Article has defended two basic propositions. First, robust
judicial review is an essential part of the American system of checks
and balances. Robust judicial review means that federal judges owe
no necessary deference to the constitutional judgments of the other
branches of government. Judicial deference is not a constitutional
requirement, but may be a political expediency as judges navigate the
system of checks and balances. Judges must anticipate the reactions
of other branches to court decisions and factor such reactions into
their decisions.
Second, constitutional theory should end the quixotic quest for the
method of interpreting the Constitution. Simply put, the checks and
balances approach shows that the Constitution does not prefer any
specific method or theory of interpretation. Rather, the Constitution
anticipates that judges will act as lawyers, however that role is defined
from time to time. When judges no longer appear to be doing law, the
other branches should check the judiciary. In this system,
commentators should critique judges' opinions as attempts at doing
law. Additionally, legal commentators should discuss and critique the
various ways of doing law, giving due consideration to the ends of law.
It is this dialogue, and not some holy-grail-like quest for a Grand
Unifying Theory of constitutional law, that judges, legislators,
administrators, scholars, and lawyers should undertake.
409. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), can be read to take this
approach to overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decision Making and Theory, 60
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 68, 103 (1991).
410. Many other examples exist. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 27, at 92-94.
Professors Devins and Fisher describe Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962)
(Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation in state legislatures),
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549-50 (1969) (Congress may not refuse to seat a
representative who meets all qualifications set forth in the Constitution), United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974) (holding that executive privilege did not shield
President Richard Nixon's tape recorded conversations from subpoena in a criminal
investigation), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1997) (Congress did
not have power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act), as cases where the Court also responded to overt political
pressure. In each case, the Court faced a "threat of resistance to its" decision. Devins
& Fisher. supra note 27, at 93.
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